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Abstract 
 
When Turkey became a candidate of the EU in 1999 it had been a problematic applicant for 
forty years due to residual unpopularity with several member states for cultural, economic, 
security and normative reasons. However, the Helsinki European Council heralded a change 
of fortunes for Ankara and by 2005 accession negotiations had opened. This happened in 
spite of Turkey remaining an unpopular candidate with some member states. Moreover, 
since 2005, Turkey’s standing within the EU has returned to a position akin to its pre-1999 
stasis. This thesis thus asks: why did Turkey make such progress between 1999 and 2004/5? 
What was the specific configuration of structures, processes and actions that enabled that to 
happen then but not before or after? 
The thesis approaches this puzzle using a “stretched” eclectic version of Historical 
Institutionalism which can incorporate the effects of both structure and agency. In this way it 
can include the influence of wider structural factors, such as CEEC enlargement, Cyprus and 
ESDP as well as the agency of Turkey’s advocates within the EU. It is a detailed qualitative 
process-tracing study which uses semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence to 
make a case for a given explanation. It concludes that a path dependent process, influenced 
by both structure and agency, can be traced from the Helsinki European Council to that in 
Brussels five years later which “rhetorically entrapped” the member states into agreeing to 
open accession negotiations in spite of Turkey’s underlying unpopularity.  
By adopting this framework for analysis, the thesis makes a contribution to the literature on 
the Turkey-EU accession process by viewing the time period as a whole and taking a 
temporal rather than a snapshot approach. In so doing it is possible to explain why and how 
Turkey was able to make such progress between 1999 and 2004. It is also valuable in the 
study of present Turkey-EU relations as the ultimate conclusion has to be that there was a 
unique window of opportunity for both Turkey and the EU during this time and the window 
may now have closed.  
  
 
Key words: Turkey, EU, EU enlargement, ESDP, Cyprus, NATO, Historical Institutionalism, 
structure and agency. 
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Introduction 
1. The puzzle 
Turkey was one of the first ever applicants to join the then EEC. Its 1959 application – 
submitted shortly after that of Greece – pre-dates even that of the United Kingdom. An 
Association Agreement was signed in 1963 which implicitly acknowledged that Turkey had 
the right to be considered as a potential member. However, by 1997 Turkey was still not 
considered to be a feasible candidate1. The Luxembourg European Council Presidency 
conclusions, of December 1997, made clear that Turkey’s continuing poor record of human 
rights and democracy was a hindrance to progress into the EU. In the meantime Ankara 
found itself lagging behind previously comparable states such as the southern 
Mediterranean countries2 and the first wave of the central and eastern European countries3 
(CEECs) including the Republic of Cyprus.  
This situation changed just two years later, in 1999, when the EU agreed to make Turkey a 
candidate and accession negotiations were then opened in 20054. The rate of progress 
between 1999 and 2005 was rapid considering the lack of headway in the preceding forty 
years and the apparent diplomatic impasse of the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. 
However, since 2005 the Turkish case has ground to a halt once more. Only one accession 
chapter has been closed with the remainder stalled over the issue of Cyprus. From 1959 
until now (March 2012) the only period of real progress in Turkey’s European aspiration has 
been the time between 1999 and 2004. Even during that time it was not a popular candidate 
for both cultural and normative reasons. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask what characterises 
this period such that progress was possible. 
                                               
1 Notwithstanding that it had achieved Customs Union in 1995. 
2 Spain, Portugal and Greece 
3 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Slovenia. 
4 The Brussels EU Council in December 2004 agreed that accession negotiations with Turkey would 
open in October 2005.  
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There is a gap in the literature looking at this question because it has been approached 
piecemeal. Several writers (Onis 2000, Robins 2003a, Font 2005, McLaren and Muftuler-Bac 
2003) have addressed the issue of why the EU changed policy in 1999 while others have 
looked at the reasons for the decision at Brussels in 2004 to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey (Schimmelfennig 2009, Font 2006, Nugent 2007).  Associated areas such as 
ESDP and the Cyprus issue have also been extensively covered (For example on ESDP see 
Donfried and Gallis 2000, Bilgin 2001, Grant 2001, Missiroli 2002, Jacoby 2006, Webber 
2007 and Yost 2007; on Cyprus see Nugent 2000, Palley 2005 and Ker-Lindsay 2005a) 
However, the originality of this thesis lies in the empirical insights it can offer by taking the 
time period as a whole and attempting to deal with the complexity within it. The theoretical 
centre of gravity is based around Historical Institutionalism and as such it will look to identify 
path dependent processes such as self-reinforcement and lock-in as well as the critical 
juncture from which they stem. At the same time it will also take into account the wider 
context in which the actors were operating and consider the interaction such processes may 
have had with structure and agency. In turn, it will assess the effect this may have had on 
the decisions being taken by the EU. Taking such a flexible theoretical approach however 
does dictate that the methodology employed is able to provide considerable detail in order to 
maintain a coherent and valid case. This has been done through process tracing to which I 
will return below.  
2. The approach 
The study, it is hoped, will add to the wider understanding of the Turkish EU accession 
process whose continuing failure must surely present a problem for the EU’s foreign and 
neighbourhood policy in 2012. The EU and Turkey have repeatedly failed to understand 
each other’s motivation which has resulted in the wholesale lack of progress when the period 
to date, since 1959, is considered. 
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That Turkey was ever included in the western sphere was a result of the aftermath of the 
Second World War and the Cold War which ensued. Turkey’s stance during World War Two 
made it geostrategically vulnerable to both allied and Soviet post-war geo-political 
manoeuvring leaving Ankara with the need to re-secure its position (Kuniholm 1980). It 
looked firstly to the UK, and then the USA, for financial and political backing against Stalin. 
However, Ankara’s motives were mistrusted in both London and Washington. It was not until 
the 1950s, after it had committed troops to the Korean campaign, that it gained credibility 
and its wish to join NATO was considered seriously (Deringil 1992). Once Turkey joined 
NATO however it became embedded in the “west”, as delineated by the Cold War, and for 
this reason its application to join the EEC in 1959 was given more consideration than it 
would otherwise have been. In other words, Turkey was only ever deemed to be a potential 
candidate for the EEC because of the security environment of the early 1960s. 
However, by the early 1990s, the Turkish government had begun to fear losing its place in 
western European security architecture. In Turkish public discourse the terms “west” and 
“Europe” were used interchangeably. Therefore any loss of influence within the western 
security sphere was seen by the Turkish Kemalist establishment as a loss of status in 
“Europe” as well. This served to heighten anxiety in a country dominated both by the military, 
and its security concerns, but also by a continuing reverence for the Kemalist European 
aspiration.  
Firstly, Turkey feared the relegation of NATO in the security hierarchy of the post-Cold War 
world. Secondly it saw the EU’s stance at Luxembourg as a critique of its western 
credentials and an ungrateful rebuff to Turkey as a loyal Cold War ally. The government in 
Ankara did not appear to appreciate that the EU did not view itself as a Cold War ally. This 
insecurity deepened as the 1990s progressed and ESDP began to emerge. The Turkish 
government was correctly concerned that its preferential status within the Western European 
Union would not be transferred over to ESDP.  
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Another factor in Turkish anxiety at this time must also be the involvement of Greece and the 
Republic of Cyprus. Athens acted as a powerful advocate for Cyprus which became a 
candidate in its own right in 1997. Thus they were able to operate from within the EU fold 
(especially after 1997) whilst Turkey remained firmly on the outside. This contributed to 
much paranoia on the Turkish side – often with cogent reason – which adversely affected 
the course of Turkey-EU relations throughout the 1990s and into the next decade.  
However, as noted already, between 1999 and 2004, Turkey’s EU aspiration took a great 
leap forward with the offer of candidacy in 1999 which occurred apparently against the odds. 
Then, in spite of on-going difficulties over the Cyprus issue and ESDP, the Turkey-EU 
relationship made unprecedented progress. In short, 1999-2004 is the only time from the 
initial application in 1959 until now (2012), that any real progress has been made with the 
Turkish European aspiration. Furthermore this happened even though many of the issues 
which had previously dogged the Turkish case e.g.: the Cyprus issue continued to affect it 
negatively. It is the aim of this thesis then to shed light both on why progress was possible 
during that time and how that happened.  
Structure, process and agency are in evidence throughout the time span 1999-2004 with 
each influential to varying degrees at different times. Specifically this thesis argues that a 
combination of structure and process between 1999 and 2002 created an opportunity for 
meaningful agency on Turkey’s behalf between 2002 and 2004 by some member states. In 
this way it uses the insights provided by a broad definition of Historical Institutionalism 
(Steinmo 2008) to presume that path dependent processes can be both ideational and 
material. It also presumes that norms can be used strategically within a normative 
environment (Schimmelfennig 2003) and that rhetorical entrapment can be both passive 
(Schimmelfennig 2009) and, according to the evidence presented here, active.  
The aim of this thesis then is to try to establish why progress was possible between 1999 
and 2004 – when it had not been before and has not been since. It will take a qualitative 
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approach to evidence gathering and is not proposing to deductively test a hypothesis but 
instead to work inductively towards providing an explanation of the research puzzle based 
on the balance of probabilities. It is therefore not the aim to present an account which claims 
“truth” in any form but instead one which can be deemed likely to be true based on the 
quality of the evidence provided for it. 
3. The method 
A theoretical approach such as the Historical Institutionalism to be applied here requires a 
detailed methodology such as process tracing. This thesis will argue ultimately that the 
outcome of 2004 can be explained and understood through the examination of causal 
mechanisms over the whole time period which takes the wider context into account. It is an 
n=1 within-case study designed to explain a given research puzzle. Process tracing (George 
and Bennett 2005) is premised on identifying such causal mechanisms through detailed 
qualitative analysis of documents, media sources and interview material. In this case, the 
high level of detail is necessary in order to “make a case”, on the balance of probabilities, for 
a causal process linking 1999 to 2004. The theoretical approach can then maintain a claim 
to be rigorous political “science” rather than being a historical narrative (Wight 2006). This 
process tracing method is suited to the theoretical approach of Historical Institutionalism 
(Checkel 2005) and requires detailed examination of primary sources.  By piecing together a 
sequence of events through primary sources, process tracing is thus able to “…empirically 
establish the posited intervening variables and implications that should be true in a case if a 
particular explanation of that case is true.” (George and Bennett 2005: 147).  
The sources in question here are a combination of official EU documentation, media reports 
from the relevant time and semi-structured off-the-record interviews with those involved. The 
EU documents are the EU Commission progress reports and European Council Presidency 
conclusions. For the media reports, priority has been given to news agency copy because it 
is the raw material from which authored reports are written and usually contains more direct 
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quotes than mediated reports. However I have also used reports written by named 
journalists as well as from The Economist, BBC Monitoring and from international sources 
such as the Washington Post, New York Times, the International Herald Tribune, Le Monde, 
and the Turkish Daily News. Considerable effort has been made to triangulate these sources. 
In other words where quotes have been salient to the causal process I have sought to find 
them from more than one source.  
In terms of semi-structured interviews I conducted 36 different interviews5 between February 
2009 and October 2010. Two of these 36 interviewees were seen twice, two were conducted 
by email and four by phone. The remainder were seen face to face primarily either in 
Brussels or London for an average of 60-90 minutes. Where it was not possible to talk to the 
primary actor (eg: Robin Cook) I have spoken to associates or advisors who were also 
involved in the decision making process. In this way it has been possible to witness the 
same process from different viewpoints and to increase the level of both complexity and 
accuracy. 
Interviewees were extremely helpful with the vast majority of those approached willing to be 
interviewed. All were conducted on a non-attributable basis, on Chatham House rules, which 
yielded results as most were extremely candid. I did not sound-record the interviews 
preferring instead to take less obtrusive shorthand notes which were transcribed immediately 
afterwards. Interviewees were more likely to speak freely when not being recorded 
especially as the majority of the interviewees are still working within the Brussels-based 
institutions and member state governments. Moreover the issue of Turkish accession has 
the potential to be politically sensitive. 
The semi-structured nature of the interview meant I was able to be flexible in my approach to 
questioning. However, all the interviews followed the same basic format of trying to establish 
policy towards the Turkish case at given times. Whilst allowing for the possibility of variable 
                                               
5Full list of interviewees in Bibliography (NB: Confidential as anonymity agreed. Also there are more 
than 36 in the list because some are listed twice under different job titles in order to maintain 
confidentiality). 
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accounts, the use of interview evidence has been aimed at trying to uncover insights into the 
decision-making process and the motives of the players behind it. By interviewing different 
players about the same topic from different countries, institutions and EU departments I have 
sought to minimise the potential for error and misperception and the over reliance on any 
one source. 
4. The structure 
The structure of the thesis follows the three major European Councils of the time frame - 
Helsinki in 1999, Copenhagen in 2002 and Brussels in 2004. These were chosen because 
they were the occasions on which the major decisions vis a vis Turkey and the EU were 
taken between 1999 and 2004. Helsinki offered candidacy to Turkey; Copenhagen finalised 
arrangements for both ESDP and CEEC enlargement and Brussels in December 2004 
agreed that accession talks with Ankara should be opened.  The first chapter however is a 
literature review which establishes what has been written about the issues surrounding the 
specific research puzzle and its component parts. It looks at the literature surrounding the 
three major European Councils but also those in between.  In addition this chapter looks at 
the existing literature on enlargement and integration as well as ESDP and the Cyprus issue 
which were both influential on the decisions taken at Helsinki, Copenhagen and Brussels.  
The second chapter places Historical Institutionalism within its New Institutionalist theoretical 
origins before offering a contemporary definition (Steinmo 2008) which has incorporated the 
reflectivist turn seen more widely in international relations literature. This reflectivist element 
can be taken as an option (not a necessity) to broaden the explanatory potential of HI and 
makes it appropriate to any complex real world research. It brings in the option of including 
agency as well as structure in any explanation of temporal process. The decision to take 
such an approach is driven by the desire to reflect the complexity of the real world situation 
and to provide the detailed evidence necessary to maintain validity. Steinmo defines 
Historical Institutionalism as an “approach” rather than a theory and suggests it is the logical 
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choice of any researcher seeking to reflect complexity. Furthermore perhaps such 
complexity is not seen if this approach is not taken. 
“If you think history and ideas matter, institutions structure actors’ 
choices but are subject to change by actors themselves and real 
people make decisions that are not always efficient or precisely self-
interested then you are probably a Historical Institutionalist.” (Steinmo 
2008: 136) 
Chapter Two also justifies this eclectic real world approach and argues that it can be 
commensurable if a critical realist epistemology is applied.  
Chapter Three is the first of the three empirical chapters based on the major European 
Councils. It explores the processes at work in 1999 and tries to account for the reversal of 
Turkey’s fortunes during that year.  Chapter Four looks at the time between the Helsinki 
European Council and that at Copenhagen in 2002. It explores why the interacting 
processes of the Cyprus peace process and ESDP-NATO relations proved so hard to 
resolve before December 2002 in spite of considerable efforts to do so behind the scenes. It 
then explores the consequences, at the Copenhagen European Council, of this failure to 
resolve these issues which meant the EU member states had to find resolutions to each in 
the pressured environment at the Copenhagen European Council. The fifth chapter is the 
third and final empirical chapter which then looks at the time between Copenhagen and the 
Brussels European Council of December 2004. It will examine how factors such as the on-
going efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue and the new “war on terror”, following the 
events of September 11th 2001, impacted on the Turkish EU accession process.  
The conclusion summarises the findings of the thesis and critically evaluates the 
effectiveness of the Historical Institutionalist approach. It will offer detailed insights into the 
exact interplay of structure, process and agency as hypothesised by the theoretical 
approach and offer an explanation of why the EU agreed to open accession negotiations 
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with Turkey in 2005 in spite of widespread misgivings in both elite and public opinion. In so 
doing it will explain what it was during the time 1999-2004 which meant that Turkey’s EU 
accession could progress to such an unprecedented extent.   
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Chapter One: EU-Turkey relations 
1997-2004 
 
When, in December 2004, the EU member states agreed to open accession negotiations 
with Turkey it was one of the “…most controversial external relations decisions” the 
European Union had ever taken (Schimmelfennig 2009: 413). The EU had seemed to 
“advance” Turkey’s case “…even though the application has been viewed widely…as highly 
problematical.” (Nugent 2007:481). Turkey was not a popular applicant prior to candidacy in 
1999 and since 2004 its accession process has ground to a halt. Moreover the reason it was 
unpopular before and unsuccessful after was largely due to the issue of Greece and Cyprus 
which has been an on-going irritant to Ankara’s EU aspiration since its initial application was 
submitted in 1959. So why did the member states agree to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey when there was a sustained and multifarious opposition to doing so amongst both 
public and elite opinion in several member states? 
The decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey was taken by the Brussels 
European Council in December 2004. However the process which led to this apparently 
perplexing decision began several years earlier. In 1997 Turkey was not considered to be a 
feasible “candidate” and yet, by 2004, accession negotiations had been opened. For this 
reason, the narrow question posed above about 2004-5 needs to be supplemented with 
another asking how this came to pass.  
Turkey’s original application to what was then the EEC was made in 1959 and an 
Association Agreement was signed in 1963. Turkey formally applied for full membership in 
1987 but was turned down two years later for a variety of reasons. These were economic 
and demographic as well as political (Kuniholm 2001: 25). Opposition to the Turkish case 
within the EU continued to be based around both normative concerns of human rights and 
democracy and “cultural” (i.e.: religious) considerations. Effective anti-Turkish campaigns, 
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run by Kurdish and Armenian groups, had become embedded in the normative discourse of 
the Brussels, and wider European, progressive class making the Turkish case rather 
unfashionable. This was not helped by the fact that the Turkish record on human rights and 
democracy was lacking in EU terms and it did not meet the Copenhagen criteria set out in 
1993 for the accession of new members6. An underlying current of opposition on the 
grounds of “culture” or “identity” was also persistent and was exacerbated by continuing 
economic and demographic factors7. These four factors, normative, economic, cultural and 
demographic combined to make the Turkish case unpopular with public – and some elite - 
opinion across the EU.  
Additionally the case against Turkish accession could be made on geopolitical grounds. 
Turkey’s position bordering the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus gave reasons for 
opponents to argue that including Turkey in the EU fold would bring the world’s trouble spots 
closer to Brussels. In this way the Turkish case gave many grounds for opposition to it and 
these were in evidence as late as 1997. Turkey was considered eligible by virtue of the 1963 
Association Agreement but it was too poor, too large, too Muslim and not democratic enough 
to become a candidate. To make matters worse it was not located in “Europe” and was at 
the junction of a number of volatile political fault lines.  
However there were also a significant number of member states who saw the geostrategic 
and cultural arguments as a positive. There was a widespread appreciation of Turkey’s 
geostrategic value and also of its symbolic value as a Muslim beacon within the western 
                                               
6Copenhagen EU Council Presidency Conclusions June 1993. 7:iii states that: 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union.” 
7 As Schimmelfennig highlights (2009: 413), Turkey’s GDP per capita in 2005 was less than a third of 
the EU average thereby creating the potential for mass migration of its relatively large, poor and 
Muslim, population. 
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security community8. Accession would encourage normative reform within Turkey and 
moreover, its geopolitical location and symbolic value presented a chance to pour oil on 
troubled waters, both of which were in the EU’s wider long term interest.  
Even for those actors and states which were convinced of the case for Turkey, making the 
pro-Turkish case was problematic for the reasons outlined and it was dogged by the Cyprus 
issue making support for the Turkish case a politically risky strategy for member state 
leaders. In addition the Turkish diplomatic style was often at odds with that of the EU 
member states. This can be seen in the reaction to the Luxembourg decision in 1997 – when 
Turkey was not deemed worthy of candidacy - and also in the Turkish reaction to the 
development of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) between 1999 and 2002. 
Finally, as noted above, Turkey did not meet the Copenhagen criteria tests which had been 
set out in 1993 in relation primarily to Central and East European countries. By 2004, whilst 
pressure from some of these factors had eased others remained extremely problematic and 
the Turkish case was far from universally popular. 
This brings us back to the key puzzle: how to explain why the EU’s Turkey policy changed 
between 1997 and 2004. Two contrasting approaches will be identified in the literature. The 
first emphasises the big picture and the structural changes that enabled the policy to change, 
whilst the second focuses far more on the details of the process by which the changes took 
place. This thesis as a whole will look at the interaction between these approaches and how 
each may have influenced the other in order to arrive at the end point whereby the EU 
member states agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey, a country about which 
many had deep misgivings. This interaction involved a complex web of structure, process 
and agency. It will be argued that all three were present throughout the time period in 
question but that the balance of influence between them was fluid and variable. However the 
interaction created the conditions under which the Turkish case could make progress 
                                               
8 For these states Turkey’s religion was a chance to prove the Samuel Huntington (1993) “clash of 
civilizations” discourse wrong. 
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between 1999 and 2004 in a way not seen either before or since and in spite of a number of 
intractable issues. In this chapter, the context of this overall argument will be set out by 
looking both at the structural and at the process-centred approaches that have been 
advanced in the existing literature. In Chapter Two, the conceptual and empirical basis for 
the approach adopted by the thesis will be explored in greater detail and a framework for 
empirical study will be advanced. 
The literature on the period 1999-2004 in EU-Turkey relations is fragmented and there is 
very little looking at the time frame as a whole (Font 2005 and 2006; Nugent 2007; 
Schimmelfennig 2009). Instead it is concentrated either thematically, on Cyprus and ESDP, 
or chronologically on either the events between Luxembourg and Helsinki or the Brussels 
2004 summit. Literature about the run up to the 1999 Helsinki European Council summit 
seeks to outline why the EU changed its mind between Luxembourg and Helsinki. Primarily 
this has been explained either with recourse to structural changes in the EU and its security 
environment or by domestic changes within the member states which made them more 
inclined to view the Turkish case sympathetically. Literature about the 2004 Brussels 
European Council clusters around ideational theories of “rhetorical entrapment” by which the 
member states felt obliged to honour previous commitments to Turkey in spite of continuing 
misgivings. This chapter will examine the existing literature along these thematic and 
chronological lines. It will look at why enlargement has been problematic for the EU since the 
end of the Cold War and why Turkey is a problematic case for EU enlargement. It will also 
explore key and apparently intractable problems in the Turkish case such as the Cyprus 
dispute and wider defence and security issues. The focus here, as in the thesis as a whole, 
is on diplomacy, high politics and security issues. Economic issues will not be examined in 
detail except where they are important to the diplomatic process, for example in such cases 
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as the Matutes package9 and the Customs Union10. The later parts of the chapter will return 
explicitly to the contrast between structural and process-centred approaches noted above. 
1.  Europe and Turkey 
There are two major research puzzles posed by scholars of contemporary EU-Turkey 
relations both of which bear closely on the subject matter of this thesis. The first is why the 
EU changed its policy on the Turkish case between 1997 and 1999 (Onis 2000, Muftuler-Bac 
2000, Park 2000a, Robins 2003). The second is why Turkey was accepted into accession 
negotiations in 2004 (Nugent 2007, Schimmelfennig 2009, Kirisci 2004, Camyar 2009; Font 
2006). As already noted, the two puzzles essentially focus on the same underlying question: 
Why would the EU member states do something which was unpopular both with elite and 
public opinion across the Union? The question is very similar to that posed by scholars of 
CEEC enlargement who asked how eastern enlargement came to happen so quickly 
(Sedelmeier 2005: 3) and on such a large scale (Vachudova 2007: 105). As Sedelmeier 
reminds us (2005: 3), whilst eastern enlargement may now seem to have been “inevitable” 
this was not always the case as several member states were opposed to it. Schimmelfennig 
(2001:47) questions why the member states offered full membership when they could have 
stuck at the level of association agreements. 
1.1. Luxembourg, 1997 
The Turkish umbrage taken at Luxembourg in 1997 can be explained both in the context of 
its own history and its long standing problematic relationship with the EU. As Kushner (1994) 
has explained, Turkey’s self-image (and especially that held by its Kemalist political elites) 
was that of a European country. Therefore any case of not including Turkey in “Europe” 
made it feel excluded from a place it had a right to be in. Turkish decision makers had not 
                                               
9 The Matutes package (prepared by the Spanish politician Abel Matutes) was a series of measures 
suggested by the EU in 1990 after the rejection of Ankara’s 1987 application to prepare Turkey for 
future EU membership. (See Redmond 1993; Arikan 2006). 
10 Whilst the Matutes package contained political and economic proposals, in the event Greek 
opposition meant that only the economic proposals were possible and these were formulated in to the 
1995 Customs Union which the EU signed with Turkey.  
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yet grasped that the accession criteria for the EU were the Copenhagen criteria and since 
Turkey did not meet them therefore it was not possible, from an EU standpoint, that it could 
be a candidate (Onis 2000). As mentioned above Ankara was also working under the 
misapprehension that “Europe” owed it a favour for having been a loyal NATO member 
during the Cold War (Park 2000a: 34) and that “Europe” would accept it post-Customs Union 
because of its potential as a market for EU goods (Rumford 2000: 331). 
For this reason, after the Luxembourg European Council, Ankara withdrew formal diplomatic 
contacts with the EU (although not with individual member states). There was uneasiness at 
the result in Washington and also by some EU member states who were concerned, for 
geopolitical reasons, by the loss of Turkish goodwill. The outcome of Luxembourg had been 
anomalous because most member states had not actually voted against Turkey and many 
subsequently acknowledged it was a mistake to alienate Turkey to such an extent (Park 
2000a: 34). There was also awareness that loss of Turkish goodwill would affect the on-
going peace process for Cyprus. Given that the Republic of Cyprus had just been made a 
formal candidate this was also an area for concern. For these broadly geostrategic reasons 
the UK began a “charm offensive” on Turkey as soon as its EU Presidency began in January 
1998 (Baun 2000). Although Turkey was not a candidate by name “…it was relatively easy to 
allow the progress reports (of the Commission) to become de facto candidacy progress 
reports” (Park 2000a: 35). In spite of Turkey’s umbrage, the geopolitical pendulum started to 
swing in Ankara’s favour almost immediately after the Luxembourg summit. However the 
normative concerns remained. So what happened to enable the member states to overlook 
these concerns and for Ankara to be deemed a candidate at the Helsinki summit? 
1.2. Helsinki, 1999. 
The literature about why Ankara was given candidacy in 1999 falls into two broad categories. 
Firstly, it has been argued that it was for geostrategic reasons and secondly that the shift 
took place because of domestic changes within Turkey and several key member states. For 
Muftuler-Bac (2000) the rapid development of ESDP, following the St Malo summit of 
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December 1998, meant “a formula for Turkey’s incorporation into the EU orbit (had) to be 
found…” (Muftuler-Bac 2000: 493). Turkey’s geopolitical location was of “such importance” 
that excluding Turkey from candidacy was “no longer reasonable” (Muftuler-Bac 2000: 490). 
Atila Eralp concurs in arguing that: 
“It is no coincidence that Turkish candidacy was offered in a summit 
in which important decisions were taken in consolidating European 
defence and security.” (Eralp 2000: 5) 
Muftuler-Bac and Eralp thus make the case that the EU was forced to make concessions to 
Turkey in 1999 because it needed its cooperation over ESDP.  
Secondly, the Kosovo conflict had a wide impact upon EU policy in this time period (Baun 
2000). It not only expedited the progress of ESDP (See Bailes 1999; Baun 2000; Donfried 
and Gallis 2000; Peters 2004 and Webber 2003) but also helped to create the political will to 
shift conceptions of EU enlargement: essentially this embodied a change from a conception 
of enlargement as taking place “in waves” to a conception based on a “regatta” start. At the 
Helsinki European Council all ten CEECs were given candidacy and negotiations effectively 
diluting conditionality 
 for Romania and Bulgaria (Nugent 2004). Kahraman (2000) argues that the Kosovo conflict 
had highlighted to the EU member states the need to keep their neighbourhood as stable as 
possible. So, having effectively lowered conditionality to the second round of CEEC 
applicants, albeit with subtlety, this affected the Turkish case.  
Another group of authors acknowledges the geostrategic nature of the Helsinki decision but 
questions the sincerity of it from the EU point of view. Was the offer of candidacy was just a 
way of “managing” the Turkish government? (Robins 2003a). Whilst Turkey could not be 
ignored was it merely being placated out of geostrategic need at that time? For Arikan 
(2003), Turkey was contained at Helsinki for geostrategic reasons and did not enjoy the 
same treatment as the CEECs who had been treated as “kin” (Sjursen 2002) and given 
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access to EU networks to help their accession process (Rumford 2000). Turkey’s case was 
always made on geostrategic grounds rather than those of duty or obligation even by its 
advocate-in-chief, the UK. A convincing case is made by Font (2006) that Helsinki was 
actually merely a “symbolic gesture”:  
“Very few within the EU trusted Turkey’s capacity to improve its 
democratic credentials and even fewer perceived Turkey’s 
membership as being a real option.” (Font 2006: 198). 
Many member states agreed to Turkey’s candidacy in 1999 because the geostrategic case 
was compelling and because they did not believe it would meet the Copenhagen criteria 
anyway. In other words, the member states put “the ball in Turkey’s court” (Onis 2000) for 
wider geostrategic reasons in the expectation that it would NOT be able to meet the 
conditions required of it for the process to progress further.  
So far it has been suggested that the Helsinki European Council decision was made for 
geostrategic reasons. Furthermore several authors have argued that whilst the geostrategic 
reasoning was genuine the actual offer was disingenuous as Turkey was not expected to 
meet the Copenhagen criteria anyway. Another school of thought has been that the “social 
democratic wave”, which saw more sympathetic governments elected in Athens and Berlin, 
and the mutual sympathy elicited by the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and 
September 1999 as having significantly contributed to the decision to recognize Turkey as a 
candidate at the Helsinki summit in December of that year. Onis (2000: 13) argues that the 
new governments of Greece and Germany were inclined to take a more multicultural view of 
the EU than their predecessors had and for this reason were more inclined to overlook 
Turkey’s “democratic deficit” in the wider security self-interest of the EU. Robins (2003a: 110) 
also cites geostrategic reasons alongside the election of more “inclusive” governments in 
Athens and Berlin. On the other hand Aybet (2006: 67) has made a case that domestic 
developments in Turkey were influential in the decision. The arrest of the Kurdish People’s 
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Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan on February 15th 199911 and the exclusion of the 
Welfare Party from mainstream politics in 1997 removed two major reasons for sceptical 
member states to object to the Turkish case.  
The approaches outlined above to explaining the EU’s decision at Helsinki to make Turkey a 
candidate are essentially geostrategic, domestic and institutional. In other words, the 
member states were persuaded by reasons in their own strategic self-interest, by the 
removal of reasons to object to it and lastly by reasons motivated by a Machiavellian gamble 
that it was safe to offer candidacy for geostrategic reasons as Turkey had a very low chance 
of ever meeting the conditionality anyway.  
It is suggested here that because of the increased status of eastern enlargement the Cyprus 
issue was the dominant factor from the EU’s point of view at the Helsinki European Council  
in 1999 rather than ESDP.  However, ESDP may have had a higher priority for the Turkish 
government at that time. The Turkish attempts to create leverage with ESDP (Bilgin 2001) 
were not successful at Helsinki. For this reason the issue festered somewhat and became a 
bigger problem between 1999 and 2002.  
Additionally it can be argued that the literature tends to significantly underestimate the role of 
Cyprus at the Helsinki European Council and overplay the social democratic wave and the 
“earthquake diplomacy” of the summer of 1999. The earthquake allowed the Greek and 
Turkish governments to push forward policies of reconciliation which already existed for 
wider geostrategic reasons. Moreover this reconciliation did not extend to the highly sensitive 
issue of Cyprus. Whilst it is true that Greek-Turkish relations improved, the Cyprus issue was 
not solved before the Helsinki European Council and remained a problem which threatened 
to undermine the CEEC enlargement round. The thesis will return to these issues in Chapter 
Three, and will present an empirically thicker and more complex real world approach to 
explaining the Helsinki decision vis a vis Turkey.  
                                               
11 The Washington Post, February 16th 1999, Turkey's Alienated Kurds; Government Raids, U.S. 
Policies Cited as Reasons for Backing Rebels. 
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1.3. Copenhagen and Brussels, 2002-4  
Whilst, after the Helsinki European Council in 1999, Turkey was a candidate, several major 
obstacles remained in the path of EU membership namely the Copenhagen criteria, Cyprus 
and the brewing resentment over ESDP which would become the “problem of Turkey” (Grant 
2001). Given these hefty problems then, why were accession negotiations opened in 
October 2005? Why did no member state object to opening accession talks with Turkey 
enough to vote against it in the European Council in December 2004? There is not a large 
body of work addressing this question specifically. Even six years and counting after the 
event it has only been tackled by a handful of scholars. Font (2006), Nugent (2007), 
Schimmelfennig (2009) and Camyar (2009) come closest to addressing the specific question 
in hand. 
Font (2006) argues that, whilst in 2004 the member states maintained self-interested motives, 
they were working from an institutional agenda lain down by previous decisions. In other 
words, Turkey already had eligibility and candidacy and therefore had to be considered. 
Moreover its case could only be rejected at this stage on “legitimate” grounds of 
conditionality. Since Turkey had made considerable advances towards meeting the 
conditions, the Copenhagen criteria, the EU member states were limited as to the grounds 
on which they could continue to oppose the Turkish case. They were loath to use cultural or 
religious reasons lest they appear illiberal and counter to the norms of the EU.  
Nugent (2007) uses the “rhetorical entrapment” argument of Schimmelfennig (2001) to make 
a case that the supporters of the Turkish case, including the European Commission, 
emphasised the need to develop democracy in Turkey when making the case for opening 
accession talks with Ankara. The Commission was also involved in the “incremental 
upgrading” of language in the Turkish case in particular by emphasising that accession was  
dependent on compliance with the EU’s accession capability (Copenhagen Criteria). This 
was further highlighted by the wording of the Copenhagen European Council  Presidency 
conclusions.  
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“These statements can be seen as moving the European Council , 
and hence the EU, from its preferred policy of being close to Turkey 
but stopping short of giving it a definite membership to a conditional 
promise of the opening of accession negotiations.” (Nugent 2007: 499) 
This in turn “constrained potential opposition by making it extremely difficult for any 
government to exercise a veto.” (Nugent 2007: 499). In this way Nugent argues that the 
Commission’s role was crucial in upgrading the Turkish case. It is not entirely clear whether 
Nugent is arguing this was done deliberately or not. However this argument is similar to that 
of Font in that both authors are saying the EU narrowed its own options between 1997 and 
2004 because of the constraining legacies of previous decisions. In so doing it significantly 
reduced the room for manoeuvre available to the member states at the Brussels European 
Council in 2004. 
Schimmelfennig has also turned his attention to the Turkish case (2009) and utilizes his 
rhetorical entrapment argument which he refers to as Normative Institutionalism (Thomas 
2009). He also identifies the European Commission as having played a critical role which 
“set the agenda” for intergovernmental decision making and framed the agenda “in favour of 
norm consistent decisions”. (Schimmelfennig 2009: 419). This was possible because the 
Commission was charged with assessing any progress which was made and deciding when 
“EU demands were met”.  Thus it acted in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria in 
making its recommendation to the member states and:  
“When Turkey – rather unexpectedly and rapidly -  demonstrated its 
willingness to reform and made substantial progress, the member 
states, including those that were principally opposed to Turkish 
accession, found themselves entrapped.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 427).  
Because Turkey had “fulfilled its part of the political accession conditionality deal, they 
(member states) were compelled to keep their part of the promise as well and could not 
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legitimately deny negotiations.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 427). Furthermore Schimmelfennig 
identifies a path dependent process going back to the Helsinki European Council: 
“Once Turkey was accepted as a candidate in 1999, when the 
constellation of member state preferences was particularly favourable, 
its further progress to membership has only depended on meeting the 
institutionalized enlargement criteria of the EU.” (Schimmelfennig 
2009: 429). 
Camyar (2009: 235) set out to explain the “striking discrepancy” between the “preferences of 
EU actors and the actual operation of Turkey-EU relations.” He highlights the “credibility trap” 
in which EU actors can be caught. Thus once an initial commitment is made EU actors may 
find it hard to back track. 
“Whilst their current preferences may dictate a slow down or halt in 
the path to membership they change the path only at the cost of 
losing the credibility of their prior commitments.” (Camyar 2009: 250) 
Camyar argues that having emphasised the importance of meeting the Copenhagen Criteria 
to the EU on several occasions, and notably the Helsinki European Council Presidency 
conclusions, the EU member states were bound by them when Turkey made progress which 
they had not expected.  
As outlined here, the existing literature on why Turkey has come to be in accession 
negotiations with the EU tends to examine either the Helsinki summit of 1999 or the Brussels 
summit of 2004. In addition, and in line with the argument made earlier in this chapter, it can 
be argued that the Helsinki literature tends to be based primarily upon structural factors such 
as the end of the Cold War, the consequences of the Kosovo conflict or changes of 
government in member state countries, and the Brussels literature upon processes within the 
EU. Thus, authors such as Schimmelfennig, Nugent, Font and Camyar outline processes 
such as incremental upgrading, rhetorical entrapment and strategic action or advocacy to 
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explain the outcome of the Brussels European Council in 2004. The argument here is that 
both of these approaches are incomplete in terms of providing an answer to the research 
question around which this thesis revolves. Only Font (2005 and 2006), Schimmelfennig 
(2009) and Nugent (2007) take the time frame 1997-2004 and they stay within the 
institutional confines of the EU. They do not take other factors into account such as the wider 
issues of EU enlargement and EU security and the effects that these may have had upon the 
decision-making processes of the EU member states. This thesis seeks to argue that the 
decision at Helsinki, made for certain (predominantly structural) reasons, enabled the Turkish 
accession process to move forward to a stage where processes were possible which 
progressed it further. It will also take into account the specific perceived problems impinging 
upon EU decision-making at Council level, particularly EU enlargement, Cyprus and ESDP. 
In other words, structural factors enabled Turkey to become a candidate, but once this had 
been achieved, the impact of engagement in the process itself and the need to deal with 
some very specific problems was crucial in determining successive European Council 
decisions at Copenhagen and Brussels. 
I will return to this later in this chapter, but first it is necessary to look at how the EU has 
viewed enlargement and the problems and challenges it raises, in order to provide context 
from the EU’s perspective. The chapter will then go on to look at why the Turkish application 
was viewed as problematic by the EU. 
2. EU integration and enlargement 
The system which is now the European Union developed from a desire after the Second 
World War to create “…the possibility for new forms of political cooperation” (Sandholtz and 
Stone-Sweet 1998: 1; Schuker 2000) and to prevent war from reoccurring. Whilst there was 
a strong federalist current in Europe at that time, the EU’s predecessor, the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC), was a response to the “practical problem” of how to rebuild 
the coal and steel industries after the Second World War rather than a purely federalist 
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project (George and Bache 2001: 63). Nevertheless the Treaty of Rome in 1956 established 
a broader set of rules and the institutions – centred on the European Commission and the 
Council of Ministers12 - to facilitate co-operation between states. During the 1970s, the 
establishment of the European Council, composed of Heads of State and Government, 
further elaborated the interplay between intergovernmental and ‘European’ institutions. 
2.1. European integration 
Almost since it was founded, the European “project” has been involved in both integration 
and enlargement. Integration was controversial from the start and progress towards 
“deepening” the relations of the member states was slow until the Single European Act 
(SEA), masterminded by Jacques Delors, which came into effect in 1987. This laid plans for 
a single market and repeated the federalist objective of transforming “relations as a whole 
among their States into a European Union”.13 The Treaty on European Union (TEU) was 
signed at Maastricht in February 1992 outlining plans for further political and monetary union. 
It led to the introduction of the Euro currency in 1999 and the establishment of the three pillar 
structure of the EU including nascent plans for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP). 
It also reiterated the ideal of the Rome Treaty for an “ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe” and increased the relative influence of the European Parliament (McAllister 1997: 
224). Plans for such integration were not universally popular with either public or elite 
opinion in the member states and this ambitious attempt at European integration may have 
weakened the EU, and its President, Jacques Delors, by leaving it vulnerable to accusations 
of acting without democratic legitimacy (George and Bache 2001: 127).  
2.2. European enlargement 
Enlargement too has been on the agenda of the EC and then the EU almost since the Rome 
Treaty in 1956 and Turkey has been involved in this process since it applied in 1959. 
                                               
12 The European Parliament did not exist by that name until 1962 but in an earlier incarnation was 
known as the European Parliamentary Assembly. Members were MPs from the member states 
delegated to attend rather than being members of an elected European parliament per se.  
13Preamble to Single European Act 1987. Official Journal reference: OJ L 169 of 29.06.1987  
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However, by the time accession negotiations were opened with Turkey in 2005 five 
enlargement rounds had already concluded. The first was initiated in July 1961 when the UK 
applied to join the European Economic Community, along with Ireland and Denmark. The 
applications made slow progress throughout the 1960s until Georges Pompidou took over 
from Charles De Gaulle as French President in 1969 and in 1973 the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark became full members of the EC.  This first enlargement “…set a framework for 
future enlargement rounds” (Preston 1997: 45) in that it stipulated that applicants must 
accept the acquis communautaire in full and the principles of the Birkelbach report.  
The Birkelbach report14 had been published in January 1962 aimed at the applications of 
Greece, Turkey and Spain. It set out the conditions of membership and was the forerunner 
of the 1978 Declaration on Democracy and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (Torreblanca 2003: 
25). It established that democracy was a precondition of membership and implied a 
commitment to integration in foreign policy terms.  
“Building on this declaration, the report concluded that the Community 
was more than just a free trade area or a customs union, that the 
‘political character of the Community cannot here on be called into 
question’, that acceptance of the institutional framework was also a 
precondition for membership; and, even more importantly, that 
accession to the Union was irrevocable and that it could not be 
partial.” (Torreblanca 2005: 26)15 
Spain and Greece (with Portugal by that time) did not become realistic candidates until after 
the end of their authoritarian regimes in 1974 for Portugal and Greece and 1975 for Spain. 
The EEC viewed their applications strategically and was explicit in laying down accession 
criteria as a means of encouraging stability on its borders (Preston, 1997: 53). Greece 
acceded in 1981 and Spain and Portugal followed suit in 1986. In this way their accession 
                                               
14The work of the German SPD politician, Willi Birkelbach. 
15The Birkelbach report is reprinted in Truyol (1999) or is available from the archives of the European 
Communities, 07.515:32; X3.075.15.  
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was not merely a rational choice cost benefit decision to maintain stability in the 
neighbourhood but was also taken with the aim of spreading “deeper values” (Sjursen and 
Smith 2004:8) and in effect to encourage those countries on the Community’s borders to 
become more like itself. It also had the consequence of redistributing the balance of power 
within the European Community away from the north (Nugent 2004:29).  
The European Free Trade Area (EFTA) enlargement round encompassing Austria, Sweden 
and Finland followed in 1995 (See Redmond 1997). The end of the Cold War had released 
the EFTA countries from the imperative to maintain their neutrality and prompted their 
applications which were largely made for economic reasons (George and Bache 2001: 209). 
This was  the quickest and easiest of all the enlargement rounds because of the pre-existing 
trade links between the applicants and the EU and the fact that they possessed similar 
political and administrative systems (Faucompret and Konings 2008: 32). It did however 
increase the number of EU members and intensified feelings that “the EU was becoming too 
big to be able to conduct its business on the basis of a system that had been devised for a 
much smaller number of states.” (Nugent 2004: 31). The prospect of further enlargement to 
encompass up to ten Central and East European countries, which was clear by the middle of 
the 1990s, was thus seen as a further threat to integration, both institutionally and in the 
broader political and economic context 
2.3. CEEC enlargement 
According to Preston (1995), the EFTA enlargement round was the last one to comply with 
the “classical” model laid down by the first, UK, Denmark and Ireland, round. This presumed 
that applicant states would accept the acquis communautaire16 and would willingly obey “the 
pre-existing rules of the club.” (Preston, 1995: 452). The sheer scale of the CEEC 
                                               
16 “The acquis communautaire is the accumulated body of European Union (EU) law and obligations 
from 1958 to the present day. It comprises all the EU's treaties and laws (directives, regulations, 
decisions), declarations and resolutions, international agreements and the judgments of the Court of 
Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice and under the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”   
As defined by House of Commons Library Standard Note SN05944, 26th April 2011. Page 2.  
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application demanded a different approach amidst fears the EU would not be able to cope 
with the scale of it and it could be a threat to the institutional and political base of European 
integration. In an effort to deal with these fears, the 1992 Lisbon European Council laid down 
three basic conditions for membership - identity, democracy and a respect for human rights 
plus a willingness to adopt the acquis communautaire. This was necessary in order to 
“…impose order on a clamour of demands that threatened to engulf the Community and 
more significantly the process of deepening….” (Sjursen and Smith 2004:9). The year after 
the Lisbon European Council the EU formally outlined the “Copenhagen criteria” at the 
Copenhagen European Council in 1993 when it agreed to go ahead with eastern 
enlargement17 on the condition that applicant countries should meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
In other words they should have a functioning market economy, stable democratic 
institutions, and a commitment to the acquis (Schimmelfennig 2001: 59). 
Eastern enlargement was not universally popular at this stage and many member states had 
misgivings (Nugent 2004:35); as already noted, CEEC enlargement was not as inevitable as 
it may seem with hindsight (Sedelmeier 2005:3). Misgivings revolved around concerns that 
such a large “widening” of the EU would threaten its future integration or “deepening” 
(Sjursen and Smith 2004: 9).  Additionally the large number of potential applicants was a 
concern, as was the fact that they were trying to join a highly institutionalized club “from a 
lower economic base than had been the case previously.” (Preston, 1995:459). Whilst the 
legitimacy of the CEECs’ claim to membership status was compelling (Sjursen 2002) the 
Copenhagen criteria were the formulation of a “safety valve” for the EU providing “exit 
options further down the line” (Sedelmeier 2005: 185). In other words the EU was only 
committing itself to the accession of those states which had become like the existing 
member states, thereby minimising the potential threat to integration. How could any existing 
                                               
17“The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
that so desire shall become members of the European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an 
associated country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and 
political conditions required.”17  
Copenhagen EU Council Presidency conclusions, June 1993, Section 7. Para.3.  
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member state object to such a well-intentioned and worthy incentive? However, the 
unintended consequence of the emphasis on this conditionality was that if the CEEC states 
met the criteria this would drive the enlargement process forward.  
Formal applications were made by 10 CEECs between 1994 and 1996, which led the EU 
Commission to produce the Agenda 2000 document in 1997. This gave the “Opinion” of the 
European Commission on whether the applicant countries had met the Copenhagen Criteria 
for becoming candidates. The Luxembourg European Council in 1997 accepted the 
Commission’s recommendations that five of the CEECs – Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia – should begin negotiations and the other five – Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Slovakia – should wait until they had improved economic conditions. It 
was, as the then Enlargement Commissioner Hans van den Broek described it, a case of the 
“ins and the pre-ins”18.   
It was “not long” however before the limited nature of the Luxembourg decision was seen as 
mistaken (Nugent 2004: 36) and the Kosovo crisis of March 1999 “led to a rethinking of 
enlargement strategy” (Baun 2000: 123). The effect was the dilution of the conditionality for 
candidacy (as opposed to membership) embodied in the Copenhagen criteria in order to 
incentivise more eastern European countries including Romania and Bulgaria to improve 
their economies and political systems and become stable neighbours. 
The case of eastern enlargement was fundamentally different from previous rounds in terms 
of scale, popularity and the political and economic conditions of the CEEC applicants 
compared to those which had gone previously (O’Brennan 2006). This being so, several 
studies have questioned why the EU enlarged eastwards at considerable risk to itself 
                                               
18Enlargement Commissioner, Hans van den Broek, speech to the International Press Institute "The 
future of Europe", Brussels on 27th November 1997.  
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(Sjursen 2002; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2005). Sjursen argues that the duty felt by 
the EU towards the CEECs overrode its misgivings about the potential cost of doing so. The 
decision was thus based on an “understanding of who Europeans are and what it means to 
be European.” (2002: 507). Sjursen distinguishes this “kinship” approach from that of 
Schimmelfennig (2001) who concentrates on political norms as a means of explanation. This 
argues that the existing member states became “rhetorically entrapped” by their liberal 
democratic identity and those member states opposed to including the CEECS were 
reluctant to say so for fear of ruining their liberal democratic credibility. In other words the 
“brakemen” (opponents) were “effectively prevented” from open opposition by the need to 
adhere to the norms of the EU. In contrast to Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergovermentalism 
approach, which focuses on grand bargains at the level of the European Council, 
Schimmelfennig also looks to the processes involved over time for a full explanation of how 
this took place. Thus Schimmelfennig (2003b) argues that those member states in favour of 
CEEC enlargement deliberately used the norms of the EU to further their own ends or as 
“rhetorical action”19.  
The role of the European Commission is also highlighted in the literature. “Principled policy 
advocates” within the Commission who had “internalised” the norms entailed in the EU’s 
identity” (Sedelmeier 2005: 9) pushed the CEEC case and “delegitimized” any opposition to 
it. O’Brennan (2006) has also argued that the CEEC case was made by elite level individuals 
within the Commission who were influenced by ideas of duty and kinship in the early stages 
and later became convinced of the strategic argument. The Commission was able to “shape 
the policy agenda and structure negotiations in a way which proved decisive.” (O’Brennan 
2006:174). Whilst the European Council took the final decisions, the member states were 
operating on an agenda driven by the Commission. Some member states were in agreement 
with the Commission’s recommendations but others were hampered by not wanting to 
appear contrary to the fundamental principles of the EU (O’Brennan 2006: 180). In this way 
                                               
19The “strategic use of norm based arguments” (Schimmelfennig 2001:62; see also Schimmelfennig 
2003b). 
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the “safety valve” nature of the Copenhagen criteria became a constraint on member state 
decision making which served to override any objections on the grounds of scale, cost, or 
effect on the integration process. Having highlighted the Copenhagen criteria the member 
states were reluctant to renege on the deal. By focusing on issues of “principle and previous 
commitment” the “principled policy advocates” within the Commission “were able to strip 
away these potential objections one after the other.” (Sedelmeier 2005: 184).  
This, in turn, meant that the CEEC case was made incrementally. By responding favourably 
at the early stages and setting the Copenhagen criteria as the accession criteria, the EU 
then found itself “rhetorically entrapped” when the CEECs made faster progress towards the 
Copenhagen criteria than had been expected. According to this argument the policy 
advocates within the Commission and the member states worked to “incrementally set the 
EU on a path to (CEEC) enlargement” and get the CEECs to a position where the remaining 
member states felt they were being “steam rollered” (Sedelmeier 2005: 82) into the decision 
but nevertheless could not say no. Much of this process was carried out at elite level and 
against public opinion which led to the need to sell the policy to the member states public 
through securitisation (Higashino 2004). In other words the policy of eastern enlargement 
was justified by referring to what might happen if it did not go ahead ie: conflict in Europe, 
lack of reform in the CEECs, proliferation of conflicts such as that in Kosovo. Initial 
securitization was aimed at the member state leaders in the European Council but by 1999 
was extended to “the EU public” (Higashino 2004: 364) and the policy reached its pinnacle at 
the Helsinki European Council in that year. 
Alternatively it has been argued that member states may have gone along with CEEC 
enlargement because they did not believe it could happen i.e.: that the CEECs would not 
meet the Copenhagen criteria (Sjursen 2002). In this way, as noted above, the Copenhagen 
criteria operated as both a “firmly articulated commitment” and a get-out clause for the 
member states when considering CEEC enlargement. However the get-out clause was 
problematic when the CEEC countries made significant progress towards meeting the 
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Copenhagen criteria and at the European Council summit in December 2002, also in 
Copenhagen, the decision was taken to admit the CEEC countries20 to the EU on the 1st May 
2004.  
It is clear from this account that enlargement – and specifically the eastern enlargement - 
can be presented as a threat to integration, requiring, at the very least management so that it 
does not become disruptive and possibly more coercive measures aimed at excluding or 
delaying the accession of troublesome candidates.  However, Dinan (2005: 4) notes that as 
well as being a threat to integration, enlargement has also been the catalyst for more 
integration as witnessed by the Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon Treaties21. Enlargement can 
also be seen as a form of foreign policy aiming to “reshape political order in Europe” acting 
out of self-interest – the desire for a peaceful neighbourhood – but also from a sense of right 
and wrong and the projection of liberal ideals (Sjursen and Smith 2004: 7 and 17). These 
ideals have at important junctures been taken up by the “principled policy advocates” within 
the Commission (Sedelmeier 2005) and by the UK and Germany (Higashino 2004). The 
safety valve of the Copenhagen criteria made it easier to reach incremental agreement along 
the way. However these “incremental steps on the path to enlargement made it difficult to 
use such exit options later” (Sedelmeier 2005: 185). 
Even though it had been an applicant for much longer the Turkish case became 
contemporaneous to that of the CEECs and therefore was subject to the emphasis on the 
Copenhagen criteria introduced to manage the scale of the CEEC applications. However a 
distinction should be made between Turkey and the CEECs. Whilst the latter were seen as 
“kin” who should be returned to the European fold this was not the case for Turkey for whom 
the justifications for accession were “very different” (Sjursen 2002: 17) and primarily 
geostrategic. 
                                               
20Plus Cyprus and Malta and excepting Romania and Bulgaria. 
21Dinan (2005: 6) also notes the converse is true i.e.: that deepening has led to widening specifically 
referring to the SEA and the EFTA round.  
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In spite of this Turkey was not without its supporters as there were several key member 
states who had been convinced of the security case for Turkish candidacy and accession. 
These states – primarily the UK and Germany – faced several major obstacles to making the 
case for Turkey in the European Council. These were the on-going Cyprus dispute, the issue 
of how Turkey could be incorporated into the ESDP structure, and the differing identities and 
strategic cultures of Brussels and Ankara. The next section will explore these issues in more 
detail. 
3. The problems of Turkey 
Turkey was a problematic case even for those states in favour of bringing it closer to the EU. 
As outlined above, this was partly because Turkey’s perception of Europe was different from 
Europe’s perception of itself. Turkey’s conflation of “European” and “Western” meant it was 
deeply offended in 1997 by not being “rewarded” by the EU for favours it believed it had 
done for Europe during the Cold War. Turkey failed to understand that the EU saw itself as 
entirely different from NATO or the “West”.  Similarly, it appeared that Turkey and its leaders 
had not fully understood the significance of the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession (Onis 
2000). This made the Turkish government inclined to suspect and cite “discrimination”.  
This broader, apparent lack of mutual understanding was accompanied by a number of 
much more specific problems. The Cyprus issue must also be included in any consideration 
of Turkey-EU relations. Turkey was extremely sensitive to any suggestion that Greece was 
working against its case within the EU by linking Turkey’s case with progress on the Cyprus 
issue. Such a combination of sensitivities made Turkey extremely hard to deal with for the 
EU, as witnessed by the Luxembourg European Council and ESDP.  
3.1. Cyprus 
The issue of “Cyprus” became inextricably entwined with Turkey-EU relations after the end 
of the Cold War and continued to be a significant influence on the processes involved 
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between 1997 and 2004.  For this reason it is important to understand the “long, complex 
and unhappy”22 background to the “Cyprus issue”.  
The island of Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire under which both Greek speaking and 
Turkish speaking communities co-existed, mostly peacefully. In 1878 it became a UK colony 
until it gained independence on 16th August 1960 with a constitution providing a 
proportionate power sharing system23. However underlying tensions caused by the Greek 
community’s support for Enosis (union with Greece) came to a head in 1963 when the 
Turkish side stopped participating in the power sharing arrangement. The situation worsened 
considerably in 1974 when the Turkish government sent troops to “occupy the north to 
protect the Turkish community from a feared Greek takeover”24 .  
Since the military intervention in 1974 the island has been divided by a “Green Line” policed 
by the UN. In 1977 and 1979 the Turkish Cypriot President, Rauf Denktash, reached an 
agreement with Archbishop Makarios and then Spyros Kyprianou which established a 
“bicommunal, bi-zonal federation” (Hannay 2005: 8). However this remained rudimentary 
and in 1983 the Turkish side proclaimed independence and formed the unrecognized 
(except by Turkey) state of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)25. Efforts have 
continued ever since, under UN auspices, to negotiate a more permanent solution. Thus the 
“Cyprus issue” began either in 1963 or 1974 depending on whether you are Greek or Turkish 
Cypriot26 and the “Cyprus issue” now is one of how to reunite the island without further 
conflict. It has proved an intractable issue due to deeply ingrained bitterness and a strong 
sense of historical self-justification on both sides which has so far defeated the best efforts of 
all those who have attempted to find a way forward, including a clutch of UN Secretary 
Generals. 
                                               
22 As described by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Second Report, 
February 2005.  
23 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee Third Report (No. 23), 1986/7.  
24House of Commons Standard Note, Cyprus: A political and economic overview November 4th 2009, 
SN/IA/5208 Sec. 1.1. pg. 3.  
25For further background see Dodd 1998; Nugent 2000; Suvarierol 2003; Ker Lindsay 2005 and 
Hannay 2005.  
26 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Second Report, February 2005.  
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The accession of Greece into the EC/EU in 1981 without Turkey27 meant Greece then had a 
veto within the European Council and the ability to hinder the Turkish case for accession 
primarily by trying to make it conditional on a settlement of the Cyprus issue. The PASOK 
administration of Andreas Papandreou was also inclined to take a hard line vis a vis Turkey 
and the EU “became Greece’s main instrument against Turkey.” (Barchard 1998: 27). 
Additionally with Greece on the inside the EU was partial by definition and could not take on 
a mediator role between either, Greece and Turkey, or the two Cypriot factions. The EU’s 
need to “work to unanimity” gave Greece the opportunity to “insert its views into every 
relevant community text” (Barchard 1998: 28). 
During the Cold War this had not been an issue as the EC’s policy had been to maintain 
equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean. It had not sought to find solutions as it was keen 
not to upset “….the delicate balance it had tried to maintain between Greece and Turkey…” 
(Muftuler-Bac 1997: 61; see also Arikan 2003: 147). However after the Cold War this 
security imperative waned and the EU was vulnerable to pressure from Athens. Thus the 
Commission’s 1989 Opinion on Turkey’s formal application directly and negatively linked the 
Turkish case to the Cyprus issue28. 
The Commission did propose the Matutes package of measures29 which was intended to 
strengthen economic and political links between Turkey and the EU. However, Greek 
opposition meant the proposed political links between Turkey and the EU were obstructed by 
Athens and only the economic aspect, the Customs Union, came to fruition (Barchard 1998: 
5; see also Muftuler-Bac 1997). This increased the political sensitivity and sense of injustice 
surrounding the twin issues of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus in Ankara. Arikan 
(2003:158) has claimed Greece deliberately sought to link Turkish accession of the EU with 
the Cyprus issue knowing the intractability of the dispute. Arikan (2003: 161) also argues this 
                                               
27Whose case at that time was hampered by the military coup of 1980. 
28European Commission, 20th December 1989, Opinion on Turkey's request for accession to the 
Community. SEC (89) 2290 final/2, December 20th 1989. 
29 The Matutes package (prepared by the Spanish politician Abel Matutes) was a series of measures 
suggested by the EU in 1990 after the rejection of Ankara’s 1987 application to prepare Turkey for 
future EU membership. (See Redmond 1993;  Arikan 2006). 
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tactic was used by other opponents of Turkey within the EC/EU when Ankara applied in 
1987. Cyprus was an acceptable reason to oppose Turkey whereas the real reasons, 
cultural and economic grounds, were not so30.   
This had been further complicated, and politically sensitized, when the Republic of Cyprus 
applied to the EU on July 4th 1990 prompting “outrage” from both Turkey and Turkish Cyprus 
(Ker-Lindsay 2005a: 17). The Opinion of the Commission on the Cypriot application, three 
years later, concluded that the adoption of the acquis communautaire “would not appear to 
present insurmountable problems in the case of Cyprus”31. However, the Commission 
stopped short of recommending the Cypriot case go forward, pointing out instead that it must 
“also have the greatest regard”32 to the troubled relations of Greece and Turkey and the 
Cyprus issue itself.  
Nonetheless, during its Presidency of the EU in 1994, Greece was able to exert influence on 
behalf of Cyprus. At the Corfu European Council,, a deal was made by which Nicosia would 
be included in the next, CEEC, round of enlargement in return for Greece dropping its 
objections to Customs Union with Turkey under the Matutes package (Brewin 2000:21; Ker 
Lindsay 2005a:20; Arikan 2003: 161). This further raised tensions between Greece and 
Turkey, and within Cyprus, as Turkey made talk of permanent division of the island. The 
situation was exacerbated by skirmishes over the Imia/Kardak islands in the Aegean and the 
proposal to site S-300 missiles on Cyprus. The EU Commission document on the 
implications of eastern enlargement, Agenda 200033, in 1997 duly included Cyprus as a 
candidate whilst Turkey was not included. Furthermore it “effectively avoided the question of 
when Turkish membership should be offered by making it conditional upon the establishment 
of good neighbourly relations with Greece including settlement of the Cyprus question.” 
                                               
30 For an alternative view see Melkopides (2006). 
31European Commission, June 30th 1993, Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for 
membership. Doc/93/5. 
32European Commission, June 30th 1993, Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus for 
membership. Doc/93/5, pg 5. 
33 European Commission, July 13th 1997, Agenda 2000 - For a stronger and wider Union, COM (97).  
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(Arikan 2003: 168). Thus the Turkish government felt that the Cyprus dispute was being 
used as a means to block their own candidacy but not that of the Republic of Cyprus. 
It can clearly be argued that Greek membership of the EC from 1981 has negatively affected 
the Turkey EU relationship and that once Cyprus was given candidacy, as a quid pro quo for 
Customs Union with Turkey, this too was always likely to adversely affect Turkey EU 
relations because of the highly sensitive nature of the Cyprus issue in Turkey. Thus this 
explains the situation the parties were in at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. At 
the same time it is relevant to point out that the EU was reluctant to admit Cyprus as a 
divided island. Therefore as soon as Cyprus was given formal candidacy at Luxembourg the 
need for a solution to the Cyprus issue increased. However the assurances given to the 
Republic of Cyprus that its case was not linked to accession and the caveats to the Turkish 
government that its own candidacy was linked to a solution served to politicise the issue 
even further. For this reason the Cyprus issue was not solved and continued to play a very 
salient role in the period under consideration. Indeed, as will be seen later, Turkey was given 
candidacy at Helsinki at least partly to smooth the process of the eastern enlargement round 
(including Cyprus). 
3.2. ESDP 
As outlined above the division of Europe after the Second World War placed Turkey into the 
“West” and facilitated its incorporation into NATO (Park 2000a: 32) as a valued geostrategic 
ally. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey also became entrenched into the Western 
European Union (WEU)34. It was invited to join as an Associate Member in 1992 along with 
the non-EU European countries, Norway and Iceland35. Under this arrangement Turkey 
participated fully in the WEU Council and planning operation and “had de facto membership” 
(Dogan 2003: 5).One of the major obstacles which came to face Turkey’s advocates within 
                                               
34 The Western European Union (WEU) had been established in 1948 but operated at a relatively low 
level until the mid-1980s when the question of European security rose to the fore. This advanced 
further after the end of the Cold War when the WEU effectively became the defence arm of the EU 
and also a link between the EU and NATO (Dogan 2003:4). 
35 They were soon joined by the Czech Republic and Poland. 
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the EU was Ankara’s reaction to the incorporation of the WEU into the EU in 1999 and the 
development of ESDP in its place. The problem was that the EU was not able to transfer the 
favourable terms of Turkey’s WEU de facto membership across into ESDP – which was only 
open to members of the EU.  
The dissolution of the WEU was the end product of the “whole new dynamic” unleashed by 
the end of the Cold War (Bailes 1999: 308). NATO had to redefine its role from deterrent and 
hard security to “crisis management” (Bailes 1999: 308). In addition, the EU, NATO and the 
WEU had to find a way to delineate responsibility for conflicts such as those in the Balkans 
following the end of the Cold War. The UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had been affected by 
the apparent inability of either the EU or the WEU to prevent ethnic cleansing and 
massacres such as Srebrenica (Webber 2003:162). Such dissatisfaction led to the UK 
government withdrawing its opposition to the merging of the WEU with the EU (Bailes 1999: 
314) and this made the European Security and Defence Project a viable possibility (Yost 
2007: 27). At the Franco-British summit at St Malo in December 1998 Tony Blair endorsed 
the plan for the EU to have “autonomous decision making” backed up by “credible military 
force”36. The result was that tentative steps were made to develop a European-based 
security and defence capability in the early part of 1999. 
Crucially the Kosovo conflict of 1999 galvanized EU member state support for a security 
project to be based within, and under the control of, the EU. An “ESDP” (European Security 
and Defence Policy) was able to develop within the EU rather than an “ESDI” (European 
Security and Defence Identity) which would be based within NATO (Peters 2004: 392). 
Kosovo, and its potential to cause more bloodshed and a refugee problem had provided 
much of the political will for these developments:  
                                               
36The St Malo Declaration, 4th December 1998. Full transcript in Chaillot Paper no. 47, (Ruttens 2001). 
NB: Whilst Blair was motivated by the disappointment that the EU could no longer rely on the USA to 
step in where necessary he was backed by France who saw an opportunity not to have to rely on the 
USA (Webber 2003: 163). 
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“…it was this that not only solidified the Europeans’ stand at 
Washington (NATO summit) but drove them on, six weeks later, at 
Cologne (European Council summit) to commit themselves irrevocably 
to a defence role for the Union in the teeth of some last minute 
wavering by non-Allies.” (Bailes 1999:315). 
These developments were causing growing unease in both Ankara and Washington as 
ESDP was developing at rapid speed generating considerable ambiguity about how it would 
operate in practice and what the line of command would be. The Cologne European Council 
set out “goals and desiderata” but left “…the devil of institutional detail to later” (Bailes 1999: 
316). For this reason both Ankara and Washington were anxious about where they would fit 
into the new arrangements. Within the WEU at that time it was openly noted that the role of 
the non-EU NATO allies such as the US and Turkey37 would be the “hardest circle to square” 
(Bailes 1999: 317). This point was made at the Washington NATO summit in April 1999 and 
again at the European Council in Cologne in June 1999. 
Indeed the “problem of Turkey” (Grant 2001) was to become a serious hindrance to the 
development of ESDP between the Helsinki European Council and that in Copenhagen 
three years later. The EU was very reluctant to grant Turkey’s request that its privileged 
status within the WEU should be transferred into ESDP.  It was equally unwilling to grant 
Turkey EU membership without due process. However as the EU required the use of NATO 
capability it had to take the Turkish case into account as Turkey had a veto on the North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) within NATO.  
Turkey interpreted this lack of flexibility by the EU negatively (Tocci and Houben 2001). 
Whilst it was willing to contribute troop numbers to ESDP, Ankara made it clear that it was 
prepared to use its NATO veto to block ESDP access to NATO facilities. ESDP had become 
a flagship project for the EU which was very keen to deploy it in the former Yugoslav 
                                               
37Also Iceland and Norway. 
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Republic of Macedonia (Operation Concordia) in March 2003. For this reason the member 
state leaders at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002 were under pressure to placate 
Turkey in order to find a way forward for ESDP. This issue will be fully explored in Chapter 
Four 
3.3. Security culture 
The “problem of Turkey” and ESDP is evidence of a broader problem: the differing security 
cultures of the EU and Turkey. As argued above, Turkey, and its leaders, had historically 
conflated ideas of the “west” with those of “Europe” and latterly the EU (Onis 2000). Turkey 
did not understand that the EU had “diverged from Westphalian principles” (Oguzlu 2003: 
292) and had a security identity different from its own. Whilst the EU was prepared to allow 
Turkey to sit in on discussions (so called “decision-shaping”) in ESDP, it would not concede 
the “decision-making” rights which Ankara demanded (Missiroli 2002). In making such 
demands,  Turkey could be seen as acting in accordance with the Cold War mentality of its 
military and Kemalist elite and was repeating a brinkmanship tactic which had been used 
successfully many times during that time (Bilgin 2001: 46).  
However, the EU was not prepared to dilute its emphasis on the Copenhagen Criteria for 
geostrategic reasons. Turkish reactions to the EU accession process should be seen in the 
light of this fundamental mismatch as “…there is a close relationship between Turkey’s 
security culture and the way Turkey reacts to the EU accession process.” (Oguzlu 2003: 290; 
see also Park 2005). Similarly, Missiroli’s (2002) argument that Turkey was acting in a 
“peculiar” fashion by apparently both supporting ESDP with troop numbers and blocking its 
operation was rebutted by Bilgin (2003: 347) on the grounds that if the Turkish policy is seen 
in the context of its security identity it is not “peculiar” at all. Turkey saw its value to the EU 
as lying in its geopolitical location and thus believed it would be able to use this as leverage.  
The deadlock created by the ESDP situation – underlined by what can be seen as broader 
differences in security cultures - contributed to the pressure on the EU member state leaders 
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and the outcome of the Copenhagen European Council .In due course I will argue that the 
high conditionality of the Copenhagen European Council Presidency conclusions – a result 
of the compromise – was very significant in processes which followed. Here, it is important to 
point out that the specific problems of Cyprus, ESDP and security culture noted in this 
section are part of a broader approach to understanding of the process by which Turkey 
gained candidacy and then open negotiations with the EU. It is to this broader approach that 
I turn in the conclusions to the chapter. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified three landmarks of the process by which Turkey was granted 
candidacy and then opened negotiations for accession into the EU. These can effectively be 
represented by the European Councils of 1999 in Helsinki (and its outcome in contrast to the 
1997 Luxembourg European Council), in 2002 in Copenhagen and lastly in Brussels in 2004. 
The majority of what has been written about the research question in hand is about the 
transition between the Luxembourg and Helsinki European Councils and the obvious 
research puzzle of why the EU changed its policy so radically in such a short space of time. 
The answers suggested tend to converge on structural issues, pointing to the changing 
European security setting and the pressures created by the Balkan conflicts and specifically 
the Kosovo conflict of early 1999. This changed the EU’s attitude to both ESDP and CEEC 
enlargement which in turn affected its policy on Turkey. 
Other authors have also highlighted the serendipitous election of more sympathetic 
governments in both Greece and Germany who in 1997 had been Turkey’s most vehement 
opponents in the European Council. In addition there were some changes in Turkey – such 
as the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan – which may have contributed to the 
atmosphere in which Turkey’s European aspiration could be considered in a more 
favourable light. Finally there is a strong argument to suggest that whilst these factors were 
instrumental in obliging the EU to consider candidacy for Turkey it actually did so because 
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many member states did not believe Ankara would meet the conditionality laid down by the 
Copenhagen criteria. 
By contrast, those authors who have looked at the Brussels European Council summit in 
2004 and asked why it agreed to open negotiations with Turkey have relied largely upon 
process based explanations. They point to processes of path dependence and 
incrementalism which developed over time in order to explain why the EU member state 
leaders may have voted in favour of something their material interests might have led them 
to oppose. Ultimately it is argued the EU member states at Brussels were rhetorically 
entrapped by their previous discourse and commitments vis a vis Turkey. Having told Ankara 
on several occasions that the Copenhagen criteria were the ultimate arbiter they then had 
limited room for manoeuvre when Turkey went a long way towards meeting the criteria.  
As mentioned above this thesis sees the structural changes around 1999 as having enabled 
Turkey’s accession and the processes which followed thereafter as having determined it. In 
other words by looking at the processes we can see not only what happened, but also how 
and why. In addition, we can explore the ways in which the process of engagement between 
the EU and Turkey between 1999 and 2004 could overcome (or by-pass) the specific 
problems of Cyprus, ESDP and broader security tensions. The added value of this thesis is 
to incorporate the structural changes with the processes of engagement they engendered 
and with specific problem-solving processes to contribute to an explanation of the timeframe 
1997-2004 as a whole.  
The thesis thus rests on three key empirical propositions that emerge from this study of the 
context and the literature: 
• Firstly, that structural changes including the end of the Cold War, geopolitical 
pressures and domestic changes made possible the acceptance of Turkey as a 
candidate between 1997 and 1999. 
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• Secondly, that the process of engagement that began in 1999 then enabled a 
combination of incremental commitment, purposeful advocacy and rhetorical 
entrapment to create the conditions in which Turkey was accepted as a negotiating 
partner for accession in 2004. 
• Thirdly, that this same process of engagement enabled the specific problems of 
Cyprus, ESDP and security cooperation to be by-passed or defused in such a way 
that negotiation for accession could start even without their solution. 
The thesis will go on to focus particularly on the second and third of these empirical 
propositions, and in Chapter Two to advance a framework for analysis based on a Historical 
Institutionalist approach as the most appropriate way of exploring the central research 
question. 
The research question, how come accession negotiations have been opened with Turkey, 
will be addressed with a theoretically eclectic and empirically rich account. It will encompass 
both structure and process to bring together the time period of 1997 and 2004. Within the 
processes at work it is also suggested there is a strong element of agency involved and, 
broadly speaking, the first enabled the second to happen. The rhetorical entrapment in 
question therefore is active as well as passive. These processes can be seen through a 
temporal approach to politics (Pierson 2004). For these reasons Historical Institutionalism 
provides a framework in which to analyse the research question. As a theory, it can 
encompass these different factors such as structure, agency and process without inherent 
contradiction. Crucially it prioritises the temporal approach without which the processes may 
not be visible. The next chapter will explore the framework in more detail.  
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Chapter Two: Turkey-EU relations 
1999-2004: A framework for analysis 
 
At the end of Chapter One, three empirical propositions were set out in relation to the 
changes that took place in EU-Turkish relations between 1999 and 2004. These propositions 
focused on the structural forces that shaped the changes and made them possible, on the 
processes through which change took place and the specific problems that confronted those 
working to produce change. They reflected in turn the study of the context and of the existing 
literature that was carried out in Chapter One. By definition, they omitted discussion of 
exactly how the questions would be pursued, and the purpose of Chapter Two is to explore 
the issues of theory, approach and method that are raised by the general focus of this thesis 
on the evolution of EU-Turkey relations during the period under study.  
 
The theoretical stance of this thesis is being shaped by its research design. This is an n=1 
within-case analysis intended to answer the research puzzle of why, in 2004, did the EU 
member states agree to open accession negotiations with Turkey when it was not a 
universally popular candidate for normative and cultural reasons? Why was progress in 
Turkey’s EU accession process possible at this time when it had not been before, and has 
not been since, for several varied and long standing reasons? The intention is to provide an 
answer without sacrificing the empirical complexity of the situation suggested by the review 
of the existing literature. 
This empirical complexity includes structural considerations, such as ESDP and CEEC 
enlargement (including the Cyprus issue) and process-based factors such as path 
dependence. In addition, it is argued here that agency must be incorporated into the 
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explanation of EU policy towards Turkey in the time period 1999-2004. The structural 
changes of the late 1990s initiated processes which, in conjunction with the on-going 
structural geostrategic considerations, created an opportunity for agency on Turkey’s behalf 
by the Ankara government and also by advocates within the EU Commission and 
sympathetic member states. Therefore any “theory” to be used must be able to withstand 
such complexity. It would not be possible to answer this research puzzle with a parsimonious 
positivist approach.   
It is argued here that structure and agency both influenced the processes which ensued from 
the decision to offer candidacy to Turkey at the Helsinki European Council summit but were 
in different configurations at different times. Structural geostrategic factors were most 
influential from 1999-2002 specifically at the Helsinki and Copenhagen European Councils. 
The influence of these factors began to wane after 2002 but did not disappear. Agency was 
also present throughout as various member states, primarily Germany and the UK, made the 
Turkish case within the EU but it only became worthwhile after the 2002 Copenhagen 
European Council. The answer to the research puzzle lies in the complex interaction of 
structure, process and agency between 1999 and 2004 in creating a “perfect storm” of 
circumstances which enabled Turkey to make more progress towards its European 
aspiration than it had done at any time before or has done since.  
To be able to reflect this complexity it is necessary to take an eclectic theoretical palette 
which can account for the influence of both structure and agency simultaneously and for 
actors to behave in either a self-interested or a normative way at different times. This 
approach reserves the right to call on either reflectivist or rationalist insights – or both –  as 
befits the empirical evidence and to take temporality into account. Historical Institutionalism, 
as used here, is less a theory than an “approach to studying politics and social change” 
which is “distinguished by its attention to real world empirical questions, historical orientation 
and its attention to the ways in which institutions structure and shape behaviour.” (Steinmo 
2008:118).  
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Accordingly this chapter will seek to put HI into its own theoretical context by outlining how it 
has evolved and offering a definition of it as applied here. It will also seek to justify its 
eclectic nature and its ontological crossing of the rationalist-reflectivist divide. It will offer brief 
definitions of “security” and “identity” as well as a detailed outline of the process tracing 
methodology to be applied. Process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) is salient to HI as it 
offers a means with which to claim rigour and validity in the face of claims that HI cannot 
claim to be a political “science” (King, Keohane and Verba 1994; Wight 2006). 
1. Theory and Metatheory 
Theory provides the means to explore a given research puzzle. It is a “way of making the 
world, or some part of it, more intelligible or better understood.” (Viotti and Kauppi 1997:15). 
Without theory, data is merely a list, or a narrative, and theory helps us to decide which 
questions to ask about a plethora of data and how to judge the results. More specifically, 
theory can be seen as “a causal argument of universal transhistorical validity and nomothetic 
quality which can be tested through a series of hypotheses.” (King, Keohane and Verba 
1994; see also Waltz 1979). Understood in this way, theories are a means to test data whilst 
maintaining “reliability” and “validity” in order to acquire “knowledge” or “truth”. However the 
pursuit of such “knowledge”, which presumes a positivist epistemology, necessitates 
theoretical parsimony which can strip explanations of context and explanatory value 
(Katzenstein and Sil 2005; Buzan and Little 2009: 460) or, as George and Bennett (2005:  
266) put it,  “….highly general theories that attempt to formulate broad covering laws tend to 
have quite limited explanatory and predictive power.” The pursuit of positivist universal 
theory leads the analyst who wants to maintain explanatory power at apparent risk of 
incommensurability. In other words, can complexity be “scientific”? Can it produce “truth”? 
However, such a conundrum is obviated if universal theory is not the goal and positivism is 
not accepted as the given epistemological stance. Middle range theories (Merton 1968) do 
not claim universality and instead are “deliberately limited in their scope.” (George and 
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Bennett 2005: 266). They are able to capture empirical complexity and maintain validity by 
not accepting the positivist epistemology and not seeking to establish truth. George and 
Bennett note the drawbacks of the deductive-nomological method of positivism, and its 
variants, and instead focus on empirically establishing causal mechanisms as a method to 
establish a valid account of a given puzzle (George and Bennett 2005: 129-131).  
This is typical of the repeated challenges to the hegemony of positivist epistemology in the 
metatheory of international relations and politics over the past twenty years. The so called 
“rationalist/reflectivist” divide has been described as the “fourth debate” in the history of the 
academic discipline of International Relations (Waever 1996; Dunne et al 2007). It follows on 
from “realism and idealism”, “behaviouralism and traditionalism” and neo-realism and neo-
liberalism as the dominant debate within the discipline and broadly echoes the positivist/post 
positivist debate (Smith, Booth and Zalewski 1996; Kurki and Wight 2007: 5)38. 
However, more recently the debate has moved on again and questioned why there has to be 
such a “divide” between the epistemologies of positivism and post-positivism and the 
ontologies of rationalism and reflectivism. Rather than attempting to show which one is 
better it has been argued that both can be valid and, furthermore, this combined approach 
can boost explanatory power (Checkel 2000). The sharp division between “scientific” 
methods of “explanation” and those of “understanding” which are more akin to literary theory 
(Hollis and Smith 1991) are not only  a “false dichotomy” (Chernoff 2007a:182) but they are 
also not able to capture the breadth and depth of empirical reality. Moreover it is not possible 
to be objective (Chernoff 2007a: 193) and “one of the most important intellectual steps you 
can take as an analyst of international relations events and topics is to recognize your own 
philosophical and ideological commitments.” (Sterling-Folker 2006:10; Rosamond 2007). 
This approach is not a wholesale rejection of parsimony but a call to be “honest about the 
difficulties inherent in such an enterprise.” (Hay 2010b: S129). 
                                               
38 It is important here to characterise process-tracing as a method rather than a theory. However it is 
a method which enables (middle range) theories to lay claim to validity other than that allowed for by 
positivism.  
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Colin Wight (2006) offers an epistemological justification for this approach by critiquing the 
hegemony of positivism as the definition of what “science” is. Wight does not agree that the 
positivist approach to “science” is the only one with “scientific” validity. Moreover such an 
approach cannot deliver complex explanations required by the social world with its greater 
number of variables. For Wight “science” is a “pragmatic product in process”  
“What makes a particular practice a science is not its form of 
validation but its commitment to public validation of its structure and 
form of reasoning, the constant questioning of its beliefs, its notion of 
and belief in the possibility of epistemological convergence and its 
commitment to a multi-layered realism.” (Wight 2006: 61) 
In other words Wight is calling for rigour as a measure of “science” rather than the 
production of universal truths.  
1.1. Eclectic theorizing 
Several writers have argued that a wide theoretical palette is necessary in order to tackle 
complex issues such as the EU (Anderson 1995) and NATO (Jacoby 2006; Webber 2007) 
as no one single theory can explain all the evidence. Indeed Rosamond (2000) has 
maintained that different theories can not only apply to different aspects of complex puzzles 
at one time but different theories may apply at different times in history. As Social 
Constructivism has gained disciplinary legitimacy in recent years the trend has been to 
incorporate “thin” (Wendt 1999) reflectivist insights of identity into the broader rationalist 
picture of self interest in order to broaden the scope of the discipline and boost explanatory 
power (Checkel 2000). 
There have been several calls for what is variously termed “theory synthesis” (Moravcsik 
2003) “eclectic theorizing” (Katzenstein and Sil, 2005:4) and “trans-paradigmatic pragmatism” 
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(Hellman 2006)39. The motive for this broad approach is similar. In the same vein as Jacoby 
and Webber above, Moravcsik (2003:132) argues that “…the complexity of most large 
events in world politics precludes plausible unicausal explanations.” Katzenstein and Sil 
(2005:2-3) call for scholars to “bypass the metatheoretical battle” in order to “deepen 
understanding of substantive problems that reflect the complexity of political life…..” while 
Hellmann’s (2006:25) motive is also that “the standard repertoire of routine theory building is 
unlikely to yield satisfactory results (with highly complex phenomena)…”. Thus the motive for 
drawing on both reflectivist and rationalist insights is to be able to explain complex political 
situations such as institutions of which NATO and the EU are two examples40. Such 
complexity does not lend itself to a parsimonious positivist  theoretical approach as 
advocated by King, Keohane and Verba (1994) or Waltz (1979).  
Therefore in order to cope with such complexity and to maintain explanatory power it is 
necessary to either take the route of theory synthesis with its “pragmatic” approach to 
philosophy or to find another philosophical justification for doing so.  The next section 
therefore will attempt to do this. It will firstly explore exactly what positivism is before going 
on to offer an alternative epistemological approach which can account for the use of 
rationalist and reflectivist insights without the need to be “pragmatic”.  
1.2. Critical Realism 
The research puzzle of this thesis is complex and requires the use of rationalist and 
reflectivist insights – or either – at different times. It is the contention here that both structure 
and agency play a role in the processes which explain the research puzzle and also that 
both ideas and interests are relevant in assessing the motivation of the actors involved. 
Hence as already outlined above it is necessary to address the issue of commensurability. 
                                               
39 See also Jupille et al (2003)  
40 In respect of the EU, “institution” is defined here as: “….a relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in 
the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and 
expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances.” (March and Olsen, 2006: 4).  NB: 
The issue of whether NATO is an institution, or not, rages on (Webber et al 2004). 
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However commensurability is only an issue if positivism is the epistemological stance which 
is taken. This is not a positivist study and instead follows the epistemology of critical realism. 
As Brown (2007: 412) outlines, positivism is the underlying epistemological belief that it is 
possible to study society using the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed the positivist 
approach associates itself with “scientific method” and presumes that such methodology will 
lead it to “truth”. It will be able to discover the laws of society through the application of a 
deductive natural science method. The objects of such scientific study are “real” and exist in 
the world so therefore can be observed through observation and measurement. 
Positivism has of course been critiqued by post positivists who question why positivism 
should be the gold standard of social science. They point out that criticising post positivist 
approaches on the grounds they are not positivist enough is a circular argument. Critical 
realism however provides a way out of this argument. It takes an epistemological, rather 
than an ideological or methodological, stance against positivism. It does not argue that 
positivism is wrong merely that its claims are too ambitious. If the positivist goal is to identify 
truth and generalisable laws of nature, critical realism argues that this is not possible. It 
argues instead that truth may exist but we cannot know when it has been reached as the 
observation of any individual is fallible. Therefore we cannot say that positivist approaches 
are the correct route to scientific knowledge as we cannot know when ultimate knowledge is 
arrived at. Therefore, it is necessary to keep an open mind about knowledge and about “truth” 
and the way it is arrived at. By this logic therefore the issue of incommensurability ceases to 
exist with a critical realist epistemology.  
As a critical realist it is possible to take insights from rationalist and reflectivist schools of 
thoughts without having to justify it metatheoretically or take a “pragmatic approach” which 
bypasses the philosophical issues.To the philosophical purist bypassing issues does not 
make them go away. As Patomaki and Wight (2000) highlight, referring to the constructivism 
of Alexander Wendt (1989).  
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“A synthesis based on problematic metaphysical systems produces only a 
synthesis of two problematic metaphysical positions not an improved 
metaphysical position.” Patomaki and Wight (2000: 215) 
Wight later (2006: 17) points out that Wendt’s attempt to provide a via media – way of 
crossing the rationalist/reflectivist divide - is flawed philosophically because it still adheres to 
a positivist epistemology. This is not to criticise constructivism per se merely the 
epistemological foundations it is built upon.  Taking a critical realist epistemological stance 
rules out the need to be philosophically “pragmatic” and removes the anxiety this may induce 
in the philosophically-minded International Relations scholar.  
Critical realism is widely accredited to the work of Roy Bhaskar (1975; see also Archer et al 
1998; Hartwig, 2008). The term is often conflated with that of Scientific Realism and is 
subject to “concept stretch” (Sartori 1977). However critical realism is the form of scientific 
realism associated with social research (rather than natural science) and I will follow the 
definition of Wight (Joseph and Wight 2010: 2; see also Wight 2006; 2007a; 2007b). For 
critical realists, truth is not possible and can’t be claimed by positivists. Positivist claims to 
know what scientific method is therefore also problematic and if judged by these criteria the 
issue of commensurability is “…an endless quest to solve problems which have no solution.” 
(Wight, 2006: Abstract).  
For critical realism science is “….about aims, depth explanations, rather than method.” 
(Wight, 2006:61) and critical realism41 is an “…interesting development for those keen to 
move beyond positivism without rejecting the commitment to science.” (Wight 2007b: 382). It  
is not necessarily deductive and fundamentally challenges the hegemony of positivism as 
the judge of good science without dismissing positivism per se. Positivism – and its 
approach – could be correct but we cannot know that as “no claim is immune from 
                                               
41 Wight often refers to Critical Realism as Scientific Realism 
59 
 
challenge…” (Patomaki and Wight 2000: 216) therefore it cannot claim “truth” status and its 
methodology cannot be the criteria by which other approaches are judged.   
This critical realist epistemology enables the argument that ontology in itself is a political 
choice. Political theories want to be able to claim truth in order to be powerful. If we accept 
that we cannot know the truth then the differing ontologies cannot claim truth. This clears the 
way for insights from one or more theories to be used simultaneously. Thus, this change in 
epistemological view is also beneficial in terms of explanatory power as it “opens up new 
avenues to IR theorists….previously hidden from view by the dominance of the positivist 
view of science in IR.” (Chernoff 2007b: 405) 
 
Wight (2006: 18) argues that science is not necessarily positivist42 but should instead be 
defined as an “attempt to explore the world beyond appearances” and “provide explanations 
at a deeper level”. Political “science” is a battleground for differing ontologies. That is, 
differing ideas of how the world is and should be. To judge them all by just one standard of 
science is misleading and limiting.  Instead “science” should be characterised by a rigorous 
approach only – and this can include either reflectivist insights or rationalist insights – or both. 
This in turn can incorporate the study of causation in a given circumstance as well as just 
correlation. Causation may not be deductive and may not produce universal laws – but that 
does not mean it is not “scientific” and it is metatheoretically coherent within a critical realist 
epistemology. Critical realism emphasises the role of structure and process within causation 
rather than merely looking for “law-like regularity” (Joseph and Wight 2010: 3). In this way it 
allows the theorist to ask different questions that one working within a purely positivist 
epistemology. In other words this approach asks different questions and legitimises a wider 
variety of theoretical frameworks with which to answer them. 
                                               
42 Conversely however a study could be critical realist but appear to be positivist in 
methodology with the caveat that it is not claiming to be “truthful” merely “good science”. 
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Therefore, a critical realist epistemology can accommodate an eclectic approach to 
Historical Institutionalism such as that proffered by Sven Steinmo (2008). This is, in effect,  
middle range theory attempting to “formulate well specified conditional generalizations” 
(George and Bennett 2005: 266) rather than a universal theory. It emphasises the role of 
processes within a given situation and reflects the view that human beings are not either 
“simple rule followers” or “strategic actors” but potentially either – or both (Steinmo 
2008:163). The next sections will look at the HI approach and the associated methodology of 
process tracing in more detail. 
2. A framework for analysis 
This thesis is an attempt to answer a research puzzle distinguished by its complexity. It asks 
why the European Council of Brussels in 2004 agreed to open accession negotiations with 
Turkey. As outlined above it rests on a series of empirical propositions: 
• First, structural changes including the end of the Cold War, geopolitical pressures 
and domestic changes made possible the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate 
between 1997 and 1999. 
• Second, that the process of engagement that began in 1999 then enabled a 
combination of incremental commitment, purposeful advocacy and rhetorical 
entrapment to create the conditions in which Turkey was accepted as a negotiating 
partner for accession in 2004. 
• Third, that this same process of engagement enabled the specific problems of 
Cyprus, ESDP and security cooperation to be by-passed or defused in such a way 
that negotiation for accession could start even without their solution. 
In terms of theoretical explanation, the centre of gravity is Historical Institutionalism (HI). As 
already established HI is able to reflect this complexity because it is theoretically eclectic and 
is not attempting to produce parsimonious, positivist “science”. Instead Historical 
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Institutionalism tries to return to real world research. Its parameters as a “theory” are defined 
by the “approach” rather than by specific theoretical constructs. As already mentioned43 it is 
a “theory” for scholars who “think history and ideas matter” and struggle to contain empirical 
evidence within categories of “universal truth” (Steinmo 2008: 136). 
What Steinmo means by “eclectic” therefore is that the HI scholar can draw on either 
material or ideational factors to understand and explain a given research puzzle with issues 
of commensurability countered by the argument of Wight (2006). HI seeks to establish its 
“scientific” credentials through the production of detailed evidence via process tracing. It is 
not aiming to show evidence of correlation which can be extrapolated to other cases but 
instead to show evidence of likely causation in the case in question. It accepts that “how one 
behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on the rules.” (Steinmo 2008: 126). 
As such it is neither a rationalist or a reflectivist theory but one which can draw on either or 
both at different times and in different contexts.  
This approach is suited to the research puzzle in hand because it can incorporate the 
complexity of the situation rather than trying to fit such a complex research puzzle into a 
parsimonious theoretical framework. Whilst it would be difficult to explain the propositions of 
structure, process and agency by using exclusively material or ideational factors, when using 
either (or both) the explanatory potential is increased. Steinmo’s (2008) HI therefore 
maintains the use of classic HI concepts such as path dependence but argues that this 
ontological shift is necessary in order to be able to reflect real world situations because 
actors do not conform to just one behaviour at all times even within a normative institutional 
setting.  
This section will therefore begin by placing Historical Institutionalism within its theoretical 
context. Whilst Steinmo has defined HI as an eclectic “approach” this has not always been 
the case. Prior to the ontological “reflectivist turn”, Historical Institutionalism was viewed as a 
                                               
43 See above – Introduction, section four, Page 21.   
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rationalist theory in its own right. It is argued here that incorporating structure and agency 
within HI enables greater explanatory value.  
2.1. New Institutionalism  
Historical Institutionalism is a sub-set of New Institutionalism which falls within the wider 
debates on the theory of European integration. They seek to explain why the states of 
Europe have apparently chosen to create supranational bodies and abrogate some degree 
of sovereignty. Broadly speaking theoretical debates in European integration centre on 
whether the institution influences the policies of its member states.  
On the one hand it is argued by Liberal Intergovernmentalism that “European integration can 
best be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders…” (Moravcsik 
1998:18). Furthermore, “…the integration process did not supersede or circumvent the 
political will of national leaders – it reflected their will.” (Moravcsik 1998: 4). On the other 
hand, it is claimed by New Institutionalists (March and Olsen 1984; Hall and Taylor 1996) 
that institutions can normatively influence and temper the behaviour of member states such 
that member states can find themselves voting for policies they do not agree with, or 
experiencing the unanticipated effects of interaction within a variety of institutional contexts. 
Historical Institutionalism however attempts to escape this binary choice and accept both 
that “institutions do matter” (Rosamond 2000: 116) but also that member state interests are 
alive and well although they may be operating within the norms and values of the institutions 
and actors may use norms strategically (Schimmelfennig 2003). This thesis will draw on this 
theoretical approach which originally evolved to explain integration and apply it to the issue 
of EU enlargement.  
It is necessary therefore to highlight the artificiality of the theoretical distinction between 
Intergovernmentalism and New Institutionalism and suggest instead that, rather than being 
in competition to explain all aspects of integration or enlargement, they are actually 
addressing “different phenomena” (Puchala 1999: 330) by asking different research 
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questions. The intergovernmentalist tends to look at moments in time or “snapshots” in order 
to explain the outcome of a given institutional setting. However, the Historical Institutionalist 
looks at how processes develop over time and in this way, it is argued, can add explanatory 
value. Therefore the HI scholar is not necessarily in opposition to the intergovernmentalist or 
to the other varieties of New Institutionalism such as Rational Choice Institutionalism and 
Sociological Institutionalism but is merely taking a different approach. This approach is one 
that is theoretically and metatheoretically eclectic and, crucially, which takes a temporal 
approach rather than a “snapshot”. 
2.2. Historical Institutionalism 
The Historical Institutionalism to be used in this thesis is based on Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002) and Steinmo (2008) for whom Historical Institutionalism means asking “real world 
questions” taking into account time, place and context.  
“How one behaves depends on the individual, on the context and on 
the rule. While this statement may seem rather obvious, it has huge 
implications for how we should study politics.” (Steinmo 2008:126) 
It is theoretically eclectic and “agnostic” as to metatheory (Steinmo 2008: 10) and responds 
to criticisms of its validity (Peters, Pierre and King 2005) through detailed qualitative 
empirical methods such as process tracing (George and Bennett 2005; see also Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002, Steinmo 2008). Furthermore it emphasises temporality: “Historical 
Institutionalists make visible and understandable the over-arching contexts and interacting 
processes that shape and reshape states, politics and public policy making.” (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002: 693). In not taking this approach the analyst may simply not see important 
insights: 
“Without the kind of attentiveness to temporally specified process 
that is a distinctive hallmark of Historical Institutionalist scholarship, 
important outcomes may go unobserved, causal relationships may 
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be misunderstood and valuable hypotheses may never receive 
consideration.” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002: 699) 
In this way HI is not just a description of events or a historical narrative. It highlights 
“processes” such as path dependence which just happen to occur temporally and are not 
visible to a “snapshot” view (Pierson 1994, 2000). The path of such processes can be 
dependent on either material or ideational factors. It is important to note however that 
Historical Institutionalism is still theoretically parsimonious compared to “thick historical” 
description and, as such, is still “political science” (Thelen 2002:95). It is trying to reflect the 
complexity of empirical reality but accepts that it cannot “…hold a mirror up to reality.” (Hay 
2010b: S128). 
However, such processes cannot be divorced from the context of complex empirical reality. 
In this case it is presumed the context is influenced by security and identity. Firstly 
geostrategic security issues were a strong influence on EU policy at Helsinki in 1999 and 
continued to be so thereafter particularly up to Copenhagen in 2002. Secondly EU identity 
has strongly influenced how it reacted to these structural changes. Thirdly, what is 
considered to be a security issue at all can be dependent on identity. It is necessary 
therefore to offer brief definitions for these terms.  
Security in this thesis is from Buzan et al. (1998:21): 
 “It is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a 
designated referent object.”   
In this case the referent object could be a state or an individual and the threat could also be 
a state, non-state or something less tangible such as poverty, climate change or terrorism. 
Similarly, identity is not the fixed entity presumed by positivist theories and for these 
purposes is defined as: 
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“…what enables a group of people to refer to themselves as ‘we’.” 
(Waever et al 1993:5/6) 
That is, states and other actors44 behave according to their identity and this affects what 
states perceive to be their self-interest including geostrategic self-interest. 
“Identity is important because what is the value of studying the self-
interested action of states without knowing what this self is. What 
appears as our interest is highly dependent on who “we” are.” (Waever 
2000:267) 
Specific EU identity “defies easy categorization…” (Manners and Whitman 1998: 238) but 
this study will follow Schimmelfennig (2001) to presume the primary component to be a 
commitment to liberal democracy. 
“The belief in and adherence to liberal human rights are the 
fundamental beliefs and practices that constitute the community.”  
(Schimmelfennig 2001: 58).  
So within a context influenced by issues of security and identity as here defined the 
Historical Institutionalist approach will identify temporal processes which can help us to 
explain and understand the causal mechanism linking 1999 and 2004 in the Turkish 
accession process. The next section will look in more detail at what these processes are.  
Critical junctures 
According to HI, there are points in history which can be seen with hindsight to have been 
“critical junctures”. They are moments from which it is hard to reverse policy and are the 
beginning of path dependent processes. They are also, to some extent, a necessarily 
arbitrary point or a convenient theoretical device to avoid going ever farther back into history 
or “infinite explanatory regress into the past” (Mahoney 2001:8).   
                                               
44 The EU, whilst not a state (Hix 1998:38) is an actor (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 4; see also 
Manners and Whitman 2003) and can act according to an identity. 
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“Before a critical juncture a broad range of outcomes is possible; after a 
critical juncture, enduring institutions and structures are created and the 
range of possible outcomes is narrowed considerably.” (Mahoney 2001: 
7). 
The term emerged from Collier and Collier’s 1991 study of early 20th century Latin America. 
They argued that “…..change would not occur unless there was a conjuncture of a variety of 
internal political forces that individually were not capable of generating significant change but 
which together could produce it…..” (Peters 2005: 78). This is subtly different from the 
definition I will use here. Collier and Collier’s framing is of a configuration of events which 
leads to a given outcome. What this study utilizes however is a more recent formulation of 
the critical juncture as a point in history which puts an institution on one path rather than 
another and after which  “...major alternative development trajectories are increasingly 
closed off.”  (Mahoney 2001: 8). The explanatory value comes from the processes which 
follow from the critical juncture rather than the juncture itself which is necessarily arbitrary in 
many cases. 
Capoccia and Keleman (2007:348) urge “caution and clarity” in the approach to critical 
junctures. They define them by “probability jump” and “temporal leverage”.  That is, 
increased likelihood that choices made at the given time will affect the outcome by triggering 
a path dependent process “which constrains future choices”. One must also “anchor” the 
critical juncture into a unit of analysis. What is a critical juncture for one policy area may not 
be for another. Similarly, temporally, the critical juncture is a relative concept.  
“…..the duration of the critical juncture must be brief relative to the 
duration of the path dependent process that it initiates.” (Capoccia and 
Keleman, 2007:350)  
Capoccia and Keleman (2007) also argue that change is a contingent factor for critical 
junctures. So critical junctures do not necessarily initiate change and they do not necessarily 
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arise out of “exogenous shock” or rapid change. Any such change can also be incremental. 
Critical junctures should primarily be seen as the starting point of path dependence as 
defined retrospectively. The next section will examine path dependence.  
Path dependence 
There has been a certain amount of “concept stretch” (Sartori 1970) in relation to the notion 
of “path dependence” and analysts “…often lack a clear understanding…” of it (Mahoney 
2000: 535). For Hay and Wincott (1998: 955), it is the process by which “strategic choices 
made at a particular moment eliminate whole ranges of possibilities from later choices while 
serving as the very condition of existence of others.” Elsewhere path dependence is defined 
as increasing returns, lock-in and sequencing (Capoccia and Keleman 2007: 342) and for 
Mahoney (2000: 535) “path dependence occurs when a contingent historical event triggers a 
subsequent sequence that follows a relatively deterministic pattern.”  Pierson and Skocpol 
(2002:697) define it as “the dynamics of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a 
political system…” This is the definition which I propose to follow. 
“….once actors have ventured down a particular path they are likely to 
find it very difficult to reverse course. Political alternatives that were once 
quite plausible may become irretrievably lost.” (Pierson and Skocpol 
2002:700)  
In other words, what comes after depends on what went before because once a policy 
decision is taken it can be difficult to change it for reasons of material cost or normative 
credibility or both. In this way “…policy decisions accumulate over time. A process of 
accretion can occur in a policy area that restricts options for future policy makers…” (Kay 
2005: 558). The options policymakers have at time-point B may be dependent on a decision 
taken at time-point A. Another seductively simple definition of path dependence is:  
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“…that what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the 
possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point 
in time.” Sewell (1996:262-3)  
That is, actors may be “rational” but the agenda from which they make rational choices is 
limited by what has gone before. For Hay (2002) the role of Historical Institutionalism is to 
illuminate the influence of the past on the structures and ideas of the present.  
Page (2006:89) also urges theoretical clarity in dealing with path dependence and identifies 
it as an umbrella term encompassing four processes which are similar but crucially not the 
same.  
1. Increasing returns: “...benefits that rise smoothly as more people make a particular 
choice and positive feedback as little bonuses given to people who have already 
made that choice or who will make that choice in the future.”    
2. Self-reinforcement:  “Making a choice or taking an action which puts in place a set of 
forces or complementary institutions that encourage that choice to be sustained.” 
3. Positive feedback: “…an action or choice creates positive externalities when the 
same choice is made by other people.” 
4. Lock-in: “…one choice or action becomes better than another one because a 
sufficient number of people have already made that choice.” 
These processes can unfold over time leading to inadvertent or unintended consequences 
which make interesting research puzzles such as the one in question here.  
“The long term effects of institutional choices which are frequently the 
most profound and interesting ones should often be seen as the by-
product of social processes rather than the realisation of actors’ 
goals.” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:708).  
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Thus, unintended consequences would not be obvious to anyone taking a snapshot view. 
Asking the substantive question makes it necessary to examine context and time and then to 
demonstrate causality – as opposed to mere correlation – through process tracing (George 
and Bennett 2005). 
2.3. Accounting for change – structure and agency 
So far it has been argued that Historical Institutionalism is characterised by its use of 
temporal processes which open explanatory options which are not visible if a non-temporal 
approach is taken. Moreover HI is theoretically eclectic; concepts from both sides of the 
divide - ideas and interests - can be subject to path dependency. In this way, HI offers broad 
explanatory value for real world puzzles.  
However, a common criticism of Historical Institutionalism is that it relies upon the theory of 
punctuated equilibrium or “rapid bursts of institutional change followed by long periods of 
stasis…” to explain change (Krasner 1984:242; See also Goertz and Mahoney 2006). This 
has left it vulnerable to criticism that HI itself had “….little or no capacity to predict change.” 
(Peters 2005:77). Even long standing HI practitioners such as Sven Steinmo have 
acknowledged the problem:  “There is something basically flawed…with the idea that 
political and institutional change is purely a product of fate.” (Steinmo 2008:133). This 
section sets out to offer a definition of agency and structure and to offer an alternative way of 
dealing with change within HI. 
The question of structure and agency is a question of philosophy as well as politics and 
sociology. It has been argued therefore that it is a “spurious” question and a “cul de sac of 
obfuscation and meaningless abstraction” (Fuller 1998: 104). However to view agency and 
structure as a “problem” to which an answer can be found is mistaken because structure and 
agency cannot be resolved “empirically” but should instead be viewed ontologically. It is 
entirely consistent to agree about what happened empirically in any given event and yet to 
disagree as to the relative influence of agency and structure (Hay 2002: 91).  
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However it is necessary to define the terms. The structure and agency debate centres on 
“…to what extent do we as actors have the ability to shape our destiny as against the extent 
to which our lives are structured in ways out of our control.” McAnulla (2010: 271). This is 
another formulation of the Marxist “truism” that “men make history but not in circumstances 
of their own choosing” (Hay 2002: 90). Structure is the “context” of a research question and 
agency is the ability of an actor to achieve intentions (Hay 2002: 94). It is argued here that 
both structure and agency can be influential and taking a binary approach may fail to reflect 
the complexity of social reality. Moreover taking this pragmatic approach to the structure and 
agency debate can add significantly to the ability of Historical Institutionalism to be able to 
account for change within institutions. 
Recent Historical Institutionalism theorists have offered more complex explanations of 
change incorporating both agency and structure. Change “….resides in the relationship 
between actors and the context in which they find themselves…” (Hay and Wincott 1998: 
955; see also Thelen 1999 and Hay 2006) with the advantage of greater potential for 
understanding complex causal processes and the disadvantage that it is a “laborious and 
time consuming exercise…” (Hay 2002: 149). Structure and agency exist in a dialectic 
relationship with each influencing the other according to the situation which means that 
“…change can be the consequence of strategic action…filtered through perceptions of an 
institutional context that favours certain strategies actions and perceptions over others.” (Hay 
and Wincott 1998: 955).   
In more recent work Hay (2002) has offered the concept of “punctuated evolution” as an 
alternative to punctuated equilibrium. It is “iterative, yet cumulative, change animated and 
informed by particular political economic paradigms.”  This redefines equilibrium away from 
stasis towards an on-going incremental change. 
“For long periods of time change may appear 
incremental… …punctuated by a dramatic quickening in the pace of 
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change associated with moments of crisis. In such moments, political 
regimes are overturned and governing paradigms replaced.”   (Hay 
2002:162) 
This model specifically highlights that change is not only “rapid” but is also slow and 
incremental. It is “interactive and iterative” with a dialectic relationship between agency and 
structure in which “…structures facilitate and constrain agents” and “agents interpret 
structures…” (Marsh et al. 2004: 11). In this framework, logically, agents can be influenced – 
or not – by structure and either by rational self-interest or by ideational factors and each can 
induce path dependence. Much of this theory is case dependent and the crucial point is to 
present rigorous empirical evidence to back up a claim being made: 
 “I have argued that the key to understanding institutional evolution 
and change lies in specifying more precisely the reproduction and 
feedback mechanisms on which particular institutions rest.” 
(Thelen1999:400). 
In order to understand why EU policy towards Turkey changed between 1997 and 2004 it is 
necessary to make a case using evidence of the causal mechanisms linking one point in 
time to another. It is the contention of this chapter that the evidence obtained can be 
explained by Historical Institutionalism as outlined by Steinmo (2008) in a version which 
incorporates both ideas and interests as being subject to temporal processes with actors 
operating within a context. By understanding the causal mechanisms, a rigorous and 
“scientific” case can be made on an n =1 basis (George and Bennett 2005: 132). 
3. Process Tracing 
I have looked above at how the pre-conceived notion of “science” has affected the choice of 
methodology and the academic debate which has raged over what counts as ”validity” in 
political science. I have argued that this notion of what is valid has changed in the past two 
72 
 
decades. This change has been countenanced by expanding definitions of what constitutes 
good science. The criteria by which quantitative and qualitative methods are judged are not 
necessarily the same. The view of qualitative methods has moved on significantly since King 
et al’s “Designing Social Inquiry” was published in 1994 (Bennett and Elman 2006a:458). 
Process tracing has been offered as a method to rigorous qualitative science (George and 
Bennett 2005). It is not a new idea but had been “undervalued by a field mesmerized by a 
standard regression model whose limitations are now becoming clear.” (Hall 2003: 391).  
3.1. “Getting on with it”. 
“Most process tracers are empirically orientated scholars who just 
want to get on with it, that is, conduct research on the fascinating 
world around us.” (Checkel, 2005: 20)  
Process tracing is a method, not a theory, applicable to small “n” cross case analysis and 
n=1 within case analysis. It uses qualitative methods – primarily documents, archives and 
interviews – to uncover causal mechanisms and runs counter to King et al’s (1994) 
emphasis on legitimising qualitative methods by correlation. For process tracers, King et al 
have conflated “causes of effects” and “effects of causes” in a misguided effort to give 
qualitative methods legitimacy (Bennett and Elman 2006). As such, process tracing is an 
appropriate method for Historical Institutionalism as it provides the detailed evidence of 
causal mechanisms required to make the case for a given series of events (Checkel 2005:3). 
The earliest reference to “process tracing” (Tansey 2007) was Alexander George’s article in 
1979 followed by another with Timothy McKeown in 1985. Its most detailed exposition is the 
2005 book “Case Studies and Theory Development” written by Alexander George with 
Andrew Bennett. The narrative produced by process tracing provides evidence that a 
sequence of events has happened in a particular way. However, although similar to, it is not 
a historical narrative but a strategic narrative “…which differs from a straightforward narrative 
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of historical events by being structured to focus attention on how patterns of events relate to 
prior theoretical belief about social phenomena.” (Goldstone 2003: 50).  
“(Process tracing) consists of analysing a case into a sequence of 
events and showing how those events are plausibly linked given 
the interests and situations faced by groups or individual actors.”  
(Goldstone 2003:47) 
Process tracing is not history but it is the application of political theory to historical narrative 
and “….moves us away from the correlational arguments and as-if styles of reasoning that 
too often dominate in IR and European studies, and towards theories that capture and 
explain the world as it really works.” Checkel 2005:14). 
“….ultimately we justify the practice of converting historical 
explanations into analytical theoretical ones by emphasising that 
the task of the political scientist who engages in historical case 
studies for theory development is not the same as the task of the 
historian.” (George and Bennett 2005: 225). 
The intention is to “test, challenge and shift prior beliefs about the case (or cases) under 
examination…” (Goldstone 2003: 51) rather than produce a universal law to apply across all 
cases.  As such it is not claiming the “certainty” of statistical inference but operating instead 
on Bayesian logic of probability (Bennett and Elman 2006: 461; Goldstone 2003: 51). As 
George and McKeown (1985) stated, process tracing was a way to help the analyst with 
small n avoid making spurious correlations for causal association by establishing the causal 
processes. In so doing, process tracing allows complexity and context to be incorporated 
into explanations. If complexity involves multiple and interdependent variables and/or the 
effects of temporality and sequencing (George and Bennett 2005: 231) then this has made 
process tracing particularly suitable to multi causal theories such as New Institutionalism and 
in particular Historical Institutionalism.  
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Fundamental to the practice of process tracing is the assumption that the researcher is 
looking to establish and make inferences from causal mechanisms within the “confines of a 
single or few cases” (Bennett and Elman 2006:459). This is done through the detailed 
examination of primary sources “…to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesises 
or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables 
in that case.” (George and Bennett 2005: 6) 
Process tracing uses classic qualitative methodology such as the study of interview material 
and documents (Bryman 2001; Creswell 2003). According to George and Bennett’s definition 
it does not venture into ethnography, focus groups and associated methods of analysis. This 
is partly because it is not starting with overt post-modernist ontology usually associated with 
these methods and partly because they would not easily contribute to the aim of the project 
which is to “…trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes…” (George 
and Bennett 2005:6). In other words these methods are asking questions the process tracer 
is not trying to answer. However, this is not a hard and fast distinction. George and Bennett 
state:  
“We exclude post-modern narratives from our view of case 
studies……though some of the more disciplined forms of 
discourse analysis approach our view of case studies.” (George 
and Bennett 2005: 18).  
The process tracing method is pre-determined by the questions to be asked rather than the 
underlying ontology. The questions to be asked are about the complexity of the social world. 
The research puzzle to be addressed here is an example of just such a question. In order to 
trace the causal mechanisms it is necessary to look at the influences of policy makers and 
decision takers at various different times and the implications these decisions had after they 
were taken. 
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Tansey (2006) and Odell (2005) have criticised George and Bennett for having a narrow 
methodological range. They “….tend to equate the case study method with the historian’s 
method” and as a result “…other forms of data collection including interviewing are left 
largely under explored.” Tansey (2007) and Odell (2006) highlight that elite interviewing 
should be considered by the process tracer as well as archives and documents. It does not 
contradict George and Bennett’s approach and is a method used here.  
3.2. Causal Mechanisms 
So we see that the distinctive feature of process tracing is that it sets out to explicate causal 
mechanisms in small n studies to a high level of detail which gives them internal validity and 
possibly external validity. Thus methodologically it is looking to explain any link between 
cause and effect by tracing the possible process by which an event happened and looking 
for evidence to support the case. In short, the process tracing method is more akin to 
detective work than that of a “scientist” in the positivist sense. The quality of the argument 
lies in establishing the causal process rather than its predictive power.  
Causal mechanisms are “…a set of hypotheses that could be the explanation for some 
social phenomenon, the explanation being in terms of interactions between individuals and 
other individuals or between individuals and some social aggregate.” (Hedstroem and 
Swedberg 1998: 25) or “…the process and intervening variables through which an 
explanatory variable exerts a causal effect on an outcome variable.” (Mahoney 2005: 363)45. 
For George and Bennett (2005:141) the causal mechanism is a “process” (“X leads to Y 
through steps A, B and C”) rather than a law (if X then Y).  The causal process is not 
demonstrated solely by correlation but also “the specification of our hypotheses about a 
causal process that brought about the correlation.” (Bennett 2003: 16). Causal mechanisms 
                                               
45 Bennett (2003: 12) offers the following definition of causal mechanisms: “…ultimately unobservable 
physical, social or psychological processes through which agents with casual capacities operate in 
specific contexts to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities. In so doing, the causal 
agent changes the affected entity’s characteristics, capacities or propensities in ways that persist 
unless and until subsequent causal mechanisms act upon it.” 
 
76 
 
work at a micro level of analysis – rather than macro – because of the detail needed to 
provide the evidence of process (Checkel 2005:4).  Exactly how micro to go is a matter of 
judgment. At some stage it will be necessary to stop and therefore some presumptions will 
be required. However the level of presumption is much lower than that required for 
correlational quantitative methods.  
In conclusion, causal mechanisms are the processes by which complex variables interact to 
form events between start and finish and we identify them through process tracing. 
“Process tracing attempts to empirically establish the posited 
intervening variables and implications that should be true in a 
case if a particular explanation of that case is true.” (George and 
Bennett 2005: 147) 
The method of process tracing is to examine the available sources – official documents, 
media reports, interviews, biographies – for evidence to support a hypothesised causal 
process and to make a case for it.   
3.3. Criticisms of process tracing. 
The criticisms of process tracing revolve around its association with case study research and 
the implications thereof for generalisation rather than anything inherent in process tracing 
itself. As previously discussed, King et al. (1994) dismissed the importance of the 
mechanism in favour of the outcome or correlation.  
“We can define a causal effect without understanding all of the 
causal mechanisms involved but we cannot identify causal 
mechanisms without defining the concept of causal effect. “ (King 
et al. 1994: 86)  
Thus for “traditional” i.e.: positivist political scientists, process tracing is history rather than 
political “science”. For George and Bennett (2005: 138) this view is logically flawed and 
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“…risks conflating the definition of causality with that of causal effect.”  They urge us not to 
confuse predictive relationships with causal explanations ie: that x happens does not explain 
how or why. It varies from deductive nomological methods and comparing the two is like 
comparing “apples and oranges” (George and Bennett 2005: 138). King et al also criticised 
small n studies as not being rigorous for not considering alternative theories, selection bias 
and measurement error. George and Bennett retort that the detail provided by process 
tracing compensates for these issues. Indeed while quantitative research makes many 
assumptions in the name of parsimonious theory, process tracing is inductively considering 
many options and alternative theories. 
George and Bennett (2005) acknowledge there are limits to process tracing (see also 
Bennett and Elman 2006; Checkel 2005). The causal path must be uninterrupted or else 
“causal validity is challenged.” (George and Bennett 2005: 221). There may also be more 
than one explanation to fit the evidence thrown up by process tracing. The method is also 
time consuming and can throw up false positives as well as false negatives. The quality of 
evidence is paramount and the process tracing project can be compromised by lack of data. 
It can lead to weak “kitchen sink arguments where everything matters”. (Checkel 2005:17) 
Whatever its other failings, process tracing can only be criticised for not being generalisable 
if generalisability is the standard by which it is judged. On the positive side, its level of detail 
allows causal inference and also may highlight previously unidentified variables. For these 
reasons it has high explanatory potential. 
3.4. “The problem of complexity” 
The basis of process tracing – and one of its benefits - is that it can deal with the “problem of 
complexity” (George and Bennett 2005: 13) in a way which previously hegemonic 
quantitative methods could not. This had meant complexity was under emphasised in 
political science thereby missing the importance of such issues as equi-finality – different 
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causal paths to the same outcome - multi-finality – different outcomes from the same causal 
path (Sayer 2000) - feedback loops, path dependence and other causal concepts.  
“Process tracing is a methodology well suited to testing theories in 
a world marked by multiple interaction effects where it is difficult to 
explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables – 
precisely the world that more and more social scientists believe 
we confront.” (Hall 2003: 18) 
By using process tracing the analyst can restore complexity to the development of theory. 
George and Bennett’s (2005) critique is in the name of theory development and explanatory 
content. Qualitative methods which defer to correlation are not able to address the problem 
of complexity which the authors are sure exists. However, process tracing – with its 
alternative method of identifying causal mechanisms – is able to do this. Process tracers 
“make a case” for a given argument. To use an analogy: 90% of arson cases are committed 
by the owners of the building involved. However this does not prove the guilt of an individual 
in any one instance. To do that, a case must be made. In making that case, complex causal 
relationships may be unveiled.  
At the same time, there is a trade-off to be had between theoretical parsimony and thick 
description. Which method is chosen depends on the definition of scientific rigor which is 
being applied and what questions are being asked. For process tracers the question will 
usually involve complexity. In this case the epistemological assumption is one of critical 
realism (Wight 2006).  The result will not be generalisable across cases but instead will be a 
within case study of the EU and the accession process of Turkey. This spans 1999-2004 
although in effect it is necessary to refer to events up to two years either side of these 
arbitrary points in time to encompass events from the Luxembourg European Council of1997 
up to the date when formal accession talks actually began in October 2005. It will 
fundamentally argue that the processes which lead to the Brussels European Council in 
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2004 and the formal opening of accession talks the following October are path dependent. 
This study is seeking to explicate the causal mechanisms at play.  
Conclusion   
The research question in hand asks why the Brussels European Council in 2004 agreed to 
open accession negotiations with Turkey when this was not a universally popular policy 
decision. Why did some member states vote against their own judgment and that of public 
and elite opinion in their own countries? As outlined in Chapter One this is an extremely 
complex area involving concepts of structure, process and agency. In order to encompass 
this variety of concepts it is necessary for the theoretical, metatheoretical and 
methodological approaches to be able to deal with complexity. How is it possible to frame a 
research programme which can encompass such theoretical eclecticism including structure 
and agency and an equally Byzantine empirical landscape involving issues such as Kosovo, 
ESDP, Cyprus, eastern enlargement of the EU (and NATO) plus the consequences of 
September 11th 2001, the “war on terror” and the second Iraq war?  
It has been argued in this chapter that this can be done within a critical realist epistemology 
which does not claim to be able to pinpoint “truth” in the positivist sense but which does aim 
to make a rigorous case for a given causal process through detailed process-tracing. 
Deviating from the positivist epistemology enables the critical realist to draw on both 
rationalist and reflectivist insights without issues of commensurability which means the 
Historical Institutionalism of Steinmo (2008) is feasible. It maintains that ideas as well as 
interests can initiate temporal path dependent processes. It also makes a virtue of taking 
context, and complexity, into account when considering a research puzzle. In this way 
structure and agency are not viewed as a binary choice but are instead placed in an 
interactive relationship whereby the precise association between structure and agency is a 
judgment call which depends on the context. Within this context are concepts of identity and 
security both of which are influences on the interests and ideas of the actors involved. This is 
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a “stretched” definition of Historical Institutionalism compared to its original incarnation 
(Steinmo et al 1992) but is entirely coherent in a wider discipline which in the past twenty 
years has embraced social constructivism (Wendt 1999) and moved on from a positivist 
definition of validity and rigour in qualitative analysis (King et al 1994). It is significant here 
that Sven Steinmo himself has made this journey across the rationalist-reflectivist divide. His 
later work redefines HI as an “approach” rather than a “theory” per se. The framework for 
analysis here defined can accommodate the following propositions: 
• Structural factors enable change to take place, but processes of interaction within 
institutional contexts determine the timing and nature of the changes that take place. 
• Specifically, the roles of ’critical junctures’ and path dependency within an HI 
approach enable the analysis to ask questions about the ways in which change is 
initiated and about how decisions taken at one point in time affect decisions taken at 
later points. 
• Questions of security and identity reflect both the impact of broad contexts and 
structural change and the impact of middle-range processes, and thus provide a 
bridge between an HI approach and the broader context within which institutional 
interactions take place. 
• The HI approach accommodates the interaction of member states and ‘European’ 
institutions within the context of discussion of issues such as Turkish membership, 
and enables analysis to highlight these interactions and their impact on the evolution 
of the relationship. 
• Process tracing is designed to produce the kind of structured and focused description 
of EU-Turkish relations between 1999 and 2004 that will enable the complexity of 
motives and actions to be assessed and the impact of incremental commitment, 
advocacy and rhetorical entrapment to be gauged. 
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These elements produce a set of key conceptual questions that will underlie the empirical 
chapters that follow, and that will provide the structure for the overall conclusions to the 
thesis. In taking the propositions suggested by the review of existing literature it does not 
take issue with them but offers “added value” through a temporal and complex explanation. 
In other words the Historical Institutionalist approach allows the analyst to approach the 
study in a way which offers scope for complex understanding and explanation. It will do so 
by asking the following questions:  
• What are the patterns of interaction between structure, process and agency that 
shaped the decisions in 1999 to admit Turkey as a candidate and then in 2004 to 
open negotiations with Turkey? 
• What evidence is there of the impact of critical junctures and of path dependency 
(with its associated forces of increasing returns, self-reinforcement, positive feedback 
and lock-in) in the evolution of EU-Turkey relations during the period 1999-2004? 
• What evidence is there of the interaction between different agents within the process 
of EU-Turkey relations, and in particular of the interaction between member states 
and European institutions? What impact did different agents have on the process? 
• What is the evidence that the above factors (structure and process, critical junctures 
and path dependency, security and identity, agency and institutions) played key roles 
in generating the patterns of incremental commitment, advocacy and rhetorical 
entrapment that one would expect to operate in the evolution of EU-Turkey relations? 
In particular, how did such patterns affect the decision to grant candidacy in 1999, 
the decision to open negotiations in 2004, and the treatment of specific problems 
such as Cyprus, ESDP and security cultures? 
The empirical chapters, three to five, will now look at how structure, process and agency 
interacted within the time frame in order to provide detailed evidence for the hypothesised 
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path dependent processes of incrementalism, advocacy and rhetorical entrapment. These 
will allow an assessment of both how and why Turkey has come to be in accession 
negotiations. Chapter Three takes the period between the Luxembourg summit in 1997 and 
the Helsinki summit in 1999 and the EU policy on Turkey which changed so drastically in this 
time. Chapter Four starts post Helsinki and goes up to the Copenhagen European Council 
looking at the processes which led to the highly conditional Presidency conclusions in 2002. 
Finally Chapter Five will explore the processes leading up to the Brussels European Council 
summit of December 2004.  
This chapter has set out the elements of a framework for the analysis of EU-Turkey relations, 
and specifically the changing position of the EU on Turkish candidacy and potential 
accession between 1999 and 2004. It has presented the case for a Historical Institutionalist 
approach, which can accommodate both the influence of structural factors and the agency of 
individuals on the path dependent processes which ensue. Additionally, this Historical 
Institutionalist approach, which is based on the work of Steinmo (2008), can argue that only 
by looking across time can the complex interplay of agency and structure be seen in its path 
dependent context. In other words the temporal approach can highlight the processes which 
result from activity in an environment which is influenced by both structure and agency. What 
Historical Institutionalism offers, as well as the temporal perspective, is the option not to 
decide which of these complex factors is dominant prior to examination of the empirical 
evidence. For HI, as defined by Steinmo (2008), this can only be done on a case by case 
basis once the evidence has been consulted. In this case, structural factors such as CEEC 
enlargement and ESDP, unleashed by the end of the Cold War, led to the scenario where 
the agency - strategic use of norms - was possible because of the path dependent 
processes involved. The active rhetorical entrapment of some member states was possible 
because of the decisions taken by the European Council at an earlier stage under pressure 
from structural issues.  
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Chapter Three: From Luxembourg to 
Helsinki  
 
At the beginning of 1999 it seemed faintly ridiculous that Turkey could be a candidate of the 
European Union in the near future. The EU was still dealing with the consequences of its 
decision at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 not to include Turkey with 
the CEEC round of enlargement. Turkey itself meanwhile had been without a government 
since November 1998 when the previous Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, had lost a vote of no 
confidence in the Parliament amidst allegations of corruption46. The next incumbent Bulent 
Ecevit, of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) arrived with an anti-EU mandate and the legacy 
of having been the Prime Minister in 1974 when Turkey invaded northern Cyprus. Turkey’s 
human rights record was still being questioned even by allies such as the US State 
Department47. Its relations with Greece remained hidebound by mutual suspicion with the 
on-going disputes over Imia/Kardak and Cyprus showing no sign of resolution. The murky 
secret service waters surrounding the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan – and his claims that 
Greece had previously funded the PKK – threatened to polarise positions further.   
However if we fast forward less than a year we see the apparently unlikely scenario of the 
EU’s Enlargement Commissioner, Günter Verheugen, and its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy High Representative, Javier Solana, flying to Ankara from the 1999 European Council 
in Helsinki to persuade the Ecevit government that Turkey should become a candidate for 
                                               
46 BBC News, 25th November 1998. “'Corrupt' Turkish government falls.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/25/newsid_4141000/4141566.stm 
47 US State Department Human Rights Report on Turkey 1998 – published May 1999.  
“There is a general recognition, including by the Government, that the country's human rights 
performance is inadequate and needs to be brought in line, not only with its international obligations 
and commitments, but also with popular aspirations and demands and the Government's own 
policies.”  
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the EU. It is valid to ask therefore – what happened to change EU policy so dramatically 
between 1997 and 1999?  
 
This chapter will make a case that the EU’s policy change was primarily due to structural 
geostrategic reasons. The apparent volte face in EU policy towards Turkey was actually a 
process of incremental change throughout 1999 influenced by a variety of security reasons 
and actors. These were broadly speaking initiated by the Balkan wars of the 1990s and in 
particular by the Kosovo conflict. As a result of the impending conflict in Kosovo the USA 
upped its longstanding efforts in late 1998/early 1999 to find a solution to the Cyprus issue in 
order to maintain stability between Greece and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean for the 
sake of NATO. Kosovo also influenced EU enlargement and security policy. Firstly, it 
convinced member states of the need for the ESDI/ESDP project initiated at St Malo in 
December 1998 and expedited its progress. Secondly, it changed attitudes of the member 
states towards the eastern enlargement of the EU. The desire not to see a repeat of Kosovo 
overcame residual reticence amongst some members and once more expedited the 
progress of eastern enlargement from the “wave” approach to the “regatta”. As a result, 
Turkey’s pivotal role in both ESDP and eastern enlargement meant that by December 1999 
those member states remaining opposed to Turkish accession were minded to overlook their 
misgivings and thus there was the political will for candidacy to be offered. 
However, whilst those states opposed to Turkey on normative grounds were minded to 
overlook misgivings, this was not so true of Greece whose objections were of a more 
“cultural” or “religious” nature and hinged on the troubled issue of Cyprus. Considerable 
progress was made in the relationship between Ankara and Athens during 1999, facilitated 
by the earthquakes of August and September 1999, but problems remained over the Cyprus 
issue which went to the wire at Helsinki. The accession of Cyprus was crucial to the 
unhindered progress of the remaining eastern enlargement round as Greece had made it 
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clear within the EU forum that it would hinder the progress of the CEEC enlargement round if 
the Republic of Cyprus was not included. Primarily for this reason, Verheugen and Solana 
made the late night dash from one edge of Europe to the other in order to persuade Bulent 
Ecevit to return with them to Helsinki and sign on the dotted line. 
1. The Kosovo effect 
The Kosovo conflict in 1999 was a catalyst in the Turkey-EU accession process. It altered 
the structural geostrategic circumstances in which the Turkish case was operating. The 
influence it had on the USA, the EU and its member states worked in favour of the Turkish 
case. This section will now outline the various aspects to this claim and provide empirical 
evidence in support of them. 
1.1. The Luxembourg European Council 1997.  
Turkey was one of the first applicants ever to apply to the EU, in 1959. Its position as an 
“eligible” country at all can be attributed to the Cold War fault lines which placed it in the 
“West” as a member of NATO (Park 2000a:32). As was outlined in Chapter One, the 
European member states at that time acknowledged Turkey’s geostrategic value for NATO 
but were more critical than the USA of Ankara’s record on human rights and democracy, 
problematic economy, demographic profile and religion (Pope and Pope 1997: 186). These 
issues gave the EU reasons not to take the Turkish case any further than the Customs 
Union of 1995 and Turkey was not included in the enlargement round outlined at the 
Luxembourg European Council in 1997. Whilst the EU did reaffirm Turkey’s eligibility for EU 
accession, the decision not to include Ankara as a candidate was justified by reference to 
Turkey’s record on human rights and democracy. Measures to improve that record were 
included: 
“While the political and economic conditions allowing accession 
negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council 
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considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn 
up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the 
European Union in every field.”48 
This caused consternation in Turkey (Robins 2003a: 109). The Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, 
issued a statement dismissing the proposed European strategy and claiming that Turkey had 
been the victim of “partial, prejudiced and exaggerated” assessments of its “domestic 
structure and foreign policy” (Robins 2003a: 109). Turkey was aggrieved that Bulgaria, 
Romania and crucially Cyprus had been included when it hadn’t. For this reason, Ankara 
suspended “political dialogue” with the EU (whilst maintaining economic dialogue with the 
EU and bilateral relations with Member States)49 It is puzzling, therefore, that two years later 
the EU’s view had changed even though Turkey had not significantly improved its record of 
human rights and democracy. It is an “…interesting and paradoxical period to explore.” (Onis 
2000:8) 
Less than a week after the disappointment of the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, 
the Turkish Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz, flew to Washington to see President Bill Clinton50. 
Washington had been disappointed by the EU’s decision at Luxembourg not to include 
Turkey in the enlargement round. In American eyes, Turkey remained a crucial geostrategic 
ally and also deserved a reward for loyalty during the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. It 
was geopolitically placed at the heart of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East and 
was symbolically vital as a Muslim democracy. Washington’s priority was to stabilise the 
south eastern Mediterranean region ie: Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and avert any threat of 
military conflict between two NATO allies as had nearly happened in 1996. Additionally it 
saw EU accession as a way of democratising and stabilising Turkey.51 Clinton summarised 
his view thus: 
                                               
48 Luxembourg EU Council Presidency conclusions, December 1997, Section 31.  
49 Turkish Daily News, December 15th 1997,  We beg to differ with the optimism of EU officials.  
50 Turkish Daily News, December 20th 1997, Washington rolls out a deep red carpet for Yilmaz 
51 Senior State Department official – interview – March 2010. 
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"If you look at the size of the country, if you look at its geo-strategic 
significance, what it could block and what it could open the doors to, it 
is terribly important.”52 
The EU was apparently less concerned with strategic considerations in 1997 than with 
maintaining its core values of human rights and democracy. The incumbent President of the 
European Council, the Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker stated that “…it is 
not possible for countries that practice torture to sit round our table…”53. However the 
severity of this statement was widely seen as a geostrategic mistake among the member 
states notwithstanding Turkey’s undeniable democratic and human rights failings. 
“Most member states were pretty appalled by the way it had been 
handled by the Commission and by Juncker. They made it clear that 
they had not vetoed (Turkey) and they did not wish to slam the 
door.”54 
The USA – and those member states who appreciated the geostrategic significance of 
Turkey – was keen for the EU accession process to become the means by which Turkey’s 
democratic failings were addressed in order to promote stability in the eastern 
Mediterranean. In other words there was a feeling within EU circles that doing nothing was 
not an option for geopolitical reasons55. The USA handed the UK, which was due to take 
over the EU Presidency in January 1998, the task of “soothing Turkish anger” and bringing 
Ankara back into the fold56. 
In January 1998, the then Sir David Hannay57 was named by the British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair, as his personal envoy to Turkey. As a former UK ambassador to the UN and envoy to 
                                               
52 Financial Times, December 19th 1997. Washington set to soothe Turkey's wounded pride. 
53 Luxemburger Wort newspaper, quoted by Agence France Press, December 12th 1997. Fears of 
Turkey rift overshadow EU summit. 
54 Senior UK diplomat A – interview, March 2010. 
55 Senior State Department Official – interview March 2010 
56 The Times, December 22nd 1997. US seeks to defuse Turkish quarrel. 
57 Lord Hannay since 2001, hereafter referred to as Lord Hannay. 
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Cyprus, Hannay was familiar with the area and was given the brief to “smooth ruffled 
feelings in Ankara, persuade Turkey that Europe has not slammed the door on it and avert 
the threat of rhetorical escalation and even military adventurism in the volatile region.”58 As 
Lord Hannay himself has since reflected the “general view” was that the Turkish government 
had over-reacted at Luxembourg and now “needed to be helped out of the hole into which 
they had thrown themselves.” The issue was complicated by the involvement of Greece and 
the Republic of Cyprus within the EU. 
 “There was some awareness that the text of the conclusions of 
Luxembourg had been rather provocative and a continuing feeling of 
guilt, everywhere except in Athens, that the EU had not been able to 
honour its commitment to provide financial aid under the 1995 
Customs Union Agreement59. All were only too well aware that there 
would be no progress in solving the Cyprus problem as long as 
Turkey was so deeply disenchanted with the international community.” 
(Hannay 2005: 85) 
The UK Prime Minister Tony Blair was instrumental in acting to placate Turkey’s ruffled 
feathers via Lord Hannay and by the time of the Cardiff Summit in March 1998 “the show 
was back on the road.”60 However, whilst Turkey may have been placated bilaterally behind 
the scenes this was not the case in public and with the EU. Ankara refused to attend the EU 
Council’s Cardiff summit in March 1998 or to participate in the European Strategy for Turkey. 
Its relations with Athens continued to be problematic and Greece continued to block EU 
Customs Union funds for Turkey. What changed at this time, to affect the Turkish case, was 
the impending Kosovo conflict which increased the need by outside actors to make progress 
on Turco-Greek relations in general, and the Cyprus issue in particular, for the sake of the 
                                               
58 The Times, January 20th 1998, British envoys try to defuse Turkish anger over EU snub. 
59 Greece had blocked the full implementation of the EU’s 1995 Customs Union agreement with 
Turkey as part of on-going hostilities. See Rumelili (2003: 224) and below Section 1.2.  
60 Senior UK diplomat A – interview, March 2010 
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NATO response to Kosovo and the EU response to Kosovo (ESDP and eastern 
enlargement). 
1.2. Cyprus 
The Republic of Cyprus was given candidate status of the EU in 1997 with the wider CEEC 
enlargement round. It had made good progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria 
and the acquis communautaire and therefore there was no reason not to take the process 
further at the 1999 Helsinki European Council . However the EU was reluctant to admit 
Greek Cyprus without a solution to the Cyprus issue61.  
Greek Cyprus applied to the EU in 1990 and whilst it was highly eligible in terms of the 
Copenhagen criteria, the division of the island was problematic. Admitting Greek Cyprus 
without its Turkish counterpart (TRNC) would import the seeming intractable Cyprus issue 
into the EU’s jurisdiction and would alienate Turkey, the geostrategic value of which was 
acknowledged. This was made clear to the Republic of Cyprus in the European 
Commission’s opinion in 1993. During its Presidency of the European Council in the first half 
of 1994, Greece was able to work a deal and at the Corfu European Council summit, in June, 
Cyprus was endorsed as a potential candidate amidst strong rumours that Greece had 
threatened to block the CEEC enlargement round if this was not done62. Such dealing was 
further entrenched the following year when Greece agreed not to veto Customs Union for 
Turkey on the condition that Cyprus was made an official candidate as soon as possible63. 
Conversely, the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller gave tacit agreement to Cypriot EU 
candidacy on the same basis.  
The next priority for the Greek government was to separate the Republic of Cyprus’ EU path 
from that of the Cyprus issue. In the run up to the Luxembourg European Council in 1997, it 
was clear that it would block the CEEC enlargement round if Cypriot progress was made 
                                               
61 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
62 Senior Turkish diplomat A – interview – March 2010.  
63 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. See also European Report, 
February 4th 1995. EU initiative on Cyprus could pave the way for Customs Union. http://eisnet.eis.be 
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dependent on a solution to the Cyprus issue. Thus, as the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf 
Denktash was not in favour of Turkish accession to the EU whilst the Republic of Cyprus 
was already virtually assured of its place, there was very little incentive for either side to find 
a solution to the Cyprus issue64.  
As a result, in 1999 the EU found itself in the position of being obliged to include the 
Republic of Cyprus if it wanted to pursue eastern enlargement. This was stated several 
times by different officials within the European Council and the Commission during 
interviews in February/March 2010. It was “…impossible to take in new member states 
without Cyprus. Greece would have vetoed it.”65 Furthermore it was “….absolutely clear, you 
will never find it in written form, but we would never get an accession treaty ratified by the 
Greek parliament unless Cyprus was part of it.”66 and “….the Greeks made the case that 
there was to be no CEEC enlargement if Cyprus was not involved.” 67   For this reason the 
imperative to find a solution to the Cyprus issue before Cyprus acceded increased at the 
same time that the likelihood of this happening decreased.  
In so doing the EU faced the prospect of alienating Turkey further. As enlargement was a 
“…priority not to be jeopardised because of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece…”68 it was therefore 
necessary to either find a solution to the Cyprus issue, and reunite the island, or find a way 
to placate Turkey such that Ankara was not alienated beyond repair. If this could not be 
done the issue of Cyprus was threatening to derail the eastern enlargement process itself 
seen, post Kosovo, as a means of ensuring the future security of Europe itself as well as the 
EU (Higashino 2004).  
In these ways the desire to facilitate eastern enlargement – highlighted by the Kosovo 
conflict – worked in favour of the Turkish case. The EU was less able to lecture Turkey about 
                                               
64 The UK government had repeatedly made this point in 1994/5 but was overruled because of the 
trade benefits mainly by the French according to Senior UK Diplomat A – interview – March 2010. 
65 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
66 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. 
67 Dutch Diplomat – interview – March 2010.  
68 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
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the need for conditionality if it was lowering the bar for Bulgaria and Romania. Moreover the 
urgent need to find a solution to the Cyprus issue in order to push forward eastern 
enlargement required Turkish (and Greek) co-operation and “…it was clear that they (the EU 
member states) had also to give something to Turkey.” 69 
From September 1999, until the Helsinki summit in December, concerted diplomatic efforts 
were made by the EU in order to “find a formula that would allow us to go along (ie: carry on) 
even if there was no solution (to the Cyprus issue).”70 The EU member states and the 
Americans also worked to bring the Turkish government “on side” and to find a solution to 
the Cyprus issue. For the EU, this was a relatively new policy but for the US and the UK it 
was merely a continuation of efforts which had, to date, been unsuccessful. A number of 
extraneous factors facilitated these efforts during 1999 and these will be examined in the 
next section.  
1.3. The Kosovo Campaign, March-June 1999. 
The NATO campaign Operation Allied Force began at 8pm GMT on March 24th 1999 and 
lasted until June 3rd of the same year when a ceasefire proposed by the Russian envoy 
Viktor Chernomyrdin and the EU envoy, the Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, was accepted 
by Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian President. The two month air campaign was “The most 
intense and sustained military operation to have been conducted in Europe since the end of 
World War II …” (Lambeth 2001:xx-xxi) and created a refugee problem not seen in Europe 
since the 1940s as well as several thousand Serbian military and civilian deaths and major 
damage to Serbian infrastructure.  
Signs of conflict in Kosovo had been obvious for some time as the dispute between the 
ethnic Albanian secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) met the full might of the 
nationalist Serbian state. Whilst acknowledging the KLA’s equally bloody tactics, the 
consensus of the international community was that “…blame for the collapse into full scale 
                                               
69 Senior European Commission official A – interview – March 2010 
70 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. 
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civil war”, which was killing tens of thousands of ethnic Albanian Kosovars, should be 
“placed squarely on the shoulders of Milosevic.” (Webber and Sperling 2009: 450). A year 
before, in March 1998, the American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, mindful of the 
previous civilian massacres in Bosnia, had warned Milosevic that bloodshed against civilian 
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo would not be tolerated71. The UN Security Council passed a 
resolution calling for them to stop and threatened NATO airstrikes in October 199872. These 
were averted by an agreement brokered by the US special envoy Richard Holbrooke73. 
However, breaches continued and a last ditch meeting at Rambouillet in March 1999 of the 
foreign ministers of the international contact group failed to reach agreement with 
Milosevic74. A final ultimatum delivered by Holbrooke on March 22nd 1999 also failed and the 
next day control of the Operation was handed over to NATO’s Allied Supreme Commander, 
General Wesley Clarke, to commence the air assault. 
Washington had long believed that stability in the eastern Mediterranean was generally 
geostrategically desirable and this was heightened by the impending Kosovo conflict. Thus 
from early 1999 Washington stepped up its efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus issue and 
lobbied hard in EU capitals for Turkish candidacy. At the same time the EU’s reaction to 
Kosovo was the rapid development of its own capability - ESDP. This section will now 
explore how these consequences of Kosovo worked in favour of Turkish candidacy at the 
Helsinki European Council of December 1999. 
1.4. The USA  
The USA had viewed Turkey as a strategic ally throughout the Cold War and for this reason 
had been prepared to overlook Turkey’s shortcomings on human rights and democracy 
(Kuniholm 1991, Kushner 1994). It had viewed Turkish accession to the EU as a means to 
                                               
71 The Economist, March 14th 1998, The Kosovo cauldron. 
72 Financial Times, October 1st 1998, NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia draw nearer. 
73 Financial Times, October 1st 1998, NATO suspends threat to bomb Serbs; 
Financial Times, October  13th 1998, Holbrooke on verge of Kosovo breakthrough;  
Financial Times, October 13th 1998, NATO hardens its threat of air strikes against Serbs.  
74 House of Commons Research Paper, 99/48, April 29th 1999, Kosovo: Operation Allied Force  
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the end of stabilising Turkey’s democracy in the long term and promoting stability in the 
eastern Mediterranean ie: between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus for the sake of NATO unity 
and the wider good.  
“In 1993-4 we thought that if we could encourage Turkey’s entry into 
the EU as a full member then it would open the possibilities for the 
USA, Turkey and the EU to do something new in the 21st century.” 75  
To this end, after the failure of the Matutes package76, the US State Department “worked 
really hard on European governments and the EU institutions” for a Customs Union with 
Turkey and was buoyed by its success in doing so77. The division of Cyprus was the obvious 
stumbling block to further improving relations between Greece and Turkey and in June 1997 
President Bill Clinton appointed the Nobel prize nominee Holbrooke, fresh from securing the 
Dayton peace accord in Bosnia, as his envoy to Cyprus78.   
However even Holbrooke, variously described as “the Quentin Tarantino” of diplomacy79 and 
a “latter day Metternich” 80 found the Cyprus issue difficult to broker81. The impending signs 
of conflict in Kosovo in 1998, which Holbrooke himself was instrumental in trying to solve, 
created a new urgency for a solution to Cyprus. On-going tensions between Greece and 
Turkey threatened to destabilise NATO as it prepared for the delicate operation in the 
Balkans in which Greece and Turkey were divided by religion along the same Orthodox 
Christian and Muslim lines as the Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. In early January 1999 the 
US administration began to try to kick start a solution to the Cypriot issue. NATO, and thus 
the USA, could not risk “losing” Kosovo because of the consequences for the region – in 
                                               
75 Senior USA State Department official – interview – March 2010. 
76 The Matutes package (prepared by the Spanish politician Abel Matutes) was a series of measures 
suggested by the EU in 1990 after the rejection of Ankara’s 1987 application to prepare Turkey for 
future EU membership. A watered down version of the Matutes package was the basis for the (See 
Redmond 1993; Arikan 2006). 
77 Senior USA State Department official – interview – March 2010. 
78 The Financial Times, June 9th 1997. Stakes are high for Cyprus initiative. 
79 The Economist, June 13th 1998. US ed. Peacemaking in Bosnia: Junkyard Dogs. 
80 British Diplomatic Oral History Project, Churchill College, University of Cambridge. Sir Ivor Roberts 
interview, Page 26.  
81 The Guardian, May 5th 1998. Peace envoy leaves Cyprus in despair. 
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terms of escalation of conflict or more likely a refugee crisis - and the potentially catastrophic 
loss of credibility for NATO82.  
On January 4th 1999, Richard Holbrooke contacted Glafkos Clerides, the Cypriot President 
to arrange a meeting between Clerides and Bill Clinton. In late January the Turkish 
ambassador Mark Parris made similar overtures to the caretaker Prime Minister in Ankara 
Bulent Ecevit. On January 28th it was announced that Bill Clinton would visit both Athens 
and Ankara in November 1999 when he was in Istanbul for the Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit. This was the first American head of state visit to 
Greece since George Bush Senior in 199083.  
In the meantime, in early 1999, the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright84, and Bill 
Clinton85 emphasised the interdependent and insecure nature of the Balkans and the 
eastern Mediterranean. The view of the US administration was that a solution to the Cyprus 
issue was the key to wider problems. 
“We share a critical interest in bringing about a diplomatic resolution 
to the Cypriot problem for we cannot meet our broader goals as long 
as Cyprus remains unsolved.” 86 
For this reason, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus had come under pressure, from 
Washington, not to site Russian-made S300 missiles on Cypriot territory which they had 
reluctantly agreed not to do87.  
                                               
82 Deutsche Presse Agentur, April16th 1999, Kosovo casts long shadow over NATO 50th anniversary.  
83 United Press International, January 28th 1999. Clinton set to visit Greece in November 
84 Madeleine Albright quoted by US Federal News Service February 4th 1999. “We must never forget 
there is no natural boundary to violence in southern Europe. Spreading conflict could re-ignite fighting 
in neighbouring Albania and destabilise fragile Macedonia. It could affect our NATO allies Greece and 
Turkey and it could flood the region with refugees and create a haven for international terrorists, drug 
traffickers and criminals.” 
85 Associated Press, February 4th 1999. Clinton seriously considering sending troops to Kosovo. “The 
Balkans are an explosive area. They touch other difficult areas, and unless we can contain and 
ultimately defuse the ethnic hatreds in that region they can embroil us...in a much larger conflict. The 
time to stop this conflict in Kosovo is now before it spreads and when it can be contained at an 
acceptable cost." 
86 Associated Press, February 17th 1999. Albright says missiles decision opens new opportunities for 
an accord. 
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The Americans thus demonstrated willingness to apply pressure to both Greece and Turkey 
over Cyprus for the wider good of NATO. Turkish accession to the EU was seen as a 
desirable long term goal and a solution to Cyprus was a precursor to that. The Kosovo 
conflict gave this long term goal added impetus in late 1998/early 1999 and this active role 
by the State Department was to continue throughout 1999. At the same time Kosovo had 
created angst in EU capitals which were morally concerned about ethnic cleansing and 
practically concerned about the potential of the Kosovo issue to spread and create refugee 
crises within the EU88. It will be argued in the next section that these broad concerns helped 
win backing from the member states for the Anglo-French St Malo ESDI/P initiative.  
1.5. The EU - ESDP 
At the end of the Cold War, the structure of European security arrangements required a new 
direction. Both the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), within the post-
Maastricht Treaty EU, and NATO itself, were incomplete. The CFSP lacked the military 
capability to shore up its humanitarian and peacekeeping intent whilst NATO had the 
capability but its raison d’etre had dissipated at the same time as the Soviet Union (Duke 
2001:33).  
Between 1994 and 1996, NATO developed the notion of the Combined Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) in order to offer “capability” to the Western European Union to carry out the St 
Petersberg tasks89. It was a “deployable, multinational multi-service formation generated and 
tailored for specific contingency operations.” (Terriff 2003: 39). As such it “provided an 
answer to those who had questioned whether the alliance did have a role in the post-Cold 
War era or whether it was simply an anachronism whose day was done.” (Terriff 2003: 39). 
The CJTF concept was formalised at the NATO Berlin meeting90 in June 1996 which laid 
down its “separable but not separate” nature and the European Security and Defence 
                                                                                                                                                  
87 Financial Times, December 30th 1998. Cyprus backtracks over missiles. 
88 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement C – interview – March 2010. 
89 The provision of humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and crisis management. 
90 See NATO, Final Communiqué, Ministerial meeting of the NAC, June 3rd 1996.. 
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Identity (ESDI) (Donfried and Gallis  2000; Yost 2007 ). This would give the EU some 
capability and enable the member states to act even if the U.S. saw “…no compelling reason 
for involvement.” (Duke 2001: 33). It was also a means to restore NATO’s raison d’être in the 
European sphere. NATO was the provider of security but would enable the EU – at this 
stage through the Western European Union (WEU) - to act even when NATO itself was not 
involved directly. However at that stage the exact nature of the CJTF chain of command was 
not explicit i.e.: whether the CJTF would remain attached to NATO and be led by U.S. 
command or whether it would be based within the WEU and led by European NATO 
personnel.  
Whilst this point was not crucial in 1996, it was to become so two years later. The 
experience of the Bosnian war and the looming Kosovo conflict had by then convinced Tony 
Blair a European capability was needed and he “regretted European performance over 
Bosnia as a failure…”91. 
“He formed a strategic judgement that we should work with the French 
to shape a European defence identity strategy rather than see it 
shaped by the French and the Germans.”92 
Blair was motivated by the desire to have a means to enforce peace following the 
frustrations of Bosnia when Europe had been seemingly unable to do so without the 
involvement of the USA. This was not an isolated view. The former Conservative politician 
Chris (now Lord) Patten put it thus: 
“When Yugoslavia is being dismembered, men butchered, villages 
burned down, women raped and Europe did bugger all…I think that 
was a terrible moment in our history and in Europe’s history.”93 
                                               
91 Senior UK diplomat C – interview - April 2010 
92 Senior UK diplomat B – interview - March 2010 
93 Lord Patten. Comments made in “Getting our Way”, presented by Sir Christopher Meyer, BBC 4. 
Broadcast on February 23rd 2010. Wingspan Productions. 
97 
 
To this end Blair was keen to have an autonomous European capability outside of NATO as 
“Europe's military capabilities at this stage are modest - too modest."94 
Thus, at the St Malo meeting with Jacques Chirac in December 1998 the British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair withdrew previous UK objections to incorporating the WEU into the EU in 
order for the EU to be able to “…play its full role on the international stage.” 
“To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous 
action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to 
decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises.” 95 
The effect of this was to enable the EU to bring “ESDI” and the CJTF under tighter control 
and to transform them into an intergovernmental entity within the European Council and not 
within NATO. It thereby implicitly challenged NATO’s newfound role and unsettled those 
states, such as Turkey, who were embedded into the WEU and NATO – but not the EU.  
“The challenge at hand was no longer constructing a WEU based 
ESDI within NATO but working out arrangements for the EU to 
pursue an European Security and Defence Policy in co-operation with 
the alliance.”(Yost 2007: 74). 
The St Malo declaration did acknowledge the wider concerns of non-EU NATO members96 
but nevertheless it created anxiety in Washington mainly as to the ulterior motives of 
Jacques Chirac. The Americans were reassured to some extent by the involvement of the 
UK and in particular George Robertson: 
                                               
94 Tony Blair quoted by BBC News online, March 8th 1999. 'We won't repeat Bosnia mistakes' - Blair  
95 The St Malo Declaration, December 4th 1998. Full transcript in Chaillot Paper No. 47 (Ruttens 2001) 
96 Franco- British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defence, St Malo, December 4th 1998. 
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“If it had been Franco-German then the Americans would have been 
more suspicious. At St Malo, because the British were in the lead the 
US thought they could be relaxed with it.”97 
However, after St Malo, American anxieties continued as the “pace picked up in bargaining 
between NATO and the EU over the nature of their relationship.” (Hunter and Farley 2002: 
53). The Americans were not opposed in principle to the EU desire for an independent 
capability. Washington had been pushing for Europe to take more responsibility for its 
security and accepted that this was the “quid pro quo”98 for securing the involvement of the 
French government. However in the months to follow there was a degree of uncertainty 
about where the line of command would end causing increasing anxiety in Washington and 
Ankara. It was not clear how an ESDP could keep the non-EU NATO states happy, 
negotiate access to CJTF and maintain a transatlantic relationship. “We were saying to the 
member states….(that) they were alienating us (USA).”99 
At the 50th anniversary NATO summit in Washington, in April 1999, NATO formally accepted, 
in principle, the EU’s desire to have a capability for “autonomous action” with the proviso of 
the “3Ds” - No decoupling, No duplication, No discrimination - outlined by Madeleine 
Albright.100 However its anxiety over the future of the transatlantic security relationship 
remained as did its broader concern for the status of Turkey within European security 
architecture (Tocci and Houben: 2001 4)101.  
Turkey’s anxiety was that the status it had enjoyed – and spent a lot of time negotiating102 - 
within the WEU would not be carried over into ESDP. Turkey had been a de facto member of 
                                               
97 Senior NATO official – interview – March 2010 
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100 Federal News Service, State Department press briefing, April 22nd 1999. Press briefing with 
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and British Secretary of State for Foreign and 
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own. Senior NATO official – interview – March 2010. See also statement by the US Ambassador to 
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the WEU with, among other things, the right to participate on the same basis as full 
members in WEU operations103 (see also Tocci and Houben 2001). Turkey wanted to retain 
a similar role in decision making within ESDI and had threatened to block agreement of the 
NATO Strategic Concept at the Washington summit unless this point was stressed. The 
Americans agreed to back Ankara and “at the eleventh hour” the EU members of NATO 
agreed to placate Ankara and “take into account the full participation of all European Allies if 
they were so to choose.” (The NATO Strategic Concept 1999. Para. 30.104; Donfried and 
Gallis 2000: 4). Furthermore the Washington Summit Communiqué stated: 
“We attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible 
involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response 
operations, building on existing consultation arrangements within 
the WEU.”105 
However the ambiguity over the EU NATO relationship remained. The Washington 
declaration still appeared to presume this would be done as part of an ESDI within NATO 
rather than an ESDP outside of it.  
This uncertainty was clarified somewhat at the Cologne European Council summit in June 
1999 when the concept of a European Security and Defence Policy was unveiled along with 
plans for the “possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU.”106 The Cologne European 
Council Presidency conclusions attempted to allay the American concerns of undermining 
NATO and alienating the non EU NATO members, but it was clear that ESDP would be an 
EU-led organisation.  
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“We welcome the results of the NATO Washington summit as regards 
NATO support for the process launched by the EU and its 
confirmation that a more effective role for the European Union in 
conflict prevention and crisis management will contribute to the vitality 
of a renewed Alliance. In implementing this process launched by the 
EU, we shall ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, 
cooperation and transparency between the European Union and 
NATO. We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in 
which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of 
the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU 
operations. We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU 
European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent 
in this endeavour.”107 
The last sentences of this paragraph again are reassuring prima facie but neither Turkey nor 
the USA was satisfied as it varied considerably from the NATO Washington Summit 
declaration and made no commitment to matching the WEU conditions for Turkey. For this 
reason it was “…..not surprising that the U.S. administration concluded that the EU had 
broken trust over this issue.” (Hunter and Farley 2002:57). Until this point the USA had felt 
that it could impose a limit on the size of the ESDP. They gradually realised that this was not 
the case and that “even the UK” would resist attempts through NATO to “freeze” ESDP at a 
certain point. 108  
This EU attitude to ESDP was “decisively influenced by Kosovo and the whole history of the 
European performance in the Western Balkans in the 1990s...” (Peters, I. 2004: 392). 
Kosovo in particular galvanised support for and provided the “political will” necessary to drive 
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ESDP forward109.  There was a feeling that “…this is our backyard and we should be able to 
sort it out…we need to speak with one voice.” 110 The appointment of the outgoing Secretary 
General of NATO, Javier Solana, (as opposed to an EU insider) is another example of this 
change of attitude to European security (Bilgin 2001). 
“It was not that the EU did not want to rely on NATO…it was not a 
competition with NATO…it was just that defence was something that 
the Europeans needed to be able to do themselves. You could trace 
that back to the Brussels Treaty of 1948.”111 
However whilst the EU changed its attitude to security capability it did not alter other aspects 
of its institutional identity. EU “theologians” 112 within the EU Council secretariat wanted to 
make ESDP “conform as much as possible to existing EU rules”. There was “no way the EU 
could change its institutional cloth to suit them (Turkey).”113 For this reason priority was given 
to “…getting the institutional arrangements right over the need to produce concrete 
pragmatic results.”114 The EU was unwilling to countenance non EU member involvement in 
ESDP and rejected Turkish participation on the associate de facto grounds it had enjoyed 
within the WEU. For its part the Turkish government found it hard to understand why the 
WEU arrangements could not carry over into ESDP and why the EU “…had to be so 
orthodox.”115 When the Turkish government realised “…they were not going to be part (of 
ESDP) in the same way as the WEU the Turkish military in particular were very upset.”116  
Turkey became insecure about its place within the western security architecture and the 
ability of the USA to make Ankara’s case.  
                                               
109 Senior UK diplomat D – interview - April 2010. 
110 Swedish Diplomat  – interview – March 2010. 
111 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010. 
112 Those EU officials dedicated to upholding the norms and values of the EU. Source: Senior WEU 
official – interview – February 2010. 
113 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010.  
114 Senior WEU official – interview – February 2010. 
115 Senior Turkish Diplomat C – interview – March 2010. 
116 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010. 
102 
 
Another reason the EU was so unwilling to accommodate Turkey within ESDP was a 
suspicion that the Turkish government was trying to use ESDP as a way of circumventing 
the strict conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria. This view was common within European 
member state diplomatic and elite actor circles. There was still reluctance amongst member 
states to engage with Ankara because of normative concerns and suspicion of Turkey’s real 
motives: 
 “…they thought that it was a way of (Turkey) getting in….that they 
could participate in (ESDP) and demonstrate their indispensability and 
get in by the back door. The EU realised what they were doing and 
were all the more determined not to give them a free ride.”117 
However, there was a problem with this approach. A European Security and Defence Policy 
would require access to NATO capabilities. As a NATO member Turkey possessed a veto 
on this agreement118. The EU member states were slow to acknowledge the level of Turkish 
anxiety over ESDP but after the Cologne European Council  there was a gradual realisation 
that they would have to take Turkey into account if ESDP was to progress. The UK in 
particular was aware of Turkish concerns and their potential to stall ESDP. Tony Blair was 
“…not going to allow (ESDP) to be obstructed by (Turkey).”119 Thus, EU candidacy, at 
Helsinki, was seen in Whitehall as a placatory quid pro quo for Ankara which in the opinion 
of the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook would put the “ball in Turkey’s court” to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria, something he was “quite sceptical” they could achieve in the short or 
medium term. 120  In this way Kosovo, and the ESDP it engendered, can be said to have 
acted as a catalyst in the progress of Turkish candidacy in 1999. Kosovo prioritized the need 
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for a solution to the Cyprus issue for the US which was keen to eliminate causes of conflict 
within NATO. 
Whilst these can be characterised as “hard power” consequences of the Kosovo conflict, 
there were also “soft power” (Nye 2004) consequences which impacted on the Turkish case 
for candidacy. The next section looks at the impact of Kosovo on the on-going EU eastern 
enlargement process and the implications this had for Turkey. 
1.6. The EU - Enlargement 
The eastern enlargement of the EU may now seem like an obvious step to have taken but 
this was not always the case. For much of the process it was “far from taken from granted.” 
(Sedelmeier 2005: 3)and the sheer scale of the eastern enlargement round has also puzzled 
academics (Vachudova 2007; Brennan 2006). It has been argued that the Kosovo conflict of 
early 1999 can explain the development and scale of eastern enlargement as it “...led to a 
rethinking of enlargement strategy…” and changed member state attitudes to eastern 
enlargement as well as the Turkish case (Baun 2000: 123). Eastern enlargement had come 
to be seen as a high stakes policy and it was felt that “…if the EU had failed enlargement to 
the east we would have written the EU off…it was the soul of the EU that was at stake.”121 
Additionally the change of attitude to the eastern enlargement round obliged the more 
reluctant member states to consider the Turkish case more sympathetically. 
In 1997, following the publication of Agenda 2000, the Luxembourg European Council had 
agreed to start accession negotiations with five CEECs and encourage another five to 
continue reforms. These were the “ins and the pre-ins” as lain down by the then External 
Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek (Baun 2000: 86). Whilst efforts were made not 
to alienate the “pre-ins” there was a level of conditionality implied. The effect of the Kosovo 
conflict was to lower this level of conditionality by 1999. As it happened, three of the “pre-ins” 
not deemed ready at Luxembourg – Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia – had made good 
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progress. However the remaining two, Bulgaria and Romania, “might not have been 
(included) in 1999 had it not been for the war in Kosovo.” (Smith, J. 2000: 122).  
The governments of Bucharest and Sofia had co-operated with sanctions on Serbia and 
provided vital access to their airspace during the NATO air campaign on Belgrade122. They 
had also taken in large numbers of refugees from Kosovo123. Dealing with a potential refugee 
influx to western Europe “scared the Europeans (member state governments) to death”124 
and was a primary motivation in member state capitals to extend eastern enlargement as far 
as possible in order to reward favours already done and to incentivise existing and future 
candidates to work towards liberal democracy. Tony Blair was a major advocate of both 
Bucharest and Sofia for these reasons125. It has been suggested that Blair may have 
“precipitated” their candidacy by talking it up during visits to Bulgaria and Romania in May 
1999 (Smith.J. 2000: 122.). Blair’s view was that enlargement should be a foreign policy tool 
to incentivise domestic reform and maximise the chances of future stability and prosperity in 
wider Europe126 and was “clearly in favour of this.”127 
By October 1999, the EU member states were taking a “strategic view of (eastern) 
enlargement” rather than one based on “objective criteria”128 because, within the 
Commission, it was felt that bringing in the remaining CEECs was the most likely way to 
foster “long term stability” for eastern Europe and “…without Kosovo this would not have 
happened”129. This development would certainly have made it more difficult for the European 
Commission and member states to argue the case for strict conditionality with regard to 
Turkey. Ankara had already demonstrated its sensitivity to being treated differently to other 
applicant states after Luxembourg (Nugent 2007). In addition, Turkey’s own geostrategic 
importance to the EU and NATO had also been highlighted by the Kosovo conflict. The 
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Incirlik airbase had become a hub for attacks on Belgrade; Turkey had also provided eleven 
F-16 fighter planes and put an infantry battalion on standby should ground troops be 
authorised130.  Within the EU Commission DG Enlargement there was tacit 
acknowledgement that Turkey had “played a very important role for the logistics of NATO…” 
which created a “new momentum in relations”131. Thus the Kosovo conflict highlighted the 
soft power desirability of eastern enlargement, Turkish accession and Turkish geostrategic 
value. However eastern enlargement brought with it the contentious and intractable issue of 
Cyprus.  
2. Changes of heart 
The previous section has outlined how the geostrategic structural considerations were 
changing in the late 1990s in favour of the Turkish case. It outlined how the Kosovo crisis in 
particular added an imperative on the USA and the EU to resolve the tensions in the eastern 
Mediterranean. For Washington this was driven by NATO considerations of the need for 
unity in the face of pending conflict and for Brussels it was driven by both the development of 
ESDP and the CEEC enlargement round. The result of these factors was a gradual change 
of attitude to the Turkish case during the second half of 1999. This was affected by several 
factors which will be addressed within this section. 
2.1. The “Ecevit letter”  
The UK government had been telling the Turkish government for some time that accession 
was dependent on an improvement in its human rights and democracy record and for any 
progress to be made Ankara would have to “…set out how they were going to address all 
their failings under the Copenhagen criteria”132.  In the spring of 1999 the Ecevit government 
took the first steps on the road to constitutional reform and it was the German government – 
which held the Presidency of the EU at that time – which facilitated the development. The 
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newly incumbent SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) Prime Minister, Gerhard 
Schroeder, and his Green coalition counterpart, the Foreign Minister, Joshka Fischer, had 
been shocked by the barbarity of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo133 and backed the NATO air 
campaign against Belgrade in spite of opposition from within their own parties 134. They also 
saw the geostrategic logic of encouraging the Turkish case and were mindful of their SPD-
voting German Turkish electorate135. For these reasons Schroeder used the German 
Presidency of the EU to push the Turkish case for EU accession by seeking to meet the 
normative concerns of the majority of Turkey’s opponents within the EU member states.  
In April 1999 the German EU Presidency asked the Turkish government to write a document 
outlining “that (they) understood what candidacy meant.”136 In other words that Turkey 
realised it would have to make far-reaching constitutional changes to improve democracy 
and human rights and could not expect simply to be rewarded for its geostrategic 
significance. In this “stately dance”137 the so called “Ecevit letter” was then circulated to all 
the member states. In effect it was a pledge to reform and an acknowledgement that reform 
was necessary in order to join the EU. 
“….(it) said that we understood perfectly well that it required Turkey to 
do a lot of things…the membership was not automatic and Turkey 
realised it had a lot of work to do…..”138 
The Turkish government did what was asked of it but in return stressed that they did not 
expect to be treated any differently from Romania and Bulgaria. This required 
acknowledgement that the Copenhagen criteria did not apply to candidacy merely to 
accession. 
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“…previously there had been the idea that we should try to fulfil the 
Copenhagen Criteria…some people like (Anna Lindh139) had said that 
we should fulfil some, if not all, the Copenhagen criteria as the 
precursor for being given candidate status…which in itself was an 
insult because the other candidates were given the obligation to meet 
the criteria before starting accession negotiations.”140 
2.2. The Kurdish issue 
The Greece-Turkey relationship arguably hit an all-time low in early 1999 as it slowly 
became clear that Greece was complicit in harbouring the head of the Turkish military’s bête 
noire, the P.K.K. (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) leader, Abdullah Ocalan (a.k.a. “Apo”). Ocalan 
had been resident just over the Turkish border in Syria from 1980 to October 1998 when the 
Turkish government threatened a military incursion to find him if he was not asked to leave. 
He did so and began a four month game of global cat and mouse involving Ankara, Athens, 
the USA and, allegedly, the Israeli secret service Mossad141. 
Initially Ocalan went to Moscow and then to Rome. The Italian government refused a request 
to extradite him to Turkey but he was placed under house arrest in Rome. He left Italy on 
January 14th 1999 and was rumoured to be in a private plane trying unsuccessfully to apply 
for asylum in various European countries literally being turned away in mid-air. He was 
arrested on February 16th 1999 in Nairobi by Turkish agents and was returned to Turkey. 
Having initially denied knowledge of his whereabouts142 Greece later admitted Ocalan had 
been in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi since February 2nd and claimed it had been trying to 
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find an African country to take him in143. Strong rumours circulated that the Greek Foreign 
Minister Theodore Pangalos had arranged the private plane and a false passport144. 
Reports of the actual circumstances of Ocalan’s arrest vary from the outwitting of Greek 
diplomats, by Turkish special forces, to their capitulation145. Either way the episode was a 
“worst case scenario”146 for the government of Costas Simitis which came under pressure 
both from Turkey and from its own nationalist element which saw the arrest of Ocalan by 
Turkey whilst ostensibly under Greek provision as the betrayal of an ally147. On February 20th 
1999 Foreign Minister Pangalos, and two other senior ministers, resigned.  
The implications of Ocalan’s arrest directly affected Turkey’s EU aspiration positively and 
negatively. The Greek government’s humiliation was compounded when it emerged that the 
USA had been helping Turkey to track Ocalan148. This left the Simitis administration in a 
more vulnerable position when the Americans began to exert pressure on it to cooperate 
over Turkish EU accession and the Cyprus issue149. However, the departure of Pangalos 
enabled Simitis to appoint George Papandreou as Foreign Minister. Papandreou was a 
liberal on the Turkish issue and this helped to facilitate rapprochement in the eastern 
Mediterranean later in 1999. 
However, the Ocalan case was highly politically sensitive in Turkey. He was sentenced to 
death on June 29th 1999 after a show trial widely reported in the Turkish and European 
media and condemned by organizations such as Amnesty International as well as many 
member states. The death penalty contravened the rules of the Council of Europe, of which 
Turkey was a member, as well as the norms and expectations of the EU. The implied 
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criticism however, prompted the petulant response from Bulent Ecevit 150 and the death 
sentence on Ocalan hung ominously over the Turkish case for candidacy forming a rallying 
point for Turkey’s opponents within the EU and for opponents to the EU within Turkey. 
In late November 1999 the High Court in Ankara upheld the death sentence on Ocalan 
prompting further warnings from the EU and its member states that Turkey should "forget the 
Helsinki Summit if Ocalan is executed…"151. Ocalan’s right to appeal to the European Court 
of Human Rights gave both the EU and Turkey a breathing space at the Helsinki European 
Council but it was clear that in the medium term the Ocalan issue was a potential problem 
for Turkish progress to meeting the Copenhagen criteria.  
2.3. “Earthquake diplomacy” 
Relations between Greece and Turkey were crucial to Turkish candidacy prospects because 
Greece had a veto within the European Council. Greek potential to veto the Turkish case 
undermined any EU reassurances to Ankara that it would be treated objectively. This was an 
oft-made demand by Turkey and was an echo of the umbrage taken by Ankara after the 
Luxembourg European Council in December 1997. In September 1999, in an interview with 
the Financial Times, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismael Cem, spoke of Turkey being “tired 
of rebuffs” by the EU.  
"It has damaged Turkey's image and become humiliating. If it turns 
wrong at Helsinki, we may not ask for our candidacy again." 152 
The UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook told Cem that “…Turkey's aspirations to join the EU 
must be judged by the same objective standards as any other candidate for membership to 
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the EU…"153. That Robin Cook was able to say this was a reflection of the improvements in 
Greek-Turkish relations over the summer of 1999 helped by so called “earthquake 
diplomacy”.  
On August 16th 1999 western Turkey suffered a serious quake which killed tens of 
thousands of people. The outpouring of sympathy and aid between Greece and Turkey after 
the earthquake gave Simitis and Papandreou “…the cover they needed to start normalising 
relations with Turkey.”154  In other words, the Greek government was also under pressure 
from other member states to give ground over Turkey and the sympathy invoked by the 
earthquake enabled Papandreou to succumb to demands by his EU member state 
counterparts without losing too much support in the domestic arena155.  
In this way there was a change in the Greek stance towards Turkish EU accession. Whilst at 
the Cologne European Council , in June 1999, Athens had blocked German plans for 
Turkish candidacy, at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Saariselka, Finland, on 
September 5th 1999 Papandreou announced that Greece would support a 600 million Euro 
loan by the European Investment Bank to Turkey for earthquake reconstruction and neither 
would it stand in the way of Turkish candidacy of the EU at Helsinki. Papandreou attributed 
the volte face directly to the changes wrought by the earthquakes.  
“Because out of this tragedy there was a human warmth that came 
out between the two peoples. The citizens took the lead in diplomacy. 
It went beyond the political leaderships of the two countries, and they 
have sent a very strong message to us that we must work for peace. I 
just hope that this climate can remain."156 
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Moreover Papandreou added: 
''We want to become the steam engine inside the EU to help Turkey's 
European course.''157 
"Greece is saying very clearly that it is in Greece's interest to see a 
European Turkey".158 
George Papandreou, and his deputy, Yiannos Kranidiotis, had come to the conclusion that 
Turkish accession was in the best long term economic and security interests of both Greece 
and the Republic of Cyprus159. Amongst UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
officials Papandreou was seen as having used the “earthquake to his credit”160. 
“For Papandreou, bad relations with Turkey damaged Greece, 
necessitating a high rate of defence spending and sacrificing many 
commercial and economic opportunities in Turkey’s large and rapidly 
growing market. Moreover he saw that the alienation of Turkey from 
the EU was contrary to Greece’s interest since it was liable in the long 
run to destabilise Turkey and leave Greece with an erratic 
unpredictable but still powerful neighbour.” (Hannay 2005: 98) 
When, on September 7th 1999, Greece suffered its own earthquake, Turkish rescue teams 
were amongst the first on the scene. This further created a climate of cooperation with 
popular support in Greece and Turkey. However the problem was abated but it was not 
solved. In all his statements, Papandreou was at pains to separate the Cyprus issue from 
the Turkish case. Neither had Greece agreed to lift its veto on Turkish Customs Union funds 
being released. Whilst “earthquake diplomacy” had helped to produce a new climate for 
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cooperation between Athens and Ankara, Cyprus remained a serious problem in Greco-
Turkish, and therefore Turco-EU, relations.  
The EU member states which advocated Turkish accession – including France, Germany 
and the UK – were pleased with the Greek change of heart at Saariselka which promised to 
simplify the complexity of Turkish candidacy. The three factors outlined above had enhanced 
the Turkish case.  The Ecevit letter had gone some way towards addressing the normative 
concerns. Similarly the Ocalan episode had weakened Greece to some extent and the 
earthquakes had helped to promote co-operation. However, opposition remained within 
Greece and also other member states, on both normative and cultural grounds. 
3. The road to the Helsinki European Council 
The next section will examine the context in which the decision to offer candidacy to Turkey 
at the Helsinki European Council was taken. It will look at the actions of the EU member 
states, the European Commission and the impact of the Cyprus issue before turning to the 
Council itself. 
3.1. EU member states 
By September 1999 Turkey had influential advocates within the EU in the form of the UK and 
Germany.  Moreover other member states were falling in line, persuaded by the Kosovo 
arguments already outlined. The long term view of the UK’s FCO was that Turkish accession 
to the EU would be a geostrategic benefit161 and this was a view they were keen to 
encourage New Labour ministers to adopt in full162. Germany too had come to see the 
Turkish case on geostrategic grounds in early 1999 and had been a major instigator of the 
Ecevit letter and attempts to push candidacy for Turkey onto the agenda at the Cologne 
European Council . In the event, the Turkish case at Cologne was overshadowed by a 
                                               
161 Senior UK Diplomat D – interview – April 2010. NB: One does not have to speak to a UK diplomat 
for long before this view is expressed. This was my experience without exception during my fieldwork.  
162 Senior UK politician B – interview – March 2010; Senior policy advisor UK Foreign Office – 
interview – March 2010.  
113 
 
combination of Greek opposition to it and the dramatic end of the Kosovo conflict. However, 
after Cologne, Gerhard Schroeder expressed “regret” to Turkey about what had happened163 
and this was followed up, with a visit to Ankara, by the German foreign minister Joshka 
Fischer164 and by the German ambassador to Ankara, Hans Joachim Vergau, in situ165. In 
July 1999, Italy, which had been in serious dispute with Turkey over Abdullah Ocalan in 
February, also pledged to support candidacy (although crucially not membership without 
improvements to Turkey’s human rights record)166. France was more circumspect but by the 
time of the Saariselka meeting, in early September 1999, Paris was working towards the 
goal of candidacy for Turkey. 
However support for Turkey was not unanimous. At Saariselka, the Swedish foreign minister, 
Anna Lindh had stated that Sweden was “not Turkey’s adversary” but was a “defender of 
human rights.”167 Sweden’s (and also Denmark’s to a lesser extent) view was that Turkey 
should meet more of the Copenhagen criteria before candidacy could be granted168.  At this 
time, Turkey also faced underlying cultural opposition and there was “still a view that the EU 
was a Christian club and a Catholic one at that...”169 This group included the Belgians and, to 
a greater extent, Wolfgang Schussel of Austria who argued that Turkey was too far from 
meeting the Copenhagen Criteria to be considered for candidacy although this was not given 
much credence170.   
These normative and cultural objections to the Turkish case were however beginning to 
weaken as momentum gained in Turkey’s favour. The initial gesture by George Papandreou 
in early September – perhaps nudged by some of his fellow EU foreign ministers was very 
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important to the Turkish case for candidacy as it had “…encouraged the Turks that 
accession was not as impossible as they had thought it was”171. In Brussels’ eurocratic 
circles George Papandreou and Ismael Cem were widely seen as “enlightened personalities” 
and their personal “good chemistry” enabled them to build a trusting working relationship172. 
Ismael Cem was invited to a meeting of EU foreign ministers, in Brussels, on September 14th 
1999 to make Turkey’s case for EU membership and, crucially, to outline Turkey’s 
commitments to the Copenhagen criteria and how it would go about meeting them173.  
The mood amongst the foreign ministers in Brussels on September 14th was broadly positive. 
Speaking afterwards the French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, said: 
"It was the most interesting meeting I have ever had with Turkey…We 
are now at a new phase when we are not fighting any more about 
Turkey but are all trying to find clever solutions." 174 
The following week, Ismael Cem continued his diplomatic charm offensive at the United 
Nations General Assembly meeting in New York. Cem held further meetings with EU foreign 
ministers and was pushing for a firm commitment to candidacy at the forthcoming Helsinki 
European Council . In addition the Turkish business lobby group TUSIAD175 toured EU 
capitals in October and November 1999 making the Turkish case to business and civil 
society groups176.  
3.2. European Commission 
Whilst progress was being made in the intergovernmental fora, the European Commission 
was preparing to publish its progress report on Turkey. The incoming enlargement 
Commissioner Gunther Verheugen had already made clear his intention to support the 
Turkish case. Verheugen had been a member of Gerhard Schroeder’s inner circle in the 
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174 Turkish Daily News, September 15th 1999. Ankara breaks the ice with European Union. 
175 Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği - Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association 
176 Turkish NGO official A – interview – March 2010.  
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SPD government and was very familiar with the Ecevit letter and the geostrategic argument 
for Turkey. He told the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee on September 1st 
1999 that the Turkish issue should be addressed at Helsinki with the caveat that Turkey 
should continue to demonstrate willingness for constitutional reform177.   
The 1998 EU Commission progress report on Turkey had highlighted “persistent human 
rights violations” and “major shortcomings in the treatment of minorities” as well as the 
“major role played by the army in political life.” Whilst acknowledging the Turkish 
government’s commitment to combat human rights violations it noted “…this has not so far 
had any significant effect in practice.” 178 The October 1999 progress report  was only slightly 
more encouraging in substance. It noted “encouraging signs of democratisation” but “serious 
shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities” remained and although 
the basic features of a democratic system existed in Turkey “…it still does not meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria”179. It proposed a set of measures to increase political dialogue, 
to provide financial assistance and help to meet the acquis communautaire and thus the 
Copenhagen Criteria.   
On this basis whilst more encouraging – or perhaps less discouraging – than the previous 
year there were still a lot of reasons for Turkey’s critics to be sceptical180. In a speech of 
November 4th 1999, Gunther Verheugen made a geostrategic case for Turkish candidacy. 
Verheugen argued that the EU was duty bound to consider Turkey as an accession 
candidate because eligibility was already conferred. Moreover it was in the best interests of 
the EU to consider Turkey because the alternative was that Turkey may lose its westward 
security orientation. Whilst acknowledging Turkey’s shortcomings in human rights and 
democracy he said: 
                                               
177 Financial Times, September 2nd 1999, Turkey warns over EU membership. 
178 European Commission, 1998, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.   Sec 1.4.  
179 European Commission, 1999, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  Sec 1.4.  
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“At the same time there are the geopolitical and strategic arguments 
that make it imperative to support Turkey's affiliation with Europe, 
bring about democratic change in Turkey, encourage it to change its 
position on Cyprus and put its relations with Greece on a sound 
footing. 
If we deprive Turkey of the prospect of accession, we will be held 
responsible for everything that goes wrong in the country. Then the 
question might become: “Who lost Turkey”?” 181 
Verheugen had “grasped the strategic importance of Turkey…partly due to the Balkan 
War….” and so had many of his officials within the Commission182.  Moreover the “Who lost 
Turkey?” speech of November 1999 was an obvious attempt to make put geostrategy above 
normative concerns.  
However, it is also important to note here that an offer of candidacy for Turkey was not as 
significant as it first appeared because Turkey was not actually expected to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria. Within the Commission it was acknowledged that “candidacy” was 
“meaningless” unless accompanied by compliance with the Copenhagen criteria183 and that 
was “… something which everybody considered impossible…including Gunther Verheugen 
himself.” 184 The view of European Commission officials at that time, was that if the EU 
offered Turkey candidacy the ball would be “...in Turkey’s court”. This was a view shared by 
the UK foreign minister Robin Cook who was “quite sceptical about the short term prospects 
(of Turkey meeting the Copenhagen Criteria)”185. For the EU candidacy was purely 
instrumental as a means of placating Turkey enough to smooth the eastern enlargement 
process and ESDP.  It was not expected that Ankara would actually meet the Copenhagen 
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criteria anytime soon but if candidacy was to encourage reforms at some stage this was a 
positive. Paradoxically, the fact that Turkey was not expected to meet the criteria may have 
encouraged sceptical normative opponents to suppress their dislike of Turkey’s application 
in favour of the geostrategic case put forward by Gunther Verheugen.  
3.3. Cyprus 
During 1999, the USA was continuing its efforts to solve the Cyprus issue in order to further 
Turkish candidacy. In June 1999 it (with the UK) had “encouraged” the G8 group of nations 
to call on the two sides in Cyprus to resume talks under the auspices of the United Nations 
(UN)186. This was reiterated by UN Security Council resolution 1250187.  However, the 
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash was predictably uncooperative. In a reply to Kofi 
Annan he said: 
"The European Union was once the grave digger of negotiations, the 
same failure awaits the G-8…no one can pull my ear and force me to 
sit at the negotiation table."188 
However Denktash was not entirely right about this. Whilst he had considerable influence 
over Bulent Ecevit, who largely agreed with him, Ecevit was in coalition with two other 
parties. Additionally, the issue of Cyprus at that time was clearly connected to Turkey’s EU 
aspiration and thus neither Ecevit nor Denktash was a “free agent” as the US was intent on 
turning the situation around (Hannay 2005: 108-109).   
When Bulent Ecevit went to Washington to see President Bill Clinton, in late September 
1999, Cyprus was high on the agenda189. Ecevit had been the Prime Minister in 1974 who 
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187 Agence France Press. June 29th 1999. UN Security Council calls for autumn peace talks in Cyprus. 
188 Xinhua News Agency. June 24th 1999. No one can force Turkish Cypriots into talks: Denktash. 
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gave the order to invade northern Cyprus and it was extremely politically sensitive to him. 
However, it seems clear some pressure was exerted on Ecevit whilst he was in Washington.  
Before he went Ecevit told reporters: 
“It will be not realistic to expect the Cyprus question to be solved with 
Greece's contribution while the main problems between Turkey and 
Greece remain unsolved (Aegean disputes). The Cyprus question 
should be solved between the two communities on the island. In 
accordance with our opinion, there is not any problem on Cyprus. But 
those who claim that there is a problem should leave its solution to 
the communities on the island. Otherwise, I do not think that it would 
be useful to add the Cyprus question to the problems which have not 
even been discussed between Turkey and Greece."190 
However, after the meeting which he described as “friendly and fruitful” Ecevit said: 
"We have agreed that there could be no return to the status quo on 
Cyprus to the pre-1974 period. We have supported the idea of 
President Clinton to send his special representative to the region next 
week to search if a basis, appropriate to progress, exists or not."191 
Clinton had “made it very clear that the US wanted settlement negotiations to begin and, 
when he got a predictably negative reaction, that he was not prepared to take no for an 
answer.” (Hannay 2005: 109).  
In September 1999 Al Moses and Tom Weston took over from Richard Holbrooke as Bill 
Clinton’s Cyprus envoy and were told to “go solve the problem” with a “license to pressurise 
Athens and Ankara” as necessary in order to “clear the way to the future.”192 Cyprus was 
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seen by Washington as a local difficulty with wide implications193 and Clinton was keen for 
progress to be made on the Cyprus issue before his visit to the OSCE summit in November 
1999. He remained closely involved in the Cyprus issue and was a “huge advocate” of the 
Turkish case for accession to the EU:  
“There was a huge effort made by the USA in advance of the Helsinki 
summit to try to make the case (for Turkey)….we were really explicit 
about it. (Clinton) talked it up all the time.”194 
Following this meeting Moses and Weston undertook a month of shuttle diplomacy which 
enabled Bill Clinton to announce, on his way to the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November, 
aboard Air Force One, that both Cypriot leaders had agreed to resume talks under UN 
auspices on December 3rd 1999 – the week before the Helsinki European Council 195.  
At this stage the Greek government’s support for Turkish candidacy remained conditional on 
the smooth progress of Cyprus into the EU i.e.: that Cypriot entry should not depend on 
finding a solution to the Cyprus issue as a whole. Conversely, Denktash was threatening 
non-compliance if Cyprus went forward196. Thus, in spite of the earthquake diplomacy effect, 
Ismael Cem’s charm offensive in the capitals of the EU member states and multifarious 
efforts by Turkey’s advocates old and new, the issue of Cyprus remained problematic at 
Helsinki.  
Bulent Ecevit’s attitude to the Cypriot issue was influenced by his past. He “felt the burden of 
his previous prime ministerships” when dealing with Cyprus and the EU. Previously he had 
opposed EU membership and ordered the invasion of Cyprus. Now he felt under pressure to 
follow Turkey’s European calling – particularly because of the strong public support for it - 
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but “his heart wasn’t in it” and he certainly was not going to make big concessions on Cyprus 
for the sake of it197. 
“I am not convinced that he was very much in favour of membership 
(of the EU)…he did not believe in it…but he felt that having been 
offered this opportunity…that if he turned it down he would never be 
able to live it down.”198 
The Greek government meanwhile tempered “…any EU support for the UN’s efforts to find a 
settlement with a clear statement that it must not be an absolute precondition for Cyprus 
joining the EU.” (Hannay 2005: 112). On this Greece and the Cypriots were “immoveable”. 
Neither Turkey nor Greece enhanced their reputations within the EU over the Cyprus issue 
and both were seen by EU diplomats as “….bloody minded.”199. As the Helsinki European 
Council approached therefore Turkey and Greece remained at stalemate over the Cyprus 
issue. The EU could not progress with the CEEC enlargement round without the inclusion of 
the Republic of Cyprus. However the inclusion of Cyprus without some concession to Ankara 
would alienate the Turkish government further which was not considered to be in the security 
interest of the EU. The EU therefore faced the choice of undermining the CEEC enlargement 
round or alienating Turkey. 
3.4. The Helsinki European Council  – December 1999. 
According to insiders, Helsinki was a “crazy” summit which was “fraught and quite 
exciting”200. As it approached, whilst the normative arguments against Turkey had been 
countered by the Ecevit letter and cultural arguments by the securitisation approach of the 
“Who lost Turkey?” argument201, the Cyprus issue remained problematic. Two days before 
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Helsinki, Athens was the only member state which hadn’t given its backing to Ankara and 
was insisting that Cypriot accession to the EU should not be linked to the UN peace process.  
Ecevit was equally immoveable and the day before the Helsinki European Council began he 
declared he had “no intention of compromising on either the Aegean or the Cypriot issue” 
and furthermore “…everyone should know that Turkey has alternatives other than the 
E.U."202.  In other words the EU faced the choice between allowing Cyprus to enter as a 
divided island by default and alienating a crucial geostrategic partner or scuppering the 
eastern enlargement round. The diplomatic effort in the run up to Helsinki was focused on 
finding a way in which Turkey would not be alienated by the Republic of Cyprus’ accession 
status.  
The resulting Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions on Cyprus were, as Lord 
Hannay eloquently describes, with typical diplomatic understatement, a “masterpiece of 
constructive ambiguity” which sought to placate both the Greek and Turkish sides. 
 9. (a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks 
aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 
December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN 
Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful 
conclusion. 
(b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will 
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no 
settlement has been reached by the completion of accession 
negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made 
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without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take 
account of all relevant factors.203  
Whilst the initial Cypriot reaction to this wording was “euphoric” (Hannay 2005: 113), Bulent 
Ecevit refused to accept it and declined to travel to Helsinki as a “candidate” on those terms. 
Several EU member state leaders tried to persuade Ecevit by phone including Tony Blair 
and Gerhard Schroeder204. There was a perceived need within the Commission to find a 
formula “which allowed us to go along (without losing Turkey) even if there was no solution 
to Cyprus.” 205 There was also frustration in the Commission that the Cyprus process was 
being managed vicariously through the United Nations which had meant a loss of direct 
control206. 
In the event, Jacques Chirac offered the use of his personal plane for Javier Solana and 
Gunther Verheugen to fly to Ankara to persuade Ecevit to return with them. Javier Solana 
rang the US State Department and asked for Bill Clinton to get involved. Clinton told the 
Turkish government it was a “huge gigantic breakthrough” and the culmination of a decade’s 
work. He urged Ecevit to see Solana and return with him to Helsinki207. 
Other members of Ecevit’s advisory team were also trying to persuade him to cooperate and 
felt his stance was “nonsensical”.  
“There was this rather strange idea that by accepting candidate status 
Turkey was consenting to the membership of Cyprus on terms 
acceptable to Greek Cypriots.”208   
However Ecevit’s advisors saw that if Turkey did not take up the offer of EU candidacy the 
Republic of Cyprus’ would go ahead anyway and Turkey would reduce its future chances of 
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candidacy. The advisors also felt the pressure from Bill Clinton and loyalty to the USA for 
previous support. They made the case to Ecevit that Turkey had nothing to lose. However 
Ecevit was sensitive to public opinion on Cyprus and wanted reassurance that he would not 
be accused of having “done a deal” which sold Turkish Cypriots short.  
Hence, Solana and Verheugen took a letter from the Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 
clarifying the Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions. It began: 
“Mr Prime Minister, 
Today the European Union has set out on a new course in its 
relations with the Republic of Turkey. I am pleased to inform you 
officially of our unanimous decision to confer Turkey the status of 
candidate State, on the same footing as any other candidate….”209 
It went on to reassure the Turkish government that its accession was not linked to that of 
Cyprus and a settlement would not be forced upon them by the International Court of Justice. 
It urged Ecevit to join the “other candidate states” in a working lunch in Helsinki the following 
day210. 
Nevertheless the Lipponen letter was a hard sell to Ecevit. Solana and Verheugen had a 
hostile reception from both Ecevit and Cem as both were extremely sensitive about how the 
Cyprus issue would be perceived by Turkish public opinion. They were also keen to 
establish the terms of the financial package and pre accession strategy which was on offer. 
On these terms an exhausted Ecevit was reassured that he had not sold the Turkish 
Cypriots short and finally he agreed to go to Helsinki and for Turkey to be a candidate211.  
                                               
209 This had not been cleared with the Greek and there was a “considerable row” (Hannay 2005: 115). 
For full text of the Lipponen letter see Hannay (2005:115) or Guney (2007) or Appendix I below. 
210 When the plane arrived in Ankara it was found to have a cracked window and another one had to 
be sent from Paris to make the return journey to Helsinki. Source: Senior European Commission 
official A – interview – March 2010. 
211 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
124 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to assess why the EU member states agreed to confer candidate status 
on Turkey at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 when Turkey remained an unpopular 
applicant. At the Luxembourg European Council, in 1997, the EU had not included Turkey in 
the CEEC enlargement round because it was too far from meeting the Copenhagen criteria. 
Thus the Helsinki decision was a puzzle because very little had changed in Turkey in the 
intervening two years. Therefore it was necessary to look at the EU context to establish what 
factors had altered to change the policy.  
The conclusion is that the decision was the result of a shifting in the wider security 
environment of Europe in the late 1990s which created the conditions whereby even those 
member states which retained misgivings about Turkey felt they had little choice but to 
placate Turkey’s EU aspirations for geostrategic reasons. The end of the Cold War had 
unleashed nationalist forces which destabilized the Balkan region. The Bosnian conflict had 
shocked public and elite opinion within the member states and created a political will in 
favour of policies to prevent a recurrence such as eastern enlargement of the EU and ESDP. 
The impending Kosovo conflict in 1998/99 heightened the sense of unease amongst the EU 
member state leaders and highlighted a need to do something to prevent the conflict from 
recurring and spreading through the Balkans. The result of this was to expedite the progress 
of the CEEC enlargement round and ESDP in 1999 beyond what might otherwise have been 
the case. However both of these policies required the cooperation, or at least the goodwill, of 
the Turkish government which was lacking following its rebuff at Luxembourg. 
Thus Kosovo hastened the progress of ESDP and CEEC enlargement and these in turn 
provided the geostrategic need for the EU to placate Turkey. This added to the existing 
opinion within several member state capitals that the outcome of the Luxembourg European 
Council had been a mistake and Turkey was too important to either ignore or alienate so an 
alternative way of dealing with Turkey would have to be found. This is not to say that Turkey 
was a universally popular candidate merely that these structural geostrategic factors had 
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crystallized the underlying pre-existing feeling within the EU that Ankara should not be 
ignored and instead needed to be “managed”. At the same time Kosovo had increased the 
imperative on the USA to find a solution to tensions in the eastern Mediterranean in order to 
facilitate relations within NATO. The key to doing this was finding a solution to the Cyprus 
issue and lobbying Turkey’s case for EU candidacy. This led to Washington being prepared 
to exert pressure on both Athens and Ankara to these ends.  
However, in spite of the pressing geostrategic considerations, the nature of the EU’s 
“management” of Turkey was driven by its strong liberal democratic identity which would not 
countenance the lowering of conditionality in Turkey’s case. It was not seen as an option, for 
example, to make an arrangement whereby Turkey could be fast tracked into the existing 
CEEC enlargement round or take part in ESDP with full membership rights without being a 
full member of the EU much to the incomprehension and annoyance of the USA.  The 
decision at Helsinki to offer candidacy was taken because Turkey’s European aspiration had 
to be “managed” in order to secure cooperation on the geostrategic matters of ESDP and 
eastern enlargement. The EU’s policy at Helsinki was instead to grant candidacy at the 
same time as stressing to Ankara that it would be treated in the same way as any other 
candidate and that would require meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Having made this 
position absolutely clear however the EU did not appreciate what its position would be if 
Turkey did actually meet the criteria.  
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that the offer of candidacy was made precisely 
because the EU did not expect Turkey to meet the criteria. Those member states with 
reservations about the Turkish case believed they were “safe” to acquiesce to Turkish 
candidacy because it was not thought possible that Turkey would be able to meet the 
conditionality required of it and therefore Turkish accession would not come to pass. The 
view within the Commission was that “candidacy” was just a form of words and was 
meaningless outside of the Copenhagen criteria which were stressed within the Helsinki 
European Council Presidency conclusions. Seen in this way it was actually a hollow, 
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perhaps insincere, offer made in order to manage the Turkish accession case more carefully 
than had been done at Luxembourg because of the increasingly pressing security 
constraints on the EU. 
The empirical conclusion of this chapter therefore is that the shifting of the geopolitical and 
geostrategic sands in Europe in the late 1990s obliged the EU to change its policy vis a vis 
Turkey for the reasons outlined. The wider need to expedite eastern enlargement and ESDP 
inclined previously sceptical member states to soften their position in order to “manage” 
Turkey’s aspiration. However it should also be noted that they were willing to do this 
because they did not expect Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria.  
In terms of structure, process and agency the conclusion is that the period up to the Helsinki 
European Council should be seen as a critical juncture in what was to follow up to 2004. The 
decision to offer candidacy to Turkey – for the reasons I have described – was structural and 
is significant not per se but because of the processes it initiated which are to be the subject 
of the next two chapters. Helsinki should be seen as a turning point in Turkey’s EU fortunes 
and happened as a result of a confluence of extraneous circumstances in 1999 which 
worked in favour of the Turkish case for EU accession – including the Kosovo conflict and 
the Turkish and Greek earthquakes. Therefore structural considerations created the 
circumstances for process to ensue. However there is also evidence of agency on Turkey’s 
behalf at this early stage. In other words structural considerations cannot take all of the 
credit for the change of Turkish fortunes at Helsinki.  
Both the Blair and Schroeder governments were in favour of the principle of Turkish 
accession and were working to enable this in 1999. The German government instigated the 
“Ecevit letter” in March/ April 1999212 which was instrumental in making the case for Turkish 
candidacy with the sceptical member states. The UK government was lobbying the Turkish 
case behind the scenes and was also trying to find a way forward for the Cyprus issue 
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through Lord Hannay. In 1999 such advocacy was hampered by the unavoidable truth that 
Turkey was in no way a viable accession state and even the UK and Germany in 1999 did 
not view Turkey as a viable candidate. Their agency at that stage was directed towards 
pushing Turkey as a “candidate” in order to “manage” its European aspirations for 
geostrategic reasons rather than aiming for accession negotiations to be opened. The Ecevit 
letter was certainly successful in this regard and whilst Lord Hannay’s efforts in Cyprus were 
less so they may have helped by regaining the trust of Bulent Ecevit enough for him to agree 
to the candidacy in spite of the implications for northern Cyprus.  
In this way then there is evidence of agency as well as structure having influenced the 
outcome of the Helsinki European Council for Turkey but the real significance of Helsinki lies 
in the consequences of it. The decision to offer candidacy increased the level of institutional 
relations between Turkey and the EU and included Turkey within the bureaucratic framework 
of accession agreements and annual progress reports. This required the EU member states 
to consider the Turkish case at European Councils as a matter of course and in effect 
obliged them to have an on-going opinion on Turkey whereas previously they had been able 
to ignore it.  
Simultaneously, candidacy was a psychological fillip to those actors within Turkey who were 
in favour of EU accession. These were primarily based in the business community of 
TUSIAD but were also in Ecevit’s own DSP (Democratic Left Party). The boost given by 
candidacy may even have inspired the formation of the AKP which was motivated by the 
promise of religious freedoms which EU accession may bring. Whilst the process of 
constitutional reform was slow, even after 1999, the consequence of Helsinki was that it was 
seen as a worthwhile option.  A third process initiated at Helsinki was the result of the stress 
placed on the Copenhagen criteria for Turkey by the EU. Having stressed it so highly and 
made a commitment to Turkey that it would be “treated like any other” the EU would come to 
be reluctant to renege on the deal for fear of losing credibility. The emphasis on the 
Copenhagen criteria was made for geostrategic reasons but would come to be a path 
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dependent ideational process which would eventually “rhetorically entrap” the EU member 
states and oblige them to agree to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. 
The next chapter will examine the time period 1999-2002 and will explore the implications of 
the Helsinki European Council in more detail. It will look at the continuing structural factors of 
ESDP and eastern enlargement and how they impinged on the processes of EU Turkey 
relations which were running in parallel with them.  
Chapter Four:  From Helsinki to 
Copenhagen  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the significance of the decision taken at the 2002 
Copenhagen European Council to offer a date for “talks about talks” to Turkey in its on-going 
quest for EU accession. In short the effect this had was to raise the conditionality in the 
Turkish case. This chapter will trace the path dependent processes which led from the 
Helsinki European Council in 1999 to that in Copenhagen three years later. It will outline the 
consequences of the Helsinki European Council, the processes which ensued and the 
implications thereof for the Turkish case for accession. 
 As outlined in Chapter Three, the decision of the Helsinki European Council in December 
1999 to make Turkey a candidate country of the EU was taken as a result of structural 
geostrategic changes which affected the EU in the late 1990s. The unrest in the Balkans led 
to both the development of a European security capability (ESDP) and the widening of the 
CEEC enlargement round both of which required some kind of Turkish co-operation. During 
1999 there was a tacit acknowledgement amongst the EU member states that Turkey’s long 
standing aspiration to membership had to be managed for these wider geostrategic reasons. 
However at the same time it was presumed that Turkey would not meet the entry 
requirements – the Copenhagen criteria – in the short or medium term, if ever.  
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So whilst in 1999 it was realised that the treatment of Turkey had been a geostrategic 
miscalculation this did not mean a wholesale reappraisal by the EU member states. It meant 
instead that the offer of candidacy was actually the management of the Turkish case in a 
way which was expected to placate the Turkish government enough to expedite ESDP and 
CEEC enlargement but not lead to any real change in the Turkish case. The fact that Turkey 
was not expected to actually meet the entry requirements meant those member states with 
misgivings – either normative or cultural – had been able to overlook them in the wider 
geostrategic interests of the EU. 
However a by-product of the candidacy offer was to increase the institutionalisation of the 
EU Turkey relationship through the EU’s Accession Partnership Document and the 
subsequent National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) from Ankara. 
Moreover it encouraged those actors within Turkey who were in favour of EU accession. 
Whilst Bulent Ecevit himself was slow to respond and hidebound by factionalism within his 
ruling coalition, the result was that Turkey passed a series of significant constitutional 
reforms by December 2002.  
So the need to “manage” the Turkish application led to the offer of candidacy which 
inadvertently increased the level of institutionalisation in the relationship. However, the very 
geostrategic considerations which had expedited the EU-Turkey accession process at 
Helsinki hindered it thereafter. Between 1999 and 2002 it seemed repeatedly as if the 
Turkish case had stalled permanently as the Ecevit government appeared to be failing to 
help either the Cyprus issue or ESDP. With regard to ESDP the offer of candidacy at 
Helsinki had failed to allay Turkish anxiety about their role within it which they suspected 
correctly would not match that which they had enjoyed within the WEU. This anxiety over 
ESDP also influenced Turkish policy on the issue of Cyprus as it did not make them any 
more inclined to exert pressure on Rauf Denktash to enable progress on the Cyprus issue. 
The deal made with the Cypriots at Helsinki that their EU accession was separate from a 
deal on the Cyprus issue had further alienated the Ecevit government. The combination and 
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interaction of these issues were deferred and fudged repeatedly in the three years after 
Helsinki into a stalemate which had to be solved at Copenhagen if Operation Concordia was 
to go ahead in March 2003 and the CEEC enlargement round was to proceed smoothly. To 
admit Cyprus as a divided island “would mean excluding the Turkish Cypriots, importing the 
40-year-old Cyprus dispute into the EU, as well as poisoning Turkey's own EU bid.”213  
Thus, that the Copenhagen European Council has been described as “chaotic”214 is not 
surprising. It was the culmination of the EU’s eastern enlargement programme which had 
become part of the “soul” of the EU215. This chapter will argue that the pressing need to 
settle eastern enlargement with Cyprus as a united island and to find a way of unblocking 
the Berlin Plus arrangements for ESDP forced the member states as an intergovernmental 
bargaining body to concede a “date for talks about talks” for Turkey at the Copenhagen 
European Council in 2002. 
Whilst the Copenhagen European Council Presidency conclusions were actually a harried 
compromise, the “date for talks about talks” produced in the “chaotic” circumstances served 
to increase the emphasis on the Copenhagen criteria within the Turkish EU accession 
process and encourage the new AKP government in Ankara to further reform.  As I will 
argue in Chapter Five, by 2004 this “rhetorically entrapped” (Schimmelfennig 2005, 2009) 
those member states which remained opposed to opening accession talks with Turkey into 
agreeing to do so. 
1. The Legacy of Helsinki 
Firstly this chapter will explain the legacy of Helsinki and the unexpected consequences of 
Turkey being given candidacy in December 1999. This section will look at these issues firstly 
from the European Union’s and then from Turkey’s. 
                                               
213 Financial Times, December 10th 2002. Election triggers hope of economic and political renaissance: 
Victorious AKP focuses on implementing IMF package and its overriding goal of achieving EU 
membership. 
214 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
215 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010.  
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1.1. The EU 
In the European Commission’s Regular Report, published in the run up to the Helsinki 
European Council in 1999, it was made clear that Turkey had not met the Copenhagen 
criteria.  
“Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a 
democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the 
Copenhagen political criteria.”216 
Moreover, as mentioned above, key actors within the European Commission, and the 
member states, did not actually expect this situation to change in the short or medium term. 
The granting of candidacy to Turkey at Helsinki was primarily a function of the EU’s need to 
expedite the enlargement process and a general desire to promote democracy in Turkey and 
thereby maintain stability in the crucial geopolitical eastern Mediterranean region. Candidacy 
was, in part, a quid pro quo for Turkey for the easy ride given to the Republic of Cyprus 217. 
Implicit within this point was the fact that candidacy by itself was meaningless. It was hoped 
that candidacy would encourage Turkey to carry out reform towards the Copenhagen criteria 
but this was not actually expected to happen. There was a “lack of trust in real 
Europeanisation by the Turks”218 and this was “something which everybody considered 
impossible.”219 (See also Font 2005; 2006). The Helsinki European Council Presidency 
conclusions made the conditionality of Turkey’s position clear.  
“Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of 
the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.”220 
                                               
216European Commission, 1999, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  Section 1.4 General evaluation.   
217 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
218 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
219 Senior European Commission official A – interview – April 2009. Also Senior UK Diplomat B – 
interview – March 2010. 
220 Helsinki European Council, December 10-11th 1999, Presidency conclusions, Section 12. See 
Appendix III. 
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In order to help Turkey reach this point there would be a “pre-accession strategy” to 
“stimulate and support” reforms. This would involve “enhanced political dialogue”, increased 
access to Commission agencies and financial assistance. In due course the Commission 
would draw up a formal Accession Partnership to bring all aspects of the strategy together 
into a one legal document. This would give Turkey a plan of necessary action and provide a 
structure by which the Commission could monitor and assess Turkey’s progress. The Feira 
European Council Presidency conclusions in June 2000 gently encouraged Turkey to carry 
out reforms and invited the Commission to make progress on preparing financial assistance 
for Ankara and the formal Accession Partnership document.221 
In November 2000 the Commission’s progress report took a less gentle tone. It noted that 
political dialogue had continued between Ankara and the EU. The European Parliament’s 
EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee had met, trade volumes increased, and a 
framework for financial assistance had been adopted.  However the report criticised the 
Turkish record on civil military relations, minority rights and corruption. It said Turkey’s 
record on “torture and ill treatment” remained “largely unchanged”. Whilst, on a positive note, 
it noted that Turkish society had embarked on a debate on these issues, the report 
concluded that Turkey was “…slow in implementing the institutional reforms needed to 
guarantee democracy and the rule of law.” 222  
Using the unpromising 2000 progress report as a base, the Commission began to prepare 
the formal Accession Partnership document (APD)223 . It was the object of intense 
negotiations at the European Council in Nice in December 2000 as the Greek government 
had lobbied strongly for a solution to the issue of Cyprus224 to be a precondition of the 
Accession Partnership Document (APD). These were highly contentious issues in both 
Ankara and Athens bearing in mind that Cyprus had been the issue which nearly halted 
                                               
221 Feira EU Council, June19-20th 2000, Presidency conclusions.  
222 European Commission, 2000, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession. Section 1.4, General evaluation.  
223 Official Journal of the EU, L085 – 24 March 2001, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOIndex.do 
224 And the territorial spats over the Aegean islands of Imia/Kardak 
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Turkish candidacy at Helsinki. In the event a document was drafted by the French Foreign 
Minister Hubert Vedrine225 which “fudged the wording so it could be interpreted favourably by 
all parties and in different ways by analysts in each country” (Kuniholm 2001:13). The APD 
was published on March 8th 2001 quickly followed in Ankara by the National Programme for 
the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA)226. In so doing the EU maintained the Turkish accession 
process but deferred the problem of Cyprus until the end of 2002227.  
Furthermore, at the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001, the Presidency conclusions 
welcomed what had been achieved - the “enhanced political dialogue” and the NPAA - but 
warned that further progress was needed in “areas such as human rights.” 
“Turkey is urged to take concrete measures to implement the priorities 
of the Accession Partnership which is the cornerstone of the pre-
accession strategy.” 228 
At this stage, therefore, Turkey was not considered to have made significant progress in 
constitutional reform and was still being urged to do so by the European Commission. The 
first constitutional reform package was passed in October 2001229. In its progress report of 
November 2001 this was acknowledged by the European Commission but Turkey’s failings 
in this regard were not overlooked.  
“Though it is beginning to make progress in some areas, Turkey does 
not yet meet the Copenhagen political criteria and is therefore 
encouraged to intensify and accelerate the process of reform to ensure 
                                               
225 Agence France Press, December 7, 2000. Greek, Turkish PM shake hands at Nice Summit. 
226 NPAA available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/npaa_full_en.pdf 
227 It is salient to note that the Nice Treaty which was signed at the end of the Nice summit in 
December 2000 did not include Turkey in its institutional framework projections designed to cope with 
enlargement. This has been cited as further evidence that the EU did not see Turkey as capable of 
the necessary reforms and therefore not a viable accession prospect (see Muftuler Bac 2004; 
Erdogdu 2002).  
228 Gothenburg European Council, June 15-16th 2001, Presidency conclusions.  
229 For more detail see Chapter Four Sec. 1.2. 
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that human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully protected in law 
and practice, for all citizens, throughout the country.”230 
The Laeken European Council Presidency conclusions, in December 2001, also 
acknowledged the Turkish constitutional amendments which could “bring forward the 
prospect of the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkey was encouraged to 
continue its progress towards complying with both economic and political criteria, notably 
with regard to human rights.”231 The EU remained encouraging to Turkey but also reiterated 
the significance of the Copenhagen criteria as entry conditions.  
Within the same time frame, the EU was also finalising accession negotiations with the 
CEEC candidate countries in time for them to participate in the 2004 European 
parliamentary elections. The list was Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Slovenia232. Turkey’s slow progress at 
this stage therefore risked it falling further behind the CEEC countries and the Republic of 
Cyprus. It was also agreed at the Laeken European Council in December 2001, to convene 
a European Convention to be chaired by the former French President, Valerie Giscard 
D’Estaing, to “consider the key issues arising for the Union’s future development and try to 
identify the various possible responses.” 233 Giscard D’Estaing had made no secret of his 
view that the offer of candidacy at Helsinki had been a mistake.  
“There are two reasons to make it impossible. First, except for Istanbul, 
Turkey is not located on the European Continent, but mainly in Asia. 
Second, if we start admitting countries not located in Europe, by which 
criteria do we reject membership by any state? If we want to have a 
real, deep integration, it must be with people of comparable conditions, 
                                               
230 European Commission, 1999, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  Section 3.2, General evaluation. Pg 98.   
231 Laeken European Council, December 14-15th 2001, Presidency conclusions.  
232 It included all countries in negotiations except Bulgaria and Romania. 
233 Laeken European Council, December 14-15th 2001, Presidency conclusions – Laeken Declaration. 
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politically, economically and culturally, and located on the European 
soil.”234 
However, Turkey was asked by the EU – in common with the other candidate countries - to 
send a representative to the Convention. This was in marked contrast to the Nice Treaty a 
year before when Turkey had not been included235.  
In February and March of 2002, further constitutional amendment packages were presented 
to the Turkish Parliament. The EU reaffirmed its message at the Seville European Council of 
June 2002 that CEECs should prepare to enlarge in time for 2004 European parliamentary 
elections. A fourth amendment package was passed by Turkish deputies in early August 
2002. The extent of this last package – which will be explored in more detail below – 
surpassed the expectations of many observers within the EU. The Enlargement 
Commissioner Gunter Verheugen welcomed it as a “courageous decision” by the Turkish 
government.236 The EU arrived at the Copenhagen European Council with a Turkey which 
had belatedly, and slightly haphazardly, exceeded earlier expectations of its capacity to 
reform. The EU was also having to deal with the prospect of managing the final negotiations 
for the largest enlargement round ever as well as the Cyprus issue and the Berlin Plus 
arrangements for its flagship defence project ESDP.  
It is important to note here that the candidacy offered at Helsinki had enabled the pro EU 
lobby in Turkey to make the politically sensitive case to implement the reforms necessary to 
make any progress towards meeting the necessary criteria to move forward with European 
accession. This was a radical departure from the previous patterns of Turkish politics.  (See 
Hale 2003, Ugur 2003; Tocci 2005).The offer of candidacy at Helsinki had led the pro EU 
                                               
234 Washington Times, February 27th 2000. Non-interference in Austria. 
235 Oguzlu (2003) has suggested this should be seen as a result of the Al Qaeda September 11th 2001 
bombings and its effect in raising Turkey’s “strategic stock” (Webber et al 2004).  
236 European Commission press release Commission welcomes package of reforms in Turkey. 
August 5th 2002. 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1197&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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lobby in Turkey to believe that if reforms were implemented the EU would have to take their 
case seriously. Thus the sincerity with which candidacy was offered by the EU is irrelevant to 
the outcome of it being offered. By the time of the Copenhagen European Council in 
December 2002 Turkey’s advocates, including the UK, had come to see the progress within 
Turkey as being in the best interests of both Turkey and the EU and something to be 
encouraged.237  
1.2. Turkey 
The reforms in Turkey which were to prove so vital at Copenhagen had been slow to 
materialise. This was partly because of the coalition nature of Bulent Ecevit’s government 
and partly because Ecevit himself was not a natural Europhile. This section outlines how the 
protracted reforms eventually came to pass after the unpromising start.  
In wider Turkish society, the major political parties were in favour of EU accession, as was 
much of civil society (Duner and Deverall 2001) and even the military, who saw it as a 
“natural extension of Turkey’s NATO membership which would further cement its 
relationship with the western powers.” (Hale 2003: 110). However, Ecevit was at the head of 
a three party coalition government238 which included the right-wing Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetci Hareket Partisi - MHP) as senior partner. Whilst most in Ecevit’s own party (DSP) 
and the other coalition partner (ANAP) were in favour of EU accession, the MHP was 
extremely sensitive about the reforms that would be necessary to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria239.  
So, whilst Ecevit had the support of his own party and broad public opinion, he had to deal 
with the acute nationalist sensitivities of the MHP position when approaching reforms which 
were necessary for Turkey to have any chance of starting accession talks with the EU. 
Furthermore, Ecevit was physically unwell and “his heart wasn’t in (the reforms)…” A 
                                               
237 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
238 A coalition of the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Partisi - DSP), the Motherland Party  
(Anavatan Partisi - ANAP) and the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi - MHP) 
239 For example the MHP regarded any concession on the Kurdish issue as “an insult to those who 
had died in the long struggle against the militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party.” (Hale 2003:110). 
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combination of these two factors meant no reforms were presented until nearly two years 
after the 1999 Helsinki European Council and then in a very febrile political atmosphere. 
The differences of opinion between the DSP/ANAP and the MHP were demonstrated by 
contrasting reactions to the European Commission’s 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s 
progress which stated:  “…though it is beginning to make progress in some areas, Turkey 
does not yet meet the Copenhagen political criteria.”240 Whilst the MHP leader Devlet 
Bahceli dismissed the report as “…void of justified and valid foundation.”241, the ANAP leader 
Mesut Yilmaz acknowledged that “…a fair amount of this criticism is justified and needs to be 
addressed immediately.”242 
Ecevit’s coalition was further weakened in 2001 by an economic crisis which had begun in 
November 2000 and resulted in intervention from the IMF (International Monetary Fund)243. 
This also affected his ability to implement controversial reforms. 
“It took about two years to get things started by which time he (Ecevit) 
was ill, losing control. His coalition was in tatters and there was an 
economic crisis. A lot of time was wasted. If Ecevit had been really 
determined he would have been able to secure much more ground 
before the 2001 (economic) crisis. He had a whole year that he could 
have used much better and which he did not use at all.” 244 
The first constitutional package of October 2001 addressed freedom of expression and the 
death penalty. In November 2001 a new Civil Code was also adopted. It addressed gender 
(in)equality in marriage and property rights for divorced women and was a “major 
breakthrough” (Muftuler-Bac 2005: 24). In February and March 2002 further amendments 
                                               
240 European Commission, 2001, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession. 
241 Agence France Press, November 15th 2001, Far right leader lashes out at EU 
242 Agence France Press, November 13th 2001, Turkey acknowledges shortcomings, urges more 
support from EU. 
243 See Akyuz and Boratov (2003) for more detail on the Turkish economic crisis of 2000/01. 
244 Senior Turkish diplomat A – interview – March 2010. 
138 
 
were made to the 1982 Turkish constitution mainly concerning freedom of speech and 
political expression. These were a continuation of those passed in October 2001.  
This slow start to reform was then implemented with Ecevit in poor health and in an 
extremely difficult economic climate involving high inflation, unemployment and a falling 
exchange rate and GDP (Yeldan 2008). The uncertainty created by Ecevit’s reluctance to 
stand aside on health grounds threatened to undermine a fledgling economic recovery245 
and the government finally fell on July 17th 2002 following the resignation of a tranche of 
DSP members of parliament including the foreign minister Ismael Cem246. The final collapse 
of the Ecevit government had been the result of two things – the frailty of Bulent Ecevit247 
and the opposition of the MHP to the August package of reforms.248 In the event, the 
“government proceeded to collapse in slow motion over a period of weeks (in July 2002).” 
(Hannay 2005: 173). In early August 2002 a recalled parliament decided both to hold 
elections in November and pass the fourth reform package. This had been driven forward by 
Mesut Yilmaz of ANAP and “had placed Turkey in a better position than before to hope for a 
positive result at Copenhagen.” (Hannay 2005:174). 
The far-reaching reforms of August 2002 were passed in the interregnum between 
parliaments as MPs from the pro-EU parties, DSP and ANAP, delayed campaigning in order 
to vote them through249. These reforms were a “…major step in fulfilling the political aspects 
of the Copenhagen criteria.” They abolished the death penalty, revised the anti-terror laws 
and allowed Kurdish groups to broadcast in their own language (Muftuler-Bac 2005:24). By 
                                               
245 Financial Times, July 2nd 2002. Turkey’s test 
246 Financial Times, July 12th 2002. Former foreign minister to head pro-EU 'dream team': Senior 
Ministers desert Ecevit. 
247 Confidence in Bulent Ecevit’s abilities within the Turkish civil service had been eroded several 
months before when he took umbrage, with little apparent cause, to a comment by the President 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer and unsettled the financial markets (Senior Turkish diplomat A – interview – 
March 2010). 
248 The Times, July 10th 2002, Frailty and conflict at the heart of Ankara’s government 
249 Turkish Daily News, August 1st 2002, Justice Committee begins discussion of EU adaptation laws  
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August 2002 the Turkish economy had improved250 and the Turkish government was 
“…doing all the right things”251 to move forward to EU accession in terms of making progress 
towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria. 
In November 2002 pro-European voters punished the DSP (and its successor the YTP) and 
ANAP for not carrying out more reforms while anti-European voters deserted the MHP for 
conceding too much (Onis and Keyman 2003; Muftuler-Bac 2005). The result was the 
election of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - AKP) on 
November 3rd 2002 with enough votes (34.2%) to be able to form a majority government. 
Neither DSP, ANAP nor MHP won enough votes to be able to take seats in parliament252.  
The AKP was driven by both “ideology and interest” and saw EU reform as a means by 
which to reach the end of religious freedom and political legitimacy as an “Islamist” party 
(Tocci 2005: 80). It passed two more constitutional reform packages on 3rd and 4th 
December 2002 literally days before the Copenhagen European Council . These 
strengthened previous reforms, revised the penal code for torture and ordered retrials of all 
cases decided in the state security courts (see also Tocci 2005:73). Up to December 2004 
the AKP would pass four more constitutional packages and a new Penal Code.  
Turkey had been slow to begin the necessary reforms and for nearly two years met the EU’s 
low expectations of it. This explains why Ankara was not included within the Nice Treaty and 
ESDP arrangements. It was not a member of the EU nor was it expected to enter into 
accession negotiations very soon – unlike the CEECs. However from the beginning of 2002 
the Turkish reform process gathered pace253. Ironically whilst Ecevit’s political and personal 
weakness may have at first impeded progress it ultimately facilitated it. Those around him 
were able to capitalise on his physical and political weakness to drive through the necessary 
                                               
250 Financial Times, July 1st 2002, Turkey's ailment: The country's chances of controlling public debt 
and securing economic recovery could be jeopardised by the ill-health of the prime minister; Turkish 
Daily News, July 2nd 2002. Ailing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit meets coalition partners Bahceli and 
Yilmaz in attempt to ease concerns over his health, economy. 
251 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010. 
252 A political party in Turkey must gain at least 10% of the vote to take seats in parliament. 
253 The impact of the 9/11 attacks must also be taken into account (Webber et al 2004)  
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legislation with broad consensus. Thus the new AKP Turkish government arrived at the 
European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002 able to point to reforms which 
“exceeded expectations” of the EU member states (Ugur 2003: 177). 
This meant that Turkey had gone further towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria than had 
been expected of it. The legacy of Helsinki for Turkey was that it created an incentive for 
reform. This process should not be overplayed. The rush to reform was actually very slow 
due to Bulent Ecevit’s own inclination, his ill health and a hostile coalition partner. However 
Ecevit’s weakness ultimately allowed the pro EU lobby to push through the necessary 
legislation.  
This unexpected progress, coupled with the role of Cyprus in eastern enlargement and the 
need to find a solution to the tortuous Berlin Plus situation, can explain the outcome at the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. The processes of Turkish domestic 
reform, the Cyprus issue and the Berlin Plus arrangements for ESDP converged at the EU’s 
Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 to produce an outcome which was 
“effectively a conditional date for starting negotiations in 2005.” (Grabbe 2003). I will 
ultimately argue that this served to reinforce the path dependent nature of the process 
leading from the Helsinki European Council in 1999 to the Brussels European Council five 
years later. However first it is necessary to examine the twin processes of the ESDP Berlin 
Plus arrangements and Cyprus in more detail.  
2. The impact of ESDP on EU Turkey relations 1999-2002 
This section begins with ESDP and argues that by the time of the Copenhagen European 
Council there was considerable political will to operationalise ESDP as a peacekeeping force, 
Operation Concordia, in Macedonia from March 2003. However the “problem of Turkey” was 
a major impediment to this end. Therefore, at the Copenhagen European Council , the 
member states were under pressure to find a solution to the “problem of Turkey”. This 
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section will look at the development of ESDP between 1999 and 2002, explore the “problem 
of Turkey” and ask why it had proved so difficult to solve prior to Copenhagen. 
2.1. The “problem of Turkey” 
The Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions set an “ambitious timetable” for 
ESDP to have a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) able “to deploy within 60 days and sustain for 
at least one year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of 
Petersberg tasks” by 2003254. There had been considerable uncertainty and disquiet in both 
Ankara and Washington in 1999 about the chain of command which the new security policy 
would operate under. At the NATO Washington European Council in April 1999 the Turkish 
government had pushed for a veto over EU access to NATO capability and won the backing 
of the Americans.   
“…if EU countries want to set up their own defence organisation it is 
their business. However when they want to use NATO’s means, the 
NATO members including Turkey must also be involved in that. That is 
what we said and we had it accepted.” (Turkish Foreign Minister Ismael 
Cem)255 
At Helsinki it was clarified that the EU wanted ESDP to be based within the EU and not 
within NATO as an “ESDI”. This created the “problem of Turkey” (Missiroli 2002) which 
would bedevil ESDP from Helsinki until a “solution” was found at the Copenhagen European 
Council in 2002. 
The Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions acknowledged the non-EU NATO 
members’ position,  
“Appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while 
respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European 
                                               
254 Helsinki European Council, December 10-11th 1999, Presidency conclusions, sec. 28.  
255 Anatolia News Agency, 25th April 1999. Quoted by House of Commons Research Paper 01/50, 
May 2nd 2001, European security and defence policy: Nice and beyond. Page 28.  
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NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military 
crisis management.” 256 
However, as noted above, the EU institutions, and its member states, would not 
countenance the admission of Turkey to the EU without improvements to its human rights 
record and therefore it could not be a full member of ESDP257.  
The EU member states at Helsinki fundamentally underestimated the strength of feeling in 
Turkey about the ESDP issue and the implications this had for the progress of ESDP (Bono 
2002:32). Ankara believed its geopolitical value alone justified access to ESDP on the same 
privileged basis it had enjoyed within the Western European Union (WEU) (Park 2000b: 319; 
Bailes 1999).  
“We looked at the ESDP always from a NATO angle. We always 
thought it should develop in the same way as the WEU. That was why it 
has become a big frustration for the Turkish bureaucracy.” 258 
So, even before it had begun, the ESDP had the “problem of Turkey” with which to contend 
plus a mistrustful transatlantic relationship. This situation was made even more tortuous by 
the inextricable role of Cyprus. Part of the reason why Ankara was so sensitive about ESDP 
was because of the fear that unless it was an ESDP insider then ESDP could be used 
against it over Cyprus and the Aegean disputes.  
At the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Brussels just a few days after the EU 
Helsinki European Council in 1999259 there was a “lively debate” 260 between the USA and 
                                               
256 Helsinki European Council, December 10-11th 1999, Presidency conclusions, Section 28.  
257 Senior UK Diplomat G – interview – March 2010. In other words, “…there was no way the EU 
could change its institutional cloth to suit (the Turkish government).” (Source Senior ESDP advisor A 
– interview – March 2010.) 
258 Senior Turkish Diplomat B – interview - March 2010. 
259 NATO, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels,15-16th December 1999.  
260 Anonymous “senior NATO official” quoted in the Turkish Daily News 17th December 1999. Turkey 
wins the war of words in NATO communiqué. 
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France over the chain of command. The UK and the Netherlands brokered a compromise 
wording for the final communiqué:261 
“… practical arrangements for assured EU access to NATO planning 
capabilities and for ready EU access to NATO collective assets and 
capabilities (will be negotiated) on a case-by-case basis and by 
consensus as set out at Washington.” (my emphasis)262 
However, this was a diplomatic rather than an actual success. ESDP was to be based within 
the EU and therefore NATO did not have the final say over the chain of command. EU 
insiders insist this was not done in order to side-line NATO per se:  
“It was not that the EU did not want to rely on NATO…it was not a 
competition with NATO…it was just that defence was something that 
Europeans needed to be able to do themselves.” 263  
In other words, it was not conceivable to the “EU theologians”264 that it could be any other 
way. 
The chain of command issue was further addressed by the “Food for Thought” paper 
presented to the EU Defence Ministers’ meeting at Sintra in February 2000. It conceded that 
the EU would need to enter dialogue with NATO and the non EU NATO allies (specifically 
the USA and Turkey) because it needed recourse to NATO capability265.  It should be noted 
that, within the ESDP secretariat, there was some sympathy with the Turkish position. 
Officials tried to reassure Turkey, off the record, that whilst the institutional constraints meant 
they were unable to offer formal arrangements this would not be a problem in practice. 
                                               
261 Turkish Daily News, December 17th 1999 Turkey wins the war of words in NATO communiqué. 
262 NATO, Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 15th 
1999.  Press release M-NAC2 (99)166. Section 19.   
263 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010. 
264 Senior WEU official – interview – February 2010. By EU theologians the interviewee was referring 
to the level of dedication to EU norms shown by some officials within the EU Council. 
265 EU “Food for Thought” paper, pg 102, presented at Sintra EU Defence Ministers’ meeting 2000. 
Reprinted in Ruttens (2001). 
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However the Turkish government “wanted more than that….they wanted a seat at the 
table…”266  
This demonstrates the lack of mutual understanding between Turkey and the EU on ESDP. 
Understanding of Turkey’s strategic and political culture was at a “pretty low level” within the 
EU267. Turkey was dealt with as it impinged on EU issues and thus the “problem of Turkey” 
was the result of a classic EU response where the EU tries to tackle a problem “bit by bit but 
does not address the substance of it.” 
“We want enlargement…but if we take Cyprus in we need to reassure 
Turkey so we work on Greece…at the same time we have to handle 
feelings of the member states that do not want Turkey….then we find 
that we have solved the enlargement problem but we have transferred 
the problem of Turkey.”268 
Only the main EU member states understood the implications of ESDP and the possible 
pitfalls. “The countries which thought about it at all were the French, us (the UK) and the 
Germans.”269 Indeed it has been suggested that even the UK did not fully anticipate the 
problem of Turkey and had just presumed that a way would be found “to bring the Turks 
round”270 and that the offer of candidacy at Helsinki and an off the record assurance would 
be enough.  
2.2. The Feira European Council  
Following the “Food for Thought” paper, a solution was proposed at the Feira European 
Council in June 2000 to the “problem of Turkey” and the other non-EU NATO allies271. This 
would comprise the EU member states + 15 (13 candidate countries plus Iceland and 
Norway) being brought into a “single inclusive structure in which all the 15 countries 
                                               
266 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010. 
267 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2011. 
268 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
269 Senior UK diplomat D – interview – April 2010. 
270 Senior UK diplomat B – interview – March 2010.  
271 Iceland and Norway in this case. 
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concerned…can enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and co-operation with the 
EU…”272 (Reichard 2006: 281). Against the objections of the French government it also 
created an EU + 6 (non EU NATO allies – Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, 
Poland and Turkey) which would give Ankara closer contact still (Tofte 2003:7).  “In the 
emerging ESDP jargon this meant that all non EU members would be involved “upstream” 
(in decision shaping which entailed information, consultation and pre-planning) and 
“downstream” (in implementation) but that decision making proper and political control would 
pertain exclusively to the EU-15.” (Missiroli 2002:15) 
However the USA remained concerned about being side-lined and losing control of the chain 
of command for ESDP273. Washington was keen for the new ESDP to utilise the NATO 
planning capability, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), based at Mons 
near Brussels in Belgium. There were two potential problems lying in the path of this aim: 
firstly the French government was keen to maintain an independent planning capability and 
secondly, Turkey was reluctant to allow EU states – including those who were not members 
of NATO (i.e.: Cyprus) - to have full access to NATO planning and military assets when 
Ankara did not have “decision making powers” within the EU. In other words, the Feira 
European Council arrangements had not solved the “problem of Turkey”. 
Turkey remained concerned by the loss of WEU privileges which left Ankara out of the 
decision making within ESDP and felt its geostrategic loyalty to NATO had earned it the right 
to be involved at a higher level274.The Turkish Ambassador to NATO, Onur Oymen, 
summarised the Turkish stance: 
                                               
272 Feira EU Summit Presidency Conclusions. Appendix 1 article 5. 
273 International Herald Tribune. May 24th 2000. “US starts to fret over EU military independence.”  
274 As outlined by the Turkish foreign minister Ismael Cem in a speech at the NATO Foreign Ministers’ 
meeting in Florence in May 2000. See Anatolia News Agency, May 24th 2000, Turkey not satisfied 
with draft of European security document. Supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe, 
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“If an EU operation seems likely to affect one NATO ally’s security then 
the Union will have to listen to what the ally will have to say.”275 
The EU member states were well aware of the Turkish position before the Feira European 
Council276. However Javier Solana made it clear at that stage that the EU was unwilling to 
relinquish control.  
“The political control of operations will exclusively remain with the EU 
countries. There will be large-scale transparency towards others, but as 
EU countries, we cannot give up the political decision-making 
power” .277  
This led to a sharp rebuke from the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit who was strongly 
backed by the Turkish military.  
“They are planning to use our military units assigned to NATO. 
However, they are reluctant to agree to allow us to participate in their 
decisions. That is a very serious situation and approach. It is impossible 
to understand why they insist on such an illogical and unmerciful 
position? Can the possibility of ill intent be considered? Do they intend 
to create developments unacceptable to Turkey? As far as Turkey is 
concerned, their behaviour is very disrespectful. The situation is illogical 
and abnormal.”278 
At this point the “problem of Turkey” became critical. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued a statement making clear it would not “accept offering NATO’s facilities and 
                                               
275 Anatolia News Agency, May 25th 2000.  European defence development unsatisfactory says 
Turkey’s NATO envoy 
276 Turkey had  made its position clear to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) High 
Representative Javier Solana during a visit to Ankara in May 2000. See Agence France Press, June 
1st 2000, Solana in Ankara for talks on EU affairs and security. Also: Anatolia News Agency, June 1st 
2000, Turkish, European leaders discuss defence initiative, supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe. 
277 Quoted in Der Spiegel, June 19th 2000, EU's Solana denies EU task force to be European army, 
supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe. 
278 Cumhuriyet, (Turkish newspaper), June 22nd 2000, Premier angered by EU decision on Turkish 
defence, translated by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 
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capabilities for the use of the EU automatically.”279 The Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin 
Cakmakoglu said Turkey was willing to use the veto it had negotiated at the 1999 NATO 
Washington summit.”280  
However, in evidence to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21st 
2000 Javier Solana still did not appear to have appreciated quite how unequivocal the 
Turkish position was. He congratulated the EU on having made “remarkable” progress on 
ESDP in the six months since Helsinki and appeared to suggest the objections of the Turks 
(and the Americans) could be appeased by “striking the right balance between safeguarding 
the autonomy of the EU and allowing for the fullest involvement in the operational phase of 
any action of partners that wish it.”281 Indeed considerable concessions had been made at 
the Feira European Council . Turkey had been included into the EU’s institutional security 
arrangements. It was now a member of the EU + 6 and EU +15 committees. “EU + 6” was 
the EU member states plus the non-EU NATO members282. The “EU +15” was the EU + 6 as 
well as those in accession talks with the EU283.  Both committees were due to meet four 
times annually in times of non-crisis. Additionally there would be two more meetings annually 
of all the countries represented in the EU+15 and the EU + 6 together making a total of ten 
meetings annually between Turkish and EU ESDP officials when they would have the 
chance to “discuss ESDP matters and their possible implications”. Was this merely Turkish 
intransigence? 284 
“One could, perhaps, unkindly, observe that what is on display here is a 
kind of Turkish national diplomatic style – confrontational, 
uncompromising and stubborn.” (Park 2000b: 319). 
                                               
279 Anatolia News Agency, June 20th 2000, Turkey not to offer NATO facilities to EU automatically, 
Supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe. See also Agence France Press, June 20th 2000, URGENT --- 
Turkey will not let EU use its NATO men and equipment. 
280Turkish Daily News. June 22nd 2000, Turkey threatens EU with its NATO power of veto. 
281 Javier Solana, quoted in European Report, June 28th 2000, Defence: Council experts consider 
how to set up CESDP rapid reaction facility.  
282 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Ireland, Norway and Turkey. 
283 Bulgaria, Greek Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
284 See Euractiv, April 30th 2001, Accommodating Turkey in ESDP; Bailes and Thorhallson 2006. 
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The “problem of Turkey” endured and re-appeared in the run up to the Nice European 
Council in December 2000. The UK had come under pressure from the US to counter moves 
by the French government to regain control of ESDP. Washington distrusted the “tightly 
drawn lawyers’ document” of Feira (Hunter and Farley 2002: 91) and suspected duplicity by 
the French government285.  
 “We (UK) were caught in the middle (of USA and EU) and we were in a 
very difficult place for quite a long time.”286 
The USA felt that the EU was not in a position to take the stance it did, because it needed 
access to NATO capability and it lacked “sensitivity” and humility. This was primarily a 
criticism of the French government. 
“….it (Feira) had too much of the “Europe-firsters” and not enough 
leavening by countries on which the United States was relying to 
protect NATO interests.” (Hunter and Farley 2002: 91). 
The Turkish position at this stage was “paradoxical” (Missiroli 2002: 16). At the same time as 
blocking automatic EU access to NATO capability – and in particular the NATO planning 
facilities at SHAPE - Ankara committed a generous 5000 troops to ESDP287.  However 
Turkey continued to demand WEU parity and efforts by third parties such as the NATO 
Secretary-General George Robertson to reassure the Turks that they were not being 
deliberately side-lined were doomed to failure as it was not within Robertson’s power to 
grant Turkey the EU decision making powers which it wanted.288  
                                               
285 Senior UK Diplomat H – interview – October 2010. 
286 Senior UK politician A – interview – March 2010. 
287 Turkey Ambassador to the UK Korkmaz Haktanir in a letter to the Daily Telegraph – 22nd 
November 2000. Reported in House of Commons Research Paper 01/50, May 2nd 2001, European 
security and defence policy: Nice and beyond.Pg. 28. 
288 Bulent Ecevit quoted in Agence France Press, December 12th 2000, US tries to persuade Turkey 
not to veto EU defence plans. 
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For these reasons the Nice European Council ,  in December 2000, was a diplomatic power 
struggle primarily between France and the UK over the “question of semantics” 289 of whether 
ESDP constituted a “European army” or not. Either way it failed to solve the problem of 
Turkey for ESDP. Moreover, ironically, the Turkish policy was working in opposition to its 
long standing ally, the USA. Washington was keen for ESDP to use SHAPE facilities in order 
to maintain a semblance of control over the chain of command. However, for NATO to agree 
to allow the EU to have access to SHAPE it would need a unanimous vote at the NATO 
foreign ministers meeting in Brussels in December 2000 and Turkey was not inclined to 
change its mind despite lobbying from Washington290.  
At the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December 2000, therefore, NATO found itself in 
the paradoxical position of proposing a plan which the Turkish position would make 
unworkable. Lord Robertson warned the French government that ESDP would not be 
allowed access to NATO military assets, except via SHAPE, and warned that they needed 
NATO capability ergo they needed to use SHAPE. At the same time however the Turks were 
refusing to budge and accused the EU of acting “against logic, moral value and 
conscience.”291 This was in spite of their NATO allies “practically pleading” with Ankara to 
drop its insistence on being involved in the fine detail decision making292 within the ESDP 
organisation. Ultimately, the USA Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, accepted the 
Turkish position and the issue was put off for another day.  
“In the end it is not we but Turkey that has to be satisfied and for the 
moment they aren’t….we understand the fact that Turkey has particular 
                                               
289 Javier Solana quoted by The Guardian, December 9th 2000, Chirac gives way in row with Blair on 
NATO: Security Differences on defence remain despite a show of unity. 
290 Bill Clinton sent Bulent Ecevit a letter which was hand delivered by the American Ambassador in 
Ankara Robert Pearson. It was addressed to “Dear Brother Ecevit…” (Turkish Daily News, December 
14th 2000) and urged Turkey not to use its veto in this way. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
also met with the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismael Cem, and Bill Clinton telephoned Ecevit on 
December 14th 2000 from Air Force One - with no success.  
291 Turkish foreign minister, Ismael Cem, quoted by Xinhua News Agency, December 15th 2000, 
NATO Fails to Get Turkey to Agree to NATO-EU Deal. 
292 Turkish Daily News, December 14th 2000, Turkey doesn't budge on ESDP as NATO meeting 
begins. 
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concerns given its unique location and it’s not surprising that its 
concerns are greater than other EU allies. At the same time we 
understand the EU’s position and believe that it really has made a good 
effort.”293 
The upshot of the Nice European Council was that the EU maintained its decision making 
autonomy and had committed itself to only being obliged to use NATO planning when it was 
using NATO military assets294. The EU member states continued to try “to convince the 
Turks their position was not productive”295 but they did not change their minds about allowing 
the Turks into the decision making circle of the EU296.  
“EU decisions have to be taken at 15 not 16. It is as if NATO were told 
that Alliance decision were to be taken by non NATO members. No one 
would agree to that.”297 
The Nice European Council also established the structure of ESDP298. The most important 
decisions were to be taken by the member state foreign ministers (General Affairs 
Committee) or the European Council heads of state. However the day to day work was 
based within the Second Pillar of the EU and the CFSP High Representative Javier Solana. 
In addition, there was the Political and Security Committee299 which was comprised of 
national representatives of ambassadorial level; the EU Military Committee (EUMC) which 
was made up of Chiefs of Defence of the member states and finally the EU Military Staff 
                                               
293 Quoted in The Washington Post, December 16th 2000, Turkey Blocks Deal To Share NATO Force; 
EU Would Have Used Alliance's Assets 
294 This caused anguish in the US State Department. The then George W Bush Advisor Richard Perle 
described an ESDP which developed its own planning capability as “a catastrophe for NATO”. Quoted 
in Daily Telegraph, December 16th 2000, America tries to stop EU going it alone on defence.  
295 General Jean-Pierre Kelche of France in evidence to the UK House of Commons’ Defence Select 
Committee, 28th March 2001.  
296 In assessing this view it should be borne in mind that, at this time, December 2000, the Turkish 
government had done very little towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria and was not considered to 
be a viable EU candidate by the other member states. 
297 General Jean-Pierre Kelche of France in evidence to the UK HoC Defence Select Committee, 28th 
March 2001.  
298 For more detail see Bjorkdahl and Stromvik (2008: 34). 
299 The Political and Security Committee was known by the French acronym COPS – established by: 
EU Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP –at Nice EU Council, December 2000. 
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(EUMS) which comprised military officers seconded from national governments. The job of 
the EUMC was to give advice to COPS and the EUMS. The European Commission had a 
representative on COPS and the DG External Relations, Chris Patten, played “quarter-
master” to the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana in “an amiable way”300 301.  
The Feira European Council in June 2000 had decided that the non-EU NATO allies could 
take part automatically in operations involving the use of NATO assets but on a case by 
case basis for EU-led operations. The Nice European Council in December 2000 made a 
further “concession” by outlining how, presuming the invitation to participate was forthcoming, 
and accepted, all countries involved in an ESDP operation would then be represented on a 
“Committee of Contributors”. The views of the Committee of Contributors would be taken into 
account by COPS but it, COPS, would retain the overall decision making function. In Turkish 
diplomatic circles the Committee of Contributors came to be seen as an insulting token 
gesture which left Turkey (and other non-EU NATO allies) “out of the debate” (Reichard 
2007:157). 
“My experience of the Committee of Contributors was disastrous….the 
EU made all the decisions and made all the juicy talks. They sent their 
youngest members to the Committee of Contributors. This was 
ridiculous. The EU was not taking NATO seriously…not only us 
(Turkey).”302 
As the EU member state leaders signed the Nice Treaty the EU “hedged its bets”303 and 
failed to find a definitive solution to either the problem of Turkey or the underlying 
                                               
300 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010. 
301 In fact Solana “had more trouble” with the member state presidencies who wanted to keep control 
of the policies during their “six months of glory” Senior UK diplomat D – interview – April 2010. 
302 Senior Turkish Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
303 The Guardian, Feb 27th 2001, EU ministers sign treaty but defence plan rankles. 
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transatlantic tensions between ESDP and NATO304. The finding of a solution to both issues 
was deferred to another time.  
2.3. The Istanbul Letters and the Ankara Document. 
In early 2001, problems threatened to stall ESDP indefinitely. It had not finalised 
arrangements for co-operation with NATO and, in any case, it was not able to enact the 
arrangements NATO would prefer – use of SHAPE planning facilities - because of the 
Turkish stance. Crucially, at the same time there was a desire within the EU to make ESDP 
operational as soon as possible305 notably for Operation Concordia to take over from NATO 
(Operation Amber Fox) in Macedonia306.  The Turkish position was not popular in EU 
circles307 and it was still not considered possible for Turkey to have full decision making 
powers in ESDP.  
 “It is as if NATO were told that Alliance decisions were to be taken by 
non NATO members. No one would agree to that. Either you belong or 
not.”308 
However, by this time, there was an acceptance of an urgent need to find a way forward 
through the impasse caused by the “problem of Turkey” and the UK was instrumental in this 
regard. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Political Director, Emyr Jones-Parry, 
                                               
304 The new George.W.Bush administration in Washington broadly followed the line of the outgoing 
Clinton administration.  The US view centred on an implicit fear of being side-lined by the French. For 
this reason NATO, and the US, wanted ESDP to use the SHAPE planning facility (Hunter and Farley 
2002:113). During his visit to Camp David on February 22nd and 23rd 2001, Tony Blair “set out the 
reasons why (the UK) was keen on (ESDP)…” and quoted the “…the lessons of Bosnia, Sierra Leone 
and Kosovo” (Campbell 2007: 506). Ultimately Bush traded his scepticism over ESDP for support 
from the UK for the US missile defence system. (See Benedict Brogan, Daily Telegraph, 24th February 
2001. See also The Times, 24th February 2001, Blair and Bush seal a new friendship with defence 
deal. Repeated in Riddell (2003: 138) see also Campbell 2007:507.) 
305 The Nice EU Council Presidency Conclusions in December 2000 had urged the incoming Swedish 
Presidency to expedite progress “…so that a decision….can be taken as soon as possible and no 
later than at the European Council in Laeken (December 2001). Para.12. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/nice1_en.htm#III 
306 The Economist, US Edition, September 15th 2001. Wake up Europe! 
307 The French foreign minister Alain Richard criticised the Turkish “attitude” and maintained that there 
was “no advantage for our Turkish friends in maintaining this hard line stance.” Quoted in Turkish 
Daily News, May 20th 2001, Ankara keeps it position on new European army. 
308 Evidence of French General Jean-Pierre Kelche to House of Commons Defence Select Committee, 
European Security and Defence, 28th March 2001, 2000-2001, HC 390-I, Para 58. 
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and George.W.Bush’s envoy, James Dobbins309, with backing from the Netherlands and 
Spain310, were attempting to negotiate a behind-the-scenes deal which would break the 
impasse. They prepared the so-called “Istanbul Letters” document which proposed that 
Turkey would be able to send representatives to COPS both “periodically” and “in the event 
of a crisis.”311 It also offered an expanded role for the “Committee of Contributors” and 
reassurance that Turkey would be involved in operations which either used NATO assets or 
were in the vicinity of Turkey. Lastly the Turks were reassured that ESDP (ERRF) capability 
would not be used in the political disputes of NATO allies i.e.: Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. 
The UK and the USA made clear to Ankara that this was the best deal available and the 
Nice European Council modalities had been “interpreted to the maximum”. 312  
The “Istanbul Letters” of May and June 2001 were an effort to allay Turkish fears of losing its 
place within European security architecture and, more specifically, losing control over any 
operations involving Cyprus and Greece. The discussions took place behind the scenes and 
in secrecy at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Budapest in May 2001 when the 
Turkish foreign minister Ismael Cem was offered verbal and written reassurances and finally 
agreed to the compromise (Tofte 2003:145)313. However, on his return to Ankara, Cem was 
overruled by the Turkish military which made its views known in an “Information Note” issued 
on June 4th 2001. It re-iterated the demand for Turkey to retain its WEU status.  
                                               
309 George Bush had sent an envoy James Dobbins to Ankara the week before to “…allay Turkey’s 
concerns”. See Agence France Press, May 30th 2001, Elements in place for deal with Turkey on EU-
NATO links. Dobbins was accompanied by a senior FCO official. See Anatolia News Agency, May 
28th 2001 Turkey insists on say in EU access to NATO facilities. Also, US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell was reportedly working behind the scenes at Budapest to broker a deal. See Agence France 
Press, May 29th 2001, European NATO allies pressed on burden as Turkey renews concerns. 
310 Agence France Press, May 30th 2001, Elements in place for deal with Turkey on EU-NATO links, 
Anatolia News Agency, May 28th 2001, Turkey insists on say in EU access to NATO facilities. 
 
312 New York Times, June 5th 2001, In Accord, Turkey Tentatively Agrees European Union Force May 
Use NATO Bases. 
313 Ismael Cem said: "The ball is our side now. If we do not want to play we have no right to complain 
about EU issues. So far we have said that EU was making discrimination by refusing Turkey's 
candidacy. But now we are one of the candidate countries and we have to fulfil necessary reforms 
needed for the membership." See Turkish Daily News, May 16th 2001 Despite EU’s strong desire 
Turkey keeps its stand on ESDP. 
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“It is believed that the EU must provide rights similar to the WEU-which 
is the infrastructure of the ESDP-acquis for non-EU European Allies, 
which Turkey gained even before having the status of a EU 
membership candidate, in the framework of Washington decision."314 
Donald Rumsfeld was in Ankara at this time to discuss the new US missile defence system 
and the continuing Operation Northern Watch in northern Iraq315. He adopted a conciliatory 
tone when asked about the Turkish stance saying the Turkish view was “understandable”316. 
However the rejection of the Istanbul Letters dashed hopes of finding a solution to the 
“problem of Turkey” before the special meeting of the NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 
Brussels on June 13th 2001 and the Gothenburg European Council immediately thereafter317. 
At Gothenburg the task of implementing ESDP was passed to the incoming Belgian 
Presidency318. 
The UK and the US continued to work behind the scenes for a solution to the Berlin Plus 
issue in the run up to the Laeken European Council in December 2001. A revised version of 
the Istanbul Letters called the “Ankara Document”319 was presented by the UK to the Turkish 
government in early December 2001 with strong American backing320 and won the 
agreement of Bulent Ecevit and the Turkish military321. It was not significantly different from 
the Istanbul Letters but included a pledge that ESDP would never be used against a NATO 
                                               
314 Turkish Daily News, June 5th 2001. Rumsfeld: Turkey’s concerns over ESDP ‘understandable’. 
315 Turkish Daily News, June 5th 2001. Rumsfeld: Turkey’s concerns over ESDP ‘understandable’. 
316 Turkish Daily News, June 5th 2001. Rumsfeld: Turkey’s concerns over ESDP ‘understandable’. 
317 It also highlighted the continuing influence of the military in Turkish society (Narli 2000, see also 
Heper 2005). 
318 Gothenburg European Council, June 15-16th 2001, Presidency conclusions,Section V, Para. 51.  
319 Also referred to in some places (Tofte 2003) as the Istanbul Document. This should not be 
confused with the Istanbul Letters of May 2001.  
320 Significantly whilst the UK can take credit for much of the diplomacy involved in the Ankara 
Document it was presented to the Turkish government as a fait accompli by the UK with US personnel 
present with the implicit message for Ankara that there was no point turning to Washington for back 
up (Rynning 2003: 65 see also note 35). This was to underline the message given to Turkey by 
Donald Rumsfeld in June 2001 at the time of the Istanbul letters that this was the best result possible. 
321 See Agence France Press, December 2nd 2001. Turkey largely satisfied over European Defence 
Project: Ecevit. Also Financial Times, December 4th 2001 Turkey breaks impasse on EU Rapid 
Reaction Force. 
155 
 
member322. This was sufficiently close to the similar WEU pledge for the Turks not to lose 
face (Reichard 2006:156 n82). It also gave Turkey the “right to suspend operations…..citing 
either geographical proximity or national security interests.”323 However the Greek 
government would not agree to the terms of the Ankara Document in spite of pressure on it 
from the US Secretary of State Colin Powell, CFSP High Representative, Javier Solana, the 
Belgian Presidency Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt and the NATO Secretary General 
George Robertson324.  Neither Greece nor Turkey “evoked much sympathy” in Brussels’ EU 
and defence diplomatic circles as both were seen “as a nuisance”325, “not an asset to the 
EU”326, inconsistent and self-interested on the issue327. As a result, whilst the Ankara 
Document may have appeased the Turks it failed to solve the “problem of Turkey”328.  
At the Laeken European Council in December 2001 the EU agreed to declare ESDP 
“operationally capable”. Pressure for progress, which had been brewing since the Nice 
European Council a year earlier, had been “….increased by the events of 11th September 
2001” (Duke 2002: 10). However no agreement was reached with Greece over the Ankara 
Document and the “tortuous politics”329 of EU NATO cooperation continued. At the Barcelona 
European Council in March 2002 and again at Seville in June 2002 the EU “demonstrated 
willingness” to take over the NATO mission Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia in early 
2003 (Reichard 2006:285; Rynning 2003: 65). This increased the pressure to find a solution 
to the Berlin Plus situation in the run up to the Copenhagen European Council  in December 
2002. The EU member states therefore arrived at Copenhagen with the future credibility of 
                                               
322 Senior UK Diplomat H – interview – October 2010. 
323 Ankara Document reproduced in Brussels EU Council Presidency conclusions, October 24-25th 
2002, Annex 2, CP 57.  
324 Athens News Agency, December 14th 2001, Athens warns of Euro force veto if sovereign rights 
infringed.  
325 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010. 
326 Dutch Diplomat  – interview – March 2010. 
327 Brussels NGO official A – interview – February 2010.  
328 This stance left Greece politically exposed within the EU (Dutch Diplomat  – interview – March 
2010) which was keen to operationalise ESDP in Macedonia. Due to the Danish defence opt out 
dating back to the Maastricht Treaty the defence portfolio passes to presidency nation to follow it 
which would be Greece in January 2003.Greece was also just six months away from taking over the 
EU defence portfolio for a year (Rynning 2003:65).  
329 Senior UK Diplomat G – interview – March 2010 
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their flagship security project depending on Turkish (or Greek) agreement. It had reached 
such a critical point because of the differing security cultures of the EU and Turkey and in 
spite of efforts by the UK – and the USA – to find a diplomatic solution. The impending 
nature of Amber Fox’s replacement, Operation Concordia330, gave an added impetus at 
Copenhagen which was also dealing with wider eastern enlargement and the Cyprus issue.  
It is not possible to fully disentangle the outcome at the Copenhagen European Council from 
wider issues of eastern enlargement of the EU and therefore Cyprus because of the 
influence of the Cyprus issue on Turkish policy making. The next section will examine how 
the Cyprus issue developed in parallel to Turkish domestic politics and ESDP. The last will 
explore the interaction of all three in the run up to the Copenhagen European Council of 
December 2002. 
3. The impact of Cyprus on EU-Turkey relations 1999-2002. 
As outlined in Chapter Three, the inclusion of the Republic of Cyprus in the fifth enlargement 
round of the EU in 1997 was testament to the hard bargaining of its advocate, Greece. This 
continued up to the Helsinki European Council in 1999 when the Cyprus issue was the one 
part of previously frosty Greek-Turkish relations that “earthquake diplomacy” could not melt. 
Greece insisted that the progress of Cyprus within the EU should not be linked to progress 
on the Cyprus issue. The EU’s desire to maintain Greek support for the CEEC enlargement 
round meant this was duly included into the Helsinki European Council Presidency 
conclusions as the “carefully constructed ambiguity” of paragraph 9b (Hannay 2005: 113)331 
which would ultimately make the issue more difficult to solve.  
                                               
330 Operation Amber Fox finished in December 2002 whilst Operation Concordia did not start until 
March 2003 because of the delays caused by the “problem of Turkey”. An interim NATO operation, 
Allied Harmony, filled the gap. See Mays (2003: 189). 
331 Helsinki European Council, December 10-11th 1999, Presidency conclusions. Paragraph 9b. See 
Appendix III. 
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The Greek government had been able to exert this leverage and power through the virtue of 
already being a member of the EU and therefore being in possession of a veto in the 
European Council (Suvarierol 2003: 65). For this reason, if the EU wanted eastern 
enlargement it was “left with no choice but to accept the membership of Greek Cyprus even 
prior to a settlement despite the repercussions this may have on its relations with Turkey.” 
(Tocci 2002: 1). As we have seen in Chapter Three above, it was this issue which prompted 
Bulent Ecevit to dig his heels in and for Verheugen and Solana to be obliged to fly to Ankara 
at the eleventh hour to persuade him to return to Helsinki and for Turkey to become a 
candidate. Offering candidacy to Turkey at Helsinki was a quid pro quo for the inbuilt, and 
arguably unfair332, advantage that the Republic of Cyprus  now had333. 
It is ironic therefore that the EU was both anxious not to import the Cyprus issue into its 
jurisdiction and forced to construct a policy which would actually make that more likely. The 
Helsinki deal may have been a short term expedient but it “gave away the shop” to the 
Cypriots334. The hyper politically sensitive nature of the Cyprus question in Turkey took away 
the incentive for the EU sceptic Bulent Ecevit to exert pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leader 
Rauf Denktash who was also against Turkish accession. The reassurances given to Cyprus 
at Helsinki tainted the UN led negotiations to find a settlement over the next three years. No 
real progress was made before the Copenhagen European Council and the member states 
arrived in Denmark with an imperative to reach a solution. This section argues that this 
context can explain why the member states were willing to compromise on the Presidency 
conclusions wording vis a vis Turkey at Copenhagen.  
                                               
332 UK Diplomats have tended to blame the then Foreign Secretary Robin Cook for giving in too easily 
to Greece. This was partly because of the vociferous (Greek) Cypriot vote in London and partly due to 
normative “leftie” concerns about Turkey and human rights etc in line with the notion of “ethical foreign 
policy”. 
333 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
334 Senior UK Diplomat C – interview - April 2010.  The interviewee added that the UK Foreign Sec. 
Robin Cook had been “obsessed” with Greece and “foolishly failed to set conditions”. He attributed 
this to Robin Cook being “very aware of the Greek Cypriot lobby in the UK”.  
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3.1. Turkish attitudes to Cyprus and the EU 
It took some time after the Helsinki European Council for the Turkish government to realise 
that its leverage over the EU on Cyprus was limited because the EU would admit Cyprus as 
a divided island come what may – albeit as a last resort. Two years after the Helsinki 
European Council the Ankara government still appeared to be in denial on this point. This 
statement was made in August 2001 by Sukru Sina Gurel, a diplomat and political ally of 
Bulent Ecevit.  
"The EU is in a difficult situation because it will either accept the Greek 
Cypriot side and put the EU seal to the partition on Cyprus or will act 
against Greece and endanger the enlargement process…."335 
UK diplomats involved in the peace talks found the Turks’ approach “not helpful”. “Turkey 
just said that…Cyprus could not join the EU without Turkey say so etc…and lots of specious 
things like that. It had one major defect….no one else agreed with them.”336 
Gunther Verheugen tried to tell the Turks otherwise and persuade Bulent Ecevit to stand up 
to Rauf Denktash. 
“He (Verheugen) explained to the Turks…look you cannot allow 
Denktash to take (away) the European vocation of Turkey…that cannot 
be in your interests….it must be solved. (Ismael) Cem fully accepted 
this….Ecevit never (did). …Verheugen told him he was overplaying his 
hand….but he (Ecevit) did not believe him.”337  
Bulent Ecevit seriously misread the Brussels consensus which was actually quite scathing 
about the Cyprus issue.  It did “not want to see the entire process blocked because of a 
small Mediterranean island.” (Suvarierol 2003: 65) and “…for the EU, the question of 
                                               
335 Anatolia News Agency, August 24th 2001. Turkish minister says UN leader should be "more 
creative" on northern Cyprus. Supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe.   
336 Senior UK Diplomat A – interview – March 2010.  
337 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. 
159 
 
whether a tiny piece of Cyprus is ruled by Ankara was meaningless.” 338 This attitude by the 
Turks made progress on the Cyprus issue problematic. The Cyprus peace process was a 
UN initiative albeit with close collaboration from the UK envoy, Lord Hannay, the US envoy 
Alfred Moses and the European Commission accession negotiator with the Republic of 
Cyprus, Leopold Maurer339. This lack of direct control was a source of frustration within the 
Commission’s upper echelons340 who would still rather admit Cyprus as a united island – 
rather than a divided one.  
3.2. The UN and Cyprus 1999-2001 
At the end of January 2000 the second round of the UN sponsored “proximity” talks opened 
in Geneva when the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, talked of “working towards a 
comprehensive settlement in the course of a year.”341 However the achievement of such 
progress would have required the Ankara government to exert pressure on the Turkish 
Cypriot President Rauf Denktash and this was something Ecevit was not inclined to do for 
the reasons discussed. By the summer of 2000, events had slowed and the protagonists 
were less optimistic. Rauf Denktash had an “obsessive preoccupation with status and 
sovereignty” which distracted from the real detail of territory and property swap (Hannay 
2005: 128). In July 2000 Kofi Annan’s special representative, Álvaro de Soto, had revised his 
boss’s optimism and admitted that a deal was “unlikely” in 2000342.  
Relations between Athens and Ankara were also tetchy in the autumn of 2000 as tensions 
over the Aegean rumbled on343. At the UN proximity talks in Geneva in November 2000 Kofi 
Annan once again struck an optimistic tone and proposed that it was time for the process to 
progress and “seize the best chance yet for a Cyprus settlement…” (Hannay 2005: 140). 
This coincided with the release of the EU’s Accession Partnership Document (APD) which 
                                               
338 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
339 For more detail on the day to day events see Hannay (2005) Chapter Eight. 
340 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
341 Financial Times, February 1st 2000, Hopes rise for Cyprus settlement this year. 
342 Financial Times, July 6th 2000, Peace deal 'unlikely' this year. 
343 Financial Times, November 3rd 2000, Aegean rivals have a lot to gain: Accord between Turkey and 
Greece would offer both countries considerable advantages. But will they stop bickering? 
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included a paragraph calling on Turkey to support the UN Cyprus initiative in order to "bring 
the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful 
conclusion"344.  
However, Ankara took umbrage at this paragraph in the APD which appeared to suggest a 
Cyprus solution was a precondition for Turkish accession. Ecevit saw this as the EU 
reneging on the “deal” made by Solana and Verheugen the previous year during their 
eleventh hour dash to Ankara during the Helsinki European Council345. Hence the Turks felt 
it would be “out of the question” for Turkey to approve the APD paragraph concerning 
Cyprus…”346 and Ecevit wrote to the member state Prime Ministers and senior EU officials to 
say so347 348. It was political difficult for Ecevit to accept this so openly because of pressure 
from his coalition partner Devlet Bahceli and the Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash. 
Accordingly Ecevit backed Rauf Denktash in his boycott of the next round of the UN 
proximity talks which were due to start in January 2001.  
Whilst the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismael Cem, was able to rebuild bridges with member 
states during discussions in advance of the European Council in Nice in December 2000, 
Denktash’s position remained unchanged. He did not win friends amongst the UK delegation 
involved in the UN talks. His advisor Mumtaz Soysal was described as “pernicious” and 
adept at “egging Denktash on”.349 
                                               
344 Agence France Press, November 15th 2000, Turkey's Ecevit writes to EU ministers over Cyprus 
snag. 
345 That the Turkish EU accession case would not be directly linked with a solution to Cyprus. 
346 Statement of Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit issued by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
November 11th 2000.  
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-statement-of-prime-minister-ecevit-regarding-the-eu-accession-partnership-
document-and-cyprus_br_november-11_-2000.en.mfa  Accessed 25th September 2010.  
347 Anatolia News Agency, November 14th 2000,Turkish premier informs EU leaders of "unease" over 
Cyprus issue, supplied by BBC Monitoring Europe. 
348 In fact, behind the scenes, Turkey accepted the need to make progress on Cyprus but the political 
sensitivity was such that Ecevit could not be seen to bow to pressure from Brussels on the issue 
(Senior Turkish diplomat A – interview – March 2010.)  
349 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010. 
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“The Turks used up an enormous amount of time. Denktash did not 
wish to join the EU. He did not care a damn…(and) it was a benefit if it 
made it more difficult for Turkey to join (the EU).”350 
However, the EU, the USA and the UK, with the UN, continued to try to persuade Denktash 
to return to the negotiating table. The US envoy to Cyprus Al Moses, and his assistant, Tom 
Weston, visited the region in early January 2001. Moses made Washington’s motivation 
clear: 
"We would like to see a united Cyprus enter the EU. One of the 
reasons we're advocating seeking to facilitate a comprehensive 
settlement is to ensure that a united Cyprus enters the EU not a divided 
Cyprus….and we hope that will be followed closely by the accession of 
Turkey to the European Union."351 
However Moses was unsuccessful and left the island with a memorable sound bite: 
“When you have one of the two sides saying they don't want to dance, 
it's very hard to have a tango; you need two to dance."352 
The UK envoy, Lord Hannay, also went to Ankara and Cyprus soon after. Hannay explicitly 
linked a Cyprus settlement with Turkish and Cypriot EU accession and highlighted the 
benefits it could bring to northern Cyprus353.  The implicit message of course was the 
negative consequences for the Northern Cyprus economy and for Turkey’s EU accession if 
the Cyprus talks did not restart and reach a satisfactory conclusion354. Two weeks later Kofi 
                                               
350 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010.  
351 Turkish Daily News, January 12th 2001. Moses: We want a united Cyprus to enter the EU. 
352 Agence France Press, January 9th 2001. US envoy leaves Cyprus without making headway in 
peace process. 
353 Cyprus News Agency, January 12th 2001. British envoys says chance of "decisive progress" on 
Cyprus issue exists. Hannay said: “The best tonic that the economy of the north Cyprus could have 
would be to get a settlement of the Cyprus problem and for the whole island to enter the EU, anything 
else is less good than that.." 
354 However, as Hannay noted later “….if like Denktash you did not want Turkey to join the EU in the 
first place there was no great discomfort.” (Hannay 2005: 147). 
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Annan’s envoy, Alvaro de Soto, visited the area and was also unsuccessful355.  In May 2001 
a high level EU delegation met Turkish Cypriots and delivered a very similar message356.   
The talks remained stalled throughout most of 2001although efforts continued by the UK, the 
US, the EU and the UN to bring the Turkish Cypriots back to the negotiating table. Kofi 
Annan met Denktash in Salzburg in August 2001357 and invited Clerides and Denktash to 
resume talks in New York on September 12th 2001 amidst cautious optimism358. However, 
ultimately Denktash declined the offer and in the event, the talks would not have taken place 
anyway as the events of September 11th 2001 intervened. However it was a blow to all 
concerned. 
“Those who had put so much effort into restarting the negotiations were 
now left, like Sisyphus in the fable, watching the stone rolling back 
down to the bottom of the hill yet again.” (Hannay 2005: 154). 
By this time, there was anxiety in Greek circles that the Turkish impasse could yet delay 
Cypriot accession359 and in EU circles that it could impede wider eastern enlargement360. 
Then, in early November 2001 Denktash wrote to Clerides unilaterally proposing that face to 
face talks between them should restart. Analysis of Denktash’s motives for the volte face has 
varied from the stubbornly independent (Hannay 2005: 154) to a Machiavellian attempt to 
undermine Cypriot accession by filibustering the talks further (Tocci 2002: 5). Denktash’s 
change of heart came soon after the EU Commission President Romano Prodi made the 
position clear during a visit to Cyprus: 
                                               
355 Agence France Press, January 29th 2001. UN mediator makes no headway after four-day trip to 
Cyprus. 
356 Agence France Press, May 31st 2001. Top EU officials meet with Turkish Cypriot politician. 
357 He had also met with Gunther Verheugen the day before in Zurich. See Turkish Daily News, 
August 24th 2001. “Denktash to meet Verheugen and Annan.”; Agence France Press, August 27th 
2001. Turkish Cypriot leader departs for talks with Annan, Verheugen. 
358 Agence France Press, August 28th 2001.Annan reports useful meeting with Turkish Cypriot leader. 
359 Financial Times, July 19th 2001, Divided Cyprus threatens to veto expansion of EU. 
360 Financial Times, July 20th 2001, Troubles of a divided island: William Wallace says a crisis is 
brewing.  
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"A political settlement before Cyprus's accession is our strong 
preference…but let me make one thing clear, Cyprus will join the 
European Union, and it will be among the first candidate countries to do 
so."361 
Although Ecevit’s immediate response was to moot the bullish possibility of Turkey annexing 
Northern Cyprus362, soon after Denktash agreed to restart talks with Clerides under UN 
auspices. It was agreed that Denktash would meet Glafkos Clerides in January 2002.  
3.3. The UN and Cyprus 2002 
Talks between Clerides and Denktash resumed in January 2002 with the aim of reaching a 
provisional conclusion by the end of June that year. Álvaro de Soto363 was present but only 
as a “fly on the wall”364. Tom Weston and Lord Hannay were in close contact with de Soto 
but kept a low profile at the request of Ankara (Hannay 2005:157). The first few months did 
not make significant progress and in March 2002 Gunter Verheugen re-iterated Prodi’s point. 
"There is a message for Turkey. Nobody should expect that the 
European Union can and will change the enlargement agenda and the 
timetable. Everybody must understand that the clock is ticking, time is 
running… 
“There will be no delay and everybody must understand that we cannot 
tell a hundred million people in eastern and central Europe that they 
have to wait until a settlement of the Cyprus question is found. That is 
not possible….so delaying tactics will not help."365 
                                               
361 Agence France Press, October 25th 2001. Cyprus will be among first of new countries to join EU: 
Prodi. 
362 Agence France Press, November 4th 2001. Turkey could annex northern Cyprus: Ecevit. 
363 Kofi Annan’s envoy. 
364 It had been agreed in advance that he could attend but was not allowed to contribute or take notes. 
Senior UK Diplomat A - Interview – March 2010.  
365 Agence France Press – March 22nd 2002. EU commissioner warns Turkey against stalling Cyprus' 
EU bid. 
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The Turkish response to Verheugen was predictable366. Ecevit’s confidence and trust had 
not recovered from the all-important paragraph 9b of the Helsinki European Council 
Presidency conclusions and the subsequent “betrayal” of the Accession Partnership 
document and Denktash appeared to be “navigating without a compass” in the absence of a 
firm line from Ankara (Hannay 2005: 162). By April 2002 the talks between Denktash and 
Clerides were again highly politicised and ultra-sensitive. Both the UK Minister for Europe, 
Peter Hain367, in April, and Lord Hannay in June encountered nationalist sensitivities on both 
sides which gave a flavour of the “tortuous”368 nature of the proceedings369. Following a 
briefing by Alvaro de Soto the UN Security Council issued a statement expressing 
“…concern that progress was slow and that a great deal of ground remained to covered for 
the June target for agreement - which the council again strongly endorses - to be met."370  
This was a time of maximum flux for the Ecevit government; Ecevit himself was physically 
weak and his government was teetering on the verge of collapse371. The Cyprus talks were 
in need of a “shot in the arm” (Hannay 2005: 162) if they were to conclude in time for the 
eastern enlargement round372. 
In May 2002 Kofi Annan visited Cyprus to inject some momentum back into proceedings. It 
was Annan’s aim to get Clerides and Denktash to agree to allow the UN to start to draw up a 
                                               
366 "The remarks we hear from the EU are in a way encouraging the Greek Cypriots to be more 
intransigent,” Foreign Minister Ismael Cem quoted by Agence France Press – March 25th 2002. 
Turkey accuses EU of favouring Greek Cypriots in peace process. 
367 Cyprus News Agency, April 11th 2001. Cyprus: British official's reference to "two peoples" criticised. 
Supplied by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 
368 Senior UK diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
369 For example see:  Xinhua News Agency, June 18th 2002,Cypriot Government Disappointed With 
British Stance on Issue.. See also, Radio Bayrak, Cyprus, June 18th 2002, Turkish Cypriot leader 
comments on Cyprus solution, reacts to UK envoy remarks. Source BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts 
370 Agence France Press, April 4th 2002, Security Council concerned by slow progress on Cyprus. 
371 See Turkish Daily News, July 2nd 2002. Ailing Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit meets coalition partners 
Bahceli and Yilmaz in attempt to ease concerns over his health.  
Also the Ecevit government in mid-2002 was “unbelievably corrupt, divided and weak.” (Source: 
Senior UK Diplomat A). 
372 Lord Hannay has claimed that most parties, including the European Commission, had found TRNC 
difficult to deal with and “petty harassment was the order of the day”. “It was very clear….that they 
(TRNC) regarded the prospect of membership of the European Union as a serious challenge to their 
grip on Turkish politics and to the hard line on a settlement they were pursuing in the negotiations, 
just as Denktash regarded the prospect of Turkey’s eventual membership of the EU as a threat to his 
own grip on Turkey’s Cyprus policy.” (Hannay 2005:170) 
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written agreement based on the outcome of the talks so far. However in spite of the 
intermittent “glimmers of hope” no progress was made and it became clear that the June 
2002 deadline would not be met. The Seville European Council in June 2002 reiterated the 
EU’s position in respect of eastern enlargement and Cypriot accession already made clear 
by both Prodi and Verheugen.  
“The European Council reaffirms that, if the present rate of progress in 
negotiations and reforms is maintained, the European Union is 
determined to conclude the negotiations with Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia by the end of 2002, if those countries are 
ready.”373 
Furthermore the Seville European Council Presidency conclusions laid down a timetable for 
the CEEC accession treaties to be signed in the spring of 2003 and for the new member 
states to participate in the European parliamentary elections of May 2004. The conclusions 
also urged the Greek and Turkish leaders to “….intensify and expedite their talks in order to 
seize this unique window of opportunity for a comprehensive settlement, consistent with the 
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, it is to be hoped before the conclusion of the 
negotiations.”374 However the talks remained deadlocked over the issue of sovereignty and 
the fifth round of proximity talks ended as Rauf Denktash said with “… visions and 
expectations still 180 degrees on opposite sides.”375 
3.4. A Sisyphean task 
The job of finding a way to solve the Cyprus conundrum for the EU was handed over to the 
Danish Presidency and Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen who was unequivocal that 
                                               
373 Seville European Council, June 21-22nd 2002, Presidency conclusions. Para. 22.  
374 Seville European Council, June 21-22nd 2002, Presidency conclusions. Para. 24. 
375 Agence France Press, August 2nd 2002. Turkish-Cypriots see no progress after seven months of 
UN talks; See also Associated Press, August 2nd 2002. Fifth round of U.N.-sponsored reunification 
talks on Cyprus ends without breakthrough. 
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whilst the EU would prefer to admit a united island Cypriot accession would go ahead come 
what may. 
"A solution to the Cyprus problem would be an advantage, but it is not a 
condition for enlargement."376  
Furthermore the EU Commission was exerting pressure on Turkey to help find a solution 
and linking this to Ankara’s EU accession case377. The UK also articulated an intention to 
“….do everything it can to ensure that the outcome of this process is a positive one.”378 
However efforts to kick start the process once again were now hampered by the collapse of 
the Ecevit coalition government through the summer of 2002. With the resignation of Ismael 
Cem the job of foreign minister went to the hawkish Sukru Sina Gurel. 
“Nothing positive could be expected from the interim government 
whose Prime Minister (Ecevit) believed he had settled the Cyprus 
problem in 1974 and whose foreign minister was generally reckoned to 
be even harder line than Denktash.” (Hannay 2005: 174). 
The Greek government’s stance was to back the Turkish case for accession provided a 
solution had been found to the Cyprus issue379. Meanwhile the interim foreign minister Gurel 
appeared to demand a date for talks with the EU begin based on the reform package just 
passed by the Turkish parliament warning that “mid-way formulas” would be “insufficient”380.  
It was in this context that the sixth round of Cyprus proximity talks opened in late August in 
Cyprus and both sides were then called to Paris to meet Kofi Annan in early September 
                                               
376 Associated Press, June 3rd 2002, A divided Cyprus could become member of the European Union, 
says Danish prime minister. 
377 Associated Press, August 5th 2002, Turkey Faces EU Membership Hurdles. 
378 Agence France Press, September 2nd 2002, Britain working hard to ensure a Cyprus solution by 
the autumn: Hannay. 
379 Deutsche Press Agentur, August 23rd 2002, Athens: Turkey can join E.U. if Cyprus talks are 
successful. 
380 Agence France Press, August 21st 2002, Turkey presses EU to set date for accession talks. 
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2002. In advance of the Paris meeting, the USA was making clear its desire for a solution to 
be found, preferably in advance of Copenhagen: 
"We look at the discussions as something that should continue, that 
should be worked on very, very hard by all parties involved.”381 
Whilst the Paris meeting did not make progress, Kofi Annan remained optimistic and 
scheduled another meeting with Clerides and Denktash in early October 2002 in New 
York382. Meanwhile the UN team continued efforts to find an acceptable solution behind the 
scenes backed up by considerable diplomatic activity by the Americans and the UK.  
With a flurry of conspiracy theories383 it was then announced that Denktash would be 
undergoing heart surgery in New York immediately after the October talks which were 
expected to take him out of action for several weeks384,385. Efforts continued behind the 
scenes by the UN and the US in particular. Kofi Annan was preparing to present his own 
plan for the future of Cyprus involving two states in federation but with separate 
administrations and there was much pressure on Greece, Turkey and both Cypriots sides to 
find a way forward to facilitate a smooth ride at Copenhagen.  However this was made 
difficult by the absence of Denktash. He had not nominated a representative so no decisions 
could be taken by the Turkish Cypriot side (Hannay 2005: 181) and very little progress was 
made in advance of the Copenhagen European Council386.  
                                               
381 US Envoy Tom Weston quoted by Agence France Press, September 2nd 2002, US urges Cypriot 
leaders to move forward at Paris meeting. 
382Agence France Press, October 6th 2002, No progress in Cyprus talks, but Annan still optimistic. 
383 Hannay (2005:177) reports “speculation that Denktash was playing a hospital card as part of a 
continuing filibuster was almost universal and not merely amongst his adversaries.” 
384 Agence France Press, October 4th 2002, Denktash to undergo heart surgery in US after Cyprus 
talks. 
385 In the event this was prolonged further by complications of the surgery Agence France Press, 
October 17th 2002, Post-op problems keep Denktash in hospital. 
386 For an overview of the Cyprus issue see Ker-Lindsay (2005a, 2005b) or Nugent (2006) 
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4. The road to the Copenhagen European Council  
It is no surprise then that Copenhagen was a “chaotic” summit387 as it worked under the 
weight of expectation to find a formula for Cyprus, a solution to the Berlin Plus impasse as 
well as negotiating the final details of the biggest enlargement round ever undertaken by the 
EU. The issues of Cyprus, enlargement and Berlin Plus were linked to Turkish accession in 
a Gordian knot. It was, as the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said at the time, the 
“….most complex matrix of negotiations in which the EU has ever been involved.”388 
4.1. The “complex matrix” of Cyprus, EDSP and enlargement 
The Gordian knot was pulled tighter by a number of issues. Firstly, in spite of the reform 
packages passed, Turkey still did not meet the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, the reforms it 
had been able to make were very recent and their implementation untested. In the 2002 
Progress Report, the EU Commission once again appeared anxious to encourage further 
reform towards future accession389 but was not able to recommend that accession talks be 
opened390.  
Secondly, the Turkish accession case remained very unpopular amongst EU public 
opinion391 and some elite opinion was also strongly opposed to Turkish accession. In 
November 2002 the former French President, and the chair of the European Convention, 
Valerie Giscard D’Estaing said Turkish accession would mean the “end of Europe”.  
                                               
387 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010.  
388 Financial Times, December 11th 2002, Denktash illness hits hopes of peace deal on Cyprus. 
389 European Commission, 2002, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  Section C – Conclusion: “In the light of the noticeable progress made in 
recent years and of the remaining areas requiring further attention, Turkey is encouraged to pursue 
the reform process to strengthen democracy and the protection of human rights, in law and in practice. 
This will enable Turkey to overcome the remaining obstacles to full compliance with the political 
criteria.”  
390 Associated Press, October 8th 2002, EU expansion plans likely to disappoint Turkey, no date likely 
for membership talks. 
391 The Eurobarometer surveys of spring and autumn 2002 showed almost half of public opinion within 
the EU-15 member states was against Turkish accession. See Eurobarometer, Report No. 58.  
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“Turkey is a nation close to Europe and an important country ... but it is 
not a European country…Its capital is not in Europe, 95 per cent of its 
population is outside Europe.”392  
Whilst views such as Giscard D’Estaing’s were based primarily on cultural and religious 
objections to the Turkish case there was also residual opposition amongst member states 
who did not believe Turkey’s record of democracy and human rights had improved enough 
to justify the opening of accession negotiations.  
However, thirdly, Ankara was not inclined to empathise with the EU point of view. Its clarion 
call for some time had been that enough reform had already been achieved to justify the 
next step393. This hard-line geostrategic approach is further in evidence in statements by the 
interim Turkish foreign minister Sukru Sina Gurel in advance of the Commission Progress 
Report in October 2002. He hinted that the failure to open accession talks may influence 
“…other aspects of relations between Turkey and the European Union.”394  In other words, 
failure to open accession talks would adversely affect Turkish willingness to cooperate with 
ESDP and to exert pressure on Rauf Denktash over the Cyprus issue – both of which the EU 
was keen to conclude and operationalise at the Copenhagen European Council . The EU’s 
inability, or unwillingness, to make a special case for Turkish accession meant it would be 
more difficult to expedite its flagship policies of eastern enlargement and the ESDP 
Operation Concordia in Macedonia. However, because it wanted to roll these policies out, 
and quickly, a way had to be found. 
                                               
392 Le Monde, November 8th 2002. See also: Agence France Press. November 8th 2002. EU's Giscard 
d'Estaing says Turkey would spell 'end' of Union. The Turkish case was also unpopular with elite 
opinion in Austria. See Deutsche Press Agentur. October 8th 2002. No chance for Turkish E.U. 
membership, says E.U. Convention member. 
393 The Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer said in June that failure to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey before the end of 2002 “…could damage the motivation for reform in Turkey. 
The sincerity of the EU will be questioned by the Turkish population." Agence France Press. June 21st 
2002. Turkey expects EU to back progress on reforms, pave way for talks. 
394 Agence France Press, October 5th 2002, Turkey says ties with EU will suffer if no date given for 
talks. 
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4.2. The AKP Dimension 
A further dimension of the difficulties facing the EU in advance of the Copenhagen European 
Council was the state of flux of domestic Turkish politics. Little progress could be made on 
either Berlin Plus or Cyprus until after the general election on November 3rd 2002. It was 
won by the AKP with 34.2% of the vote and a parliamentary majority with a mandate to 
pursue EU accession395.  The UK government had established before the election that the 
AKP was a credible player in terms of EU accession. It had “been obvious that the AKP were 
building up a head of steam and we (the UK) needed to find out what they were all about.”396. 
 The UK Ambassador to Ankara, Sir Peter Westmacott, had forged close links with AKP 
politicians (particularly Abdullah Gul and Yasar Yakis)397. He established that the AKP was 
serious about EU accession – albeit for its own reasons – and was prepared to take action to 
achieve it. 
“…it convinced us that the AKP was going to be an effective proponent 
of Turkey’s inclusion because they had come to the conclusion that the 
best way to counter the military and the deep state was to join the EU.  
“We knew certainly that we were in business both for Turkish accession 
and Cyprus.”398 
Thus the AKP’s European aspiration neatly merged with the UK government’s longstanding 
strategic aims in the eastern Mediterranean. The new Turkish government embarked on a 
tour of all the major European capitals to make the Turkish case immediately after the 
election of November 3rd 2002399. The Prime Minister, Abdullah Gul, and the Chairman of the 
                                               
395 AKP won 363 out of 550 seats in the Turkish parliament (See Cagaptay 2002) 
396 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
397 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
398 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010 
399 Turkish Daily News. December 1st 2002. Flying AKP chairman searches for concrete support. 
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AKP, Tayyip Recep Erdogan400, were very specific, and indeed “pushy” 401 about what 
Ankara would accept. They continued the narrative of their Kemalist predecessors and 
lobbied for a “date for talks” rather than “talks about talks”402. The Turks were extremely 
sensitive about their position relative to the CEECs and wanted parity with Romania and 
Bulgaria403.  Additionally they wanted Turkish accession negotiations to open before the 
CEECs, and especially Cyprus, formally acceded in May 2004.  
However the EU case was equally consistent. After meeting Erdogan in Copenhagen in late 
November 2002 the Danish Prime Minister, and EU Presidency incumbent, Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen said: "As far as a date for the start of the accession negotiations is concerned, 
my answer is clear: Turkey can get a date if and when Turkey fulfils the political criteria."404   
4.3. The USA dimension 
The role of the USA must also be taken into account at this time. Whilst under the Clinton 
administration the UK and the USA had shared a broadly similar geostrategic motivation of 
EU accession for the purpose of “making Turkey a different country… with a modern 
economy and a real democracy”405, there had been a change of emphasis under the 
administration of George.W.Bush which in late 2002 was focusing on Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein thereby heightening Turkey’s geostrategic value to the USA406. In early December 
2002 the US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held talks in Ankara about Turkey’s 
possible role in any operation against Iraq407.  The following week, just two days before the 
Copenhagen European Council , the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan went to 
                                               
400 Erdogan was officially chairman of AKP rather than Prime Minister because of a previous 
conviction under the Turkish constitution for reciting a poem at a public rally which banned him from 
public office.  
401 Senior European Commission official A – interview – February 2010. 
402 Although both the European Parliament President Pat Cox and Gunther Verheugen’s spokesman 
Jean-Christophe Filori were both quick to rebuff Giscard D’Estaing’s remarks. See Agence France 
Press, November 8th 2002. Brussels denies Turkish membership would spell the end of the EU. 
403 This coincided with the furore over Giscard D’Estaing’s negative remarks about Turkish accession 
404 Financial Times. November 28th 2002 Leaders consider next steps as momentum builds for 
Europe to open door to Ankara. 
405 Senior USA State Department Official – interview - March 2010 
406 See Riddell (2003) and Meyer. C. (2006)  for background accounts.  
407 Financial Times, December 4th 2002. Turkey renews pressure to win firm date for EU entry talks. 
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Washington for talks with George.W.Bush about both Turkish co-operation in any Iraq 
campaign and Turkey’s EU accession after which the White House press spokesman Ari 
Fleischer endorsed the Turkish case: 
“He (Bush) thinks it is very important that the EU give consideration to a 
nation like Turkey, an Islamic democracy, a merging country that has 
certainly made tremendous strides in terms of integration into Europe 
and to an approach that is compatible with the transparency and 
openness of Europe.”408 
In the run up to Copenhagen, the USA indulged in “unprecedented lobbying”409 and “bullying 
tactics”410 on Turkey’s behalf. The EU’s External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten could 
reportedly “hardly suppress his anger” after Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote to him 
suggesting the EU should waive strict conditionality in Turkey’s case because “all manner of 
good things would come from Turkey’s full membership of the EU…”411 while President Bush 
telephoned the Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen on the eve of the summit to 
make the case412. The US State Department did not understand why the EU persisted in the 
strict legal approach to Turkish accession rather than taking a strategic view.  
“We kept saying that there was a strategic question here. Turkey is to 
the benefit of the EU so why not think strategically? The Europeans 
said to us…that what if this was Mexico…but still our frustration was 
“for God’s sake, think strategically.”… 
“It is a strange amalgam….where is the first champagne cork going to 
be popped if the EU says never….if you want this society (Turkey) to be 
                                               
408 The Times, December 11th 2002. Bush backs Turkey’s efforts to join the EU. See also Agence 
France Press, December 12th 2002. Bush lobbies EU, France for Turkey accession. 
409 The Times, December 14th 2002. Hawks fail to secure Turkey’s early EU entry. 
410 Financial Times, December 14th 2002. Tough talk by Ankara and Washington misfires. 
411 Senior USA State Department Official – interview - March 2010 
412 Financial Times, December 12th 2002. US presses Brussels on Turkey: Powell pushes accession 
talks before reforms are complete. 
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a 21st century society then we have to give it incentives and we cannot 
screw around.”413 
Ultimately the American efforts did not succeed. The EU resented the interference and 
mistrusted President Bush’s motives which were “transparently” concerned with the pending 
Iraq campaign414. Anders Fogh Rasmussen stated publicly after the Copenhagen summit: “I 
think we have to emphasise that this is a European decision and only a European 
decision.”415 
4.4. The Copenhagen European Council 2002: The date for “talks 
about talks”. 
Nevertheless, whilst the EU was not able to accept the geostrategic case above the 
normative case it still needed to face geostrategic reality. It had to find a way forward if it 
wanted to proceed with Operation Concordia and admit Cyprus as a united island rather 
than only the Greek-speaking Republic of Cyprus plus a seemingly intractable border 
dispute which meant very little to most Europeans416 and was potentially destabilising 
(Wallace 2002). A compromise of some sort was necessary. 
Whilst the AKP was treated with some scepticism within the European Commission417 there 
was an acknowledgement of the progress already made and good intentions which should 
be encouraged. This sense of Turkey’s geopolitical value had been heightened after the 
World Trade Centre attacks on September 11th 2001 which had made a “psychological 
difference”418. In marked contrast to the situation after the Helsinki European Councilit was 
now acknowledged that Turkey could make progress towards meet the Copenhagen criteria. 
                                               
413 Senior USA State Department Official – interview - March 2010 
414 The Times, December 14th 2002. Hawks fail to secure Turkey’s early EU entry. 
415 The Times, December 14th 2002. Hawks fail to secure Turkey’s early EU entry. 
416 In Brussels circles the Cyprus issue was seen as a peripheral legacy of British colonialism and not 
important in its own right. (Senior European Commission official  D – interview – August 2010.) 
417 Senior European Commission official D – interview August 2010 
418 Senior European Commission official A – interview – February 2010  
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There were mixed views within the European Council. Outside of the EU’s official circles, 
Giscard D’Estaing had been joined in the public fray by Pope John Paul II419, the leader of 
the Christian Social Union party in Germany Edmund Stoiber420 and the former French 
Foreign Minister, the socialist, Hubert Vedrine421 who all highlighted Turkey’s religious 
differences as a reason against its accession. The Turkish case for talks to open in 2004 
was openly backed by four member states - UK, Spain, Italy and Greece422. However the 
remaining member states were more cautious and backed the Verheugen approach of 
incentivising further reform before opening accession talks. Even France and Germany did 
not feel that the Turks had done enough domestically to warrant the opening of accession 
talks as soon as 2004.  
Following a meeting with Anders Fogh Rasmussen on December 4th 2002, Jacques Chirac 
and Gerhard Schroeder proposed instead to the Council in Copenhagen that a decision in 
the Turkish case should be postponed for two years with a view to opening negotiations in 
July 2005 subject to Commission recommendations based on Turkish progress423. At the 
pre-summit dinner in Copenhagen this was opposed by the UK, Spain, Italy and Greece but 
supported by Sweden, Finland and also Jan-Peter Balkenende of the Netherlands and 
                                               
419 Pope Jean Paul II called for a clear reference to Christianity in the Convention on the future of 
Europe. He said: "The contribution of Christianity and man's Christian vision in the history and culture 
of different countries is part of a common treasure and it appears logical that this should be inscribed 
in the project of the Convention," Source EU Observer, November 8th 2002, Religious identity enters 
Convention debate. 
420 Stoiber reportedly told the CSU conference in October 2002: "Europe is a community that is based 
on western values. As a community of shared values, Europe has to deal with the question of its 
borders. These borders must be based on shared values, culture and history. Turkey's membership 
would breach these borders." Source The Guardian, November 27th 2002, Turkey demands talks on 
joining EU: Scepticism grows in Europe’s key capitals as Muslim nation pushes for a place at the top 
table. 
421 Vedrine said: "Turkey is not a European country and has no more reason to be in the European 
Union than in the Organisation of African Unity," he said. "It would be more honest to say things 
clearly." Source: The Independent, November 5th 2002, Europe offers a cautious welcome to the AKP. 
See also: The Guardian, December 9th 2002, Turkey and its place in Europe. 
422 With Greek Cyprus’s place virtually assured Greece had no reason to oppose. They were also 
being pressurised heavily by both the EU Commission and Presidency and the USA. See Agence 
France Press, December 2nd 2002, US leans hard on EU to open its doors to Turkey. See also: 
Agence France Press, December 2nd 2002, EU presses for Cyprus solution before enlargement 
summit. 
423 Chirac had been forced to take his own hostile public opinion into account. July 2005 was 
conveniently after the May 2005 referendum in France. The Daily Telegraph, December 14th 2002. 
“Europe dismisses Bush plea to let Turkey join earlier.” 
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Wolfgang Schussel of Austria who were able to use it to mask underlying concerns more 
akin to those voiced by Giscard D’Estaing424.Ultimately a compromise suggested by Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen was accepted by the member states. December 2004 was given as a 
“date for talks about talks” when, subject to a favourable progress report by the Commission, 
the Council would offer a date for talks to begin.425  
“If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report 
and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open 
accession negotiations with Turkey without delay”.426 
Behind the scenes Abdullah Gul and Recep Tayyip Erdogan were disappointed with this 
compromise but had been placated by the UK with the addition of “without delay”. They were 
sensitive to the reaction of the Turkish press427however which may have bounced them into 
a more belligerent public reaction (Hannay 2005: 194). Abdullah Gul accused the EU of 
“discrimination” whilst Erdogan said Chirac was breaking promises428.  
Ultimately, Erdogan was quick to see the futility of this approach and conceded the pressure 
domestic public opinion had imposed on Chirac and to a lesser extent Schroeder. By early 
afternoon on Friday December 13th 2002 Gul and Erdogan “had decided, to proclaim victory 
and to present the outcome, correctly, as a considerable success.” (Hannay 2005: 194).  
They also met with both Chirac and Schroeder to rebuild relations and later told Turkish 
reporters that Turkey would “…prove if it joins the EU that a Muslim country can be 
                                               
424 The Daily Telegraph. December 14th 2002. Europe dismisses Bush plea to let Turkey join earlier. 
425 The Guardian. December 14th 2002. EU embraces ten new members – and open the door to 
Turkey. 
426 Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13th 2002, Presidency conclusions. Para.19. See 
Appendix IV. 
427 Cumhuriyet, December 14th 2002, Once again a broken dream; Hurriyet, December 14th 2002, 
Turkey’s hopes are gone. See also The Guardian, December 14th 2002, Dismayed Turks vow to meet 
the test. 
428 The Daily Telegraph. December 13th 2002. Turks win date for talks on EU entry. 
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democratic and comfortable with the modern world. I think the European leaders are not 
ignoring this."429  
4.5. ESDP and the Annan Plan 
After this rollercoaster ride however the chance for pushing forward the Annan Plan on 
Cyprus had passed. On the afternoon of Friday December 13th 2002 the Turkish delegation 
announced that the “proposals (Annan Plan) were unacceptable in too many ways to 
enumerate and there was nothing to negotiate about.” (Hannay 2005: 194). It was felt that 
the disappointing result on Turkish accession had left the AKP too politically vulnerable to 
take a stand against Denktash on the highly sensitive Cyprus issue.430 
For this reason the UN talks on the Annan Plan collapsed and the European Union switched 
to its Plan B of accepting Cyprus as part of a divided island whilst setting a new deadline of 
February 28th 2003 in the hope that agreement could be reached before the accession treaty 
was signed for the Republic of Cyprus in April 2003. Additionally Turkey was urged by the 
EU to “pursue energetically its reform process”. 431 
The Berlin Plus issue within ESDP also loomed large over the Copenhagen European 
Council . Within the EU it was believed that the Turks were deliberately using Berlin Plus to 
lever a date for accession talks to start432. This was not thought to be a “wise tactic” as they 
“lost friends”433 and it “made people angry”434, including Jacques Chirac who was usually 
sympathetic to the Turkish case but objected to what was described as “aggressive lobbying” 
by Turkey on both Cyprus and Berlin Plus435 with a view to procuring accession.  
                                               
429 Turkish Daily News. December 14th 2002. Turks leave Copenhagen with broken heart, but hopeful. 
430 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010 
431 Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13th 2002, Presidency conclusions.Para. 19. See 
Appendix IV. 
432 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement C – interview – March 2010. 
433 Senior UK diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
434 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010. A very similar point was made by Senior UK 
diplomat B (interview March 2010) who added that the legacy of the hardball tactics of 2002 may still 
be being felt now within ESDP. 
435 The Guardian, December 14th 2002. Dismayed Turks vow to meet the test. NB: In Turkish circles 
Chirac was seen to have “broken promises” (Senior Turkish diplomat E – Interview - February 2010). 
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Such was the political will within the EU to press ahead with the plan to launch Operation 
Concordia as replacement for NATO’s Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia that there were 
even suggestions that ESDP could manage the small project without recourse to NATO 
assets at all thereby by passing the Berlin Plus arrangements altogether436. This was 
strongly opposed by the UK and there was recognition that it was not a sustainable long 
term strategy. However, there was a feeling within the EU that the Berlin Plus arrangements, 
ie: the Turkey-Greece impasse could not be allowed to block ESDP much longer. 
Attempts by the EU member states to deal with the question of Berlin Plus at Copenhagen 
were complicated by the fact that the AKP government was a very young administration. 
There was deep suspicion of AKP “within the (Turkish) state apparatus” which left Erdogan, 
who wasn’t even able to be Prime Minister at that stage, and Abdullah Gul “unsure” of their 
footing437. Just as they had been unwilling to pressurise Rauf Denktash over Cyprus, 
Erdogan and Gul did not feel able to make easy concessions on the Berlin Plus 
arrangements which effectively also boiled down to similar sensitivities over Cyprus. 
Ultimately it was “some hectic shuttling” between all sides by Javier Solana438 on the fringes 
of the Copenhagen European Council (Hannay 2005: 196; Reichard 2006: 287) which made 
the deal on Berlin Plus. It was agreed that the Republic of Cyprus and Malta would not take 
part in ESDP missions using NATO assets as neither were members of NATO nor had 
signed up to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative439. This was accepted by Erdogan and 
Gul440 who had been persuaded by the UK diplomatic contingent that it was a good deal with 
which to work.  
                                               
436 Letter from Prime Minister of Belgium Guy Verhofstadt to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. Full 
transcript in Haine (2003) (Chaillot Paper No 57). 
437 Turkish NGO official A  – interview – March 2010. He added: “In fact Copenhagen was a mess.” 
438 Javier Solana was familiar to the Turkish government from his former role as Sec. Gen. of NATO. 
439 EU Observer, December 14th 2002, EU strikes deal with NATO over security and defence. 
440 Although some commentators in Turkey argued immediately that they should have held out for a 
better deal. See Turkish Daily News, December 20th 2002, Turkey welcomes solution to ESDP amidst 
some concerns. 
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The UK argument was that the conditionality of the Copenhagen European Council 
Presidency conclusions could be used instrumentally to further Turkish aims.  In other words, 
if the Turks did what was being required of them by the conditions it would be “…hard for the 
member states to go back….we told them that if they did this, this and this then they would 
start. People (member states) would have no choice.” 441 However, it was also made clear to 
Erdogan and Gul that France and Germany were prepared to press ahead with ESDP 
regardless of Turkish cooperation. Moreover, the Cyprus issue had not been resolved and 
the Republic of Cyprus would go ahead to accession. Turkish leverage was weak and for all 
of these reasons it was the best deal available. 
Conclusion 
In Chapter Three it was argued that the change of EU policy towards Turkey between 1997 
and 1999 can be explained largely by geostrategic structural factors. The shifting security 
environment in Europe at that time highlighted Turkey’s geopolitical value and obliged the 
EU member states to consider Ankara’s case more favourably at the Helsinki European 
Council than they had done at Luxembourg two years previously.  
However there is also evidence of agency on Turkey’s behalf by a small group of member 
states which helped to make the case to member states as a whole. This small group – 
primarily the UK and Germany - were already convinced of the geostrategic case for Turkish 
membership of the EU. In early 1999 they tried to prepare the way for Turkish candidacy 
through initiatives such as the Ecevit letter and efforts to find a resolution to the Cyprus issue. 
Such efforts meant that ultimately, in 1999, Turkish candidacy came to be seen, by the 
member states as a group, as the price to pay for expediting ESDP and CEEC enlargement. 
It would have the added bonus of incentivising reform within Turkey and potentially lowering 
the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey. This was of course 
                                               
441 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
179 
 
with the proviso that Turkey was not actually expected to progress very much beyond 
candidacy.  
The advocacy in 1999 therefore was only ever intended to further Turkish candidacy – not its 
accession - as it was accepted within the EU that Turkey’s further progress would be 
dependent on improvements to its undeniably poor record of democracy and human rights. 
Candidacy in 1999 was merely a way to “manage” the Turkish aspiration to accession in the 
light of the increasingly pressing geostrategic need to do so. At the Helsinki European 
Council this this need was considerably stronger than it had been at Luxembourg.  
The significance of Helsinki however is less why it happened than the consequences of it. 
Whatever the intention of the actors involved may have been the result of the Helsinki 
decision to offer candidacy was to change the status of the Turkish application within the EU. 
It increased the bureaucratic integration of Ankara within the EU’s institutional framework. 
After 1999 Turkey was on the agenda of the European Councils and was a part of the 
European Commission’s system of progress reports. Any attempt to side-line it from these 
would have to be publically justified (unlike previously). Simultaneously, the offer of 
candidacy encouraged the pro-EU lobby within Turkey to work towards making the 
necessary changes such that Ankara’s aspiration could progress further. In these ways 
Turkey’s case was upgraded incrementally between 1999 and 2002 and it started to make 
the domestic reforms necessary to meet the Copenhagen criteria.  
The structural geostrategic issues which had been so influential in gaining candidacy for 
Turkey at Helsinki continued to influence its case up to the Copenhagen European Council.  
Whilst Turkey was still seen in a negative light by many EU member states because of its 
perceived lack of cooperation over ESDP and Cyprus they were nevertheless obliged to 
placate Ankara for these same reasons. It was not possible to solve either issue before 
Copenhagen in spite of repeated and sustained efforts to do so. Therefore the atmosphere 
at the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 was “chaotic” and pressurized. 
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Similarly to the situation at the Helsinki European Council three years earlier, at 
Copenhagen the EU member states were constrained in their dealings with Turkey because 
of wider geostrategic structural factors - specifically the plans to press ahead with CEEC 
enlargement and the deployment of Operation Concordia as an ESDP operation. Both 
issues required Turkish cooperation and that required the placation of Turkey’s security 
concerns and progress on the Cyprus issue – issues that were inextricably linked. To have 
dismissed the Turkish application out of hand at Copenhagen would have jeopardised both 
issues.  
The result of this continuing need to “manage” Turkey carefully was the wording of the 
Copenhagen European Council Presidency conclusions, brokered by Tony Blair, which 
pledged that the Turkish case would be reappraised two years hence on the basis of the 
European Commission’s progress report of October 2004. The Turkish delegation were 
disappointed by this outcome which did not meet their prior demands for accession talks to 
be opened before the Republic of Cyprus was due to accede in May 2004. However 
considering Turkey had made only belated progress on meeting any of the Copenhagen 
criteria the outcome was relatively favourable. The UK contingent was able to persuade the 
Turks it was the best result possible and was an opportunity.  
This was because the Copenhagen Presidency conclusions wording transformed the 
European Commission into the arbiter in the Turkish case. It is the conclusion here that such 
a favourable outcome was the result of continuing agency by the UK in conjunction with the 
pressing geostrategic considerations acting on the EU member states at the Copenhagen 
European Council. The significance of the conclusions is that they created an opportunity for 
meaningful agency on Turkey’s behalf by its advocates within the EU for the first time.  
Therefore it is possible to conclude the following: Firstly that the outcome of the Copenhagen 
European Council in 2002 was itself the path dependent result of decisions taken at the 
Helsinki European Council in 1999. The fact that, after Helsinki, Turkey was “in the system” 
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coupled with its (albeit) belated but unprecedented green shoots of constitutional reform 
made it harder for the EU member states to ignore the merits – or otherwise – of Ankara’s 
case for talks to open.  
Secondly, as well as this element of path dependent processes, the outcome of 
Copenhagen was also the result of wider geostrategic factors which limited the options of the 
EU member states in dealing with Turkey. The Helsinki European Council may have 
temporarily smoothed the path of CEEC enlargement but it did not solve the underlying 
issues of Cyprus and ESDP. These issues therefore continued to hinder the smooth 
progress of both and so Turkey still needed to be “managed” at Copenhagen in 2002. This 
management was done within the liberal democratic identity of the EU by reiterating the 
significance of the Copenhagen criteria in dealing with applicant states and throwing the date 
for consideration forward by two years. 
So, thirdly, the result of the Copenhagen European Council was to further emphasise the 
significance of the Copenhagen criteria. In stressing yet again that these were the criteria by 
which Turkey would be judged, the EU locked itself into abiding by them. Whilst, at Helsinki, 
this strategy was taken for instrumental reasons and in the expectation that Turkey would 
not meet the criteria, by Copenhagen this position had changed. There was a realisation that 
it was possible, perhaps even likely, that Turkey could meet the criteria and this was a 
source of anxiety to Turkey’s opponents within and outside of the EU. Such anxiety 
remained based in both normative and “cultural concerns but the EU was obliged to 
“manage” the Turkish case in some way because firstly it had said it would and secondly it 
still required Turkey’s geostrategic cooperation.  
The compromise wording was the way it found to deal with this conundrum however, in 
stressing the importance of the criteria and crucially by giving the European Commission the 
role of arbiter in the case, the EU inadvertently upgraded the Turkish case further. The result 
at Copenhagen in 2002 was stark: if Turkey could meet the Copenhagen criteria accession 
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negotiations would be opened. This result created room for meaningful agency by Turkey’s 
advocates. It was seen as an opportunity by the UK FCO and the Turkish government who 
reasoned that if Turkey made considerable progress the EU member states would feel 
obliged to honour their previous commitments.  
Finally then it can be concluded from the evidence here that process and structure both 
played a role in explaining the outcome of the Copenhagen European Council in 2002. The 
Turkish case was only on the agenda at all because it had been made a candidate at 
Helsinki. Furthermore Turkey’s case had to be addressed in a climate whereby the Turks 
were starting to make progress with domestic reform and in which Turkish cooperation was 
required for the smooth progress of CEEC enlargement and ESDP. In this way, process and 
structure brought the EU to the point at Copenhagen whereby it was obliged to manage the 
Turkish case. Perhaps the real significance of the Copenhagen European Council however 
was the opportunity this combination provided thereafter for meaningful and worthwhile 
agency on Turkey’s behalf. This is not to say that agency by Turkey’s advocates had not 
already been seen. It was in evidence most obviously by the brokering role of Tony Blair at 
the Copenhagen European Council but the UK had also been active on Turkey’s behalf with 
the Istanbul Letters and the Ankara Document in 2001 aimed at solving the “problem of 
Turkey” to expedite ESDP operations and to remove Turkey from being seen as a “problem”. 
Prior to Copenhagen the agency on Turkey’s behalf was still only aimed at facilitating the 
wider geostrategic factors (CEEC enlargement/Cyprus and ESDP) rather than being 
specifically aimed at the accession process.  
However as will be examined in the next chapter, after December 2002 this changed. The 
UK government had already established that the AKP had the political will to pursue EU 
accession and the reforms that required. Therefore, after November 2002 any advocacy by 
the UK on Turkey’s behalf could be meaningful because the EU had pledged repeatedly to 
judge the Turkish case by the Copenhagen criteria. The UK knew the AKP meant business 
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and it was prepared to venture that if it could carry out the reforms the EU would feel obliged 
to abide by its previous rhetoric.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Five:  From Copenhagen to 
Brussels  
This chapter will argue that the high conditionality of the Copenhagen European Council 
Presidency conclusions allowed Turkey’s advocates to work the system to achieve their aim 
of accession negotiations being opened with Ankara. This was done by anticipating the 
constraining influence of EU identity on its decision making in an European Council setting. It 
therefore implies a degree of agency and advocacy by some EU member states in favour of 
the Turkish case and the rhetorical entrapment of others by this agency. In effect the EU’s 
previous emphasis on the Copenhagen criteria as the condition of accession was used 
against it. Turkey’s advocates wagered on the assumption that if Ankara was able to 
implement substantial reforms the member states would not be able to say no to the opening 
of accession negotiations. Between 2002 and 2004 the new AKP government in Ankara was 
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helped to meet enough of the Copenhagen criteria – particularly the political section – in 
order for the member states to be rhetorically entrapped.  
 “After Turkey had fulfilled its part of the political accession 
conditionality deal (the member states) were compelled to keep their 
part of their promise as well and could not legitimately deny 
negotiations.” (Schimmelfennig 2009: 427) 
The advocate-in-chief within the EU was the UK in the form of FCO personnel in its embassy 
in Ankara but also “well placed Brits”442 within the European Commission. It had been 
realised after the Copenhagen European Council that whilst the outcome had not been ideal 
it was a basis on which to build. From that time it was UK FCO strategy to ensure that 
Turkey had met enough of the Copenhagen criteria by 2004 to restrict the grounds on which 
Turkey’s opponents could object. This coincided with the zeitgeist within the EU Commission 
and the AKP government. The argument is that the action to help Turkey meet the 
Copenhagen criteria was deliberate and therefore, not only were member states “rhetorically 
entrapped” (Schimmelfennig 2003b; 2009) by their previous statements but that action was 
actively taken to entrap them.  
What this chapter offers is a “thick description” of the processes involved. It explains how the 
AKP’s EU resolve was initially tested by the pending Iraq war and the Cyprus issue which 
also stretched relations with its UK and US allies. Nevertheless, Turkey’s advocates inside 
and outside of the EU, persevered in finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. This was 
testament to Turkey’s on-going geopolitical value which had been highlighted by both 9/11 
and the Iraq war. Additionally, the AKP’s willingness, albeit after a dubious start, to carry out 
domestic reforms subsequently reinforced the agency of Turkey’s advocates.  
At the Brussels European Council , in December 2004, Turkey’s opponents indeed had few 
arguments left against the opening of accession talks. Those normatively opposed had 
                                               
442 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010.  
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largely had their fears allayed and could see the wider geostrategic case. Those culturally 
opposed were not brazen enough to articulate the cultural/religious arguments in a public EU 
forum. For these reasons, the December 2004 Brussels European Council agreed to open 
accession talks with Turkey the following October. 
1. Turkey’s advocates 
This section will look at the agency undertaken on Turkey’s behalf by its advocates within 
the European Union between 2002 and 2004.  
1.1. UK  
Turkey’s primary advocate within the EU was the UK. This had been so for several decades 
and was based on a UK Foreign Office orthodoxy that “Turkey would be an asset for the 
Europeans in dealing with the Muslim world”443 as well as the beneficial effects for both the 
EU and NATO of encouraging stable democracy in Anatolia. In 1990 the Conservative 
government, and its Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, decided to take a “strategic approach” 
in spite of Turkey’s human rights record because it was a “key partner” in a “key location.”444 
This sentiment endured and was expressed in markedly similar form by all the 13 UK 
politicians and diplomats with whom I spoke during my research. In particular it was a view 
shared by Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Foreign Secretary Jack Straw445 who saw 
Turkey as a “model” (of Muslim democracy) and important to the “changing face of European 
security”. It was “strategically important in a defence sense and strategically important in a 
social sense.” 446  Fundamentally Tony Blair’s attitude was that Turkey’s strategic value 
“trumped” the demographic, economic, political and cultural objections offered by other 
member states to its joining the EU.  
                                               
443 Senior UK diplomat D – interview – April 2010.  
444 Senior UK diplomat H – interview - October 2010. 
445 Straw was more convinced of the Turkish accession case than his predecessor Robin Cook had 
been. 
446 Senior UK Diplomat C – interview – April 2010. 
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“It was vital to have Turkey on board to show that you can have a 
stable Muslim country on the borders of Europe.”447 
The events of September 11th 2001 had served to raise further the symbolic and strategic 
importance of Turkey for the UK “perhaps more so than for other (EU) member states” 
because of Tony Blair’s closer links to George W Bush and the Iraq conflict448.  The Iraq 
conflict itself highlighted Turkey’s geostrategic value as a transit route for NATO. Turkey was 
also symbolically important. A successful democracy in Ankara would “…give added force 
and added order to Blair’s idea that a Muslim democracy was viable.” 449 Moreover this 
general view was shared in 2002 by the USA450. There was also some sympathy for it in the 
German government of Gerhard Schroeder451 (which had previously included Gunther 
Verheugen before his move to Brussels in September 1999).  
However, even so, at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002, Tony Blair had been 
unable to make the case for Turkey to go straight to accession talks largely because the 
government of Bulent Ecevit had not made enough progress towards the Copenhagen 
criteria. Without such reforms it was too difficult to overcome the residual normative and 
cultural opposition to the Turkish case. After Copenhagen, it was realised within the FCO 
that “we had to get the Turks into a place where they could tick off all points for joining.”452 
That was “…such an obvious thing to do…”453 and to a large extent was a re-run of the 
policies used for eastern enlargement whereby the CEECs were given an incentive to reform 
and a “European scaffold” to work within454. 
                                               
447 Senior UK Diplomat F – interview – June 2010.  
448 Senior UK Diplomat C – interview – April 2010 
449 Senior UK Diplomat F – interview – June 2010.  
450 Senior USA State Department Official – interview – March 2010.  
451 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
452 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
453 Senior UK Diplomat C – interview – April 2010 
454 Senior UK Diplomat F – interview – June 2010. However this source also stressed that there was a 
sincere wish by the UK (and the EU Commission) that reform should take place in Turkey for reasons 
already outlined. This was not a time for “grubby deals” to push Turkish candidacy for its own sake. 
This was a chance to effect real change in Turkey, perhaps for the first time, which was also 
considered to be in the best interests of both Turkey and the EU member states.  
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The logic of the UK FCO was that if Turkey’s human rights “issues” could be addressed the 
only reasons left would be “cultural” and even staunch opponents such as Austria and the 
Republic of Cyprus may be reluctant to openly express reasons based solely in cultural 
prejudice in an EU forum with norms based on liberal democracy and social justice.   
“You use the logic of the process and you are not prepared to say 
that Turkey is fundamentally different...if they have passed the post 
then you have got to let them move to the next stage and that is how 
we squeezed them through.”455 
The FCO was already aware of the AKP and its intentions. The “brilliant diplomatist”456, the 
UK Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Peter Westmacott, had made strong contacts with the AKP 
before the November 2002 election. He did a “sterling job” of assessing their intentions and 
capability457.  
“We knew a lot about them before they took power…and it convinced 
us the AKP was going to be an effective proponent of Turkey’s 
inclusion because they had come to the conclusion that the best way 
to counter the military and the deep state was to join the EU.”458 
Westmacott established that, whilst the AKP were not secular in the Kemalist sense, neither 
were they Islamist in the fundamentalist sense. Moreover Abdullah Gul and Yasar Yakis in 
particular were “known in previous incarnations” and were able to “fill a political vacuum”. It 
was believed that the AKP was more serious about EU reforms than its predecessors had 
been459. 
                                               
455 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010.  
456 Senior UK politician C – interview – September 2010.  
457 Senior UK Diplomat H – interview – October 2010.  
458 Senior UK Diplomat A – interview – March 2010.  
459 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
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“They did at least produce a manifesto which had some sensible 
things about European aspirations and taking forward Turkish 
candidacy.”460  
Because the AKP were a known quantity, and were considered to be a viable partner, the 
UK government thought it worthwhile to work with the AKP to make progress towards the 
Copenhagen criteria.  
“We pursued it and it is true to say that if it had not been for British 
sponsorship we would not have started accession negotiations with 
Turkey. We (the UK) can take a lot of the credit.”461 
Sir Peter Westmacott had “extremely good access” to the upper echelons of the AKP and 
became an unofficial advisor “on call” to the government. “He was extraordinarily pivotal in 
all that. He was the EU expert for the AKP.” 462 Ambassador Westmacott’s diplomatic skills 
meant he was able to be “very tough on telling them what they should do.” He had the “gift of 
delivering the tough message without losing the way.”463 His role was to “liaise” with the AKP 
and “engage with them to get the negotiations started.”464  Westmacott was able to advise 
the AKP on which policies would hasten accession talks namely judicial reform, Kurdish 
freedom of speech, human rights in general and women’s rights in particular. He was also 
able to advise the AKP on how to “sell” these changes to the Turkish public.  
“He did quite a lot of work with them on transparency and better 
governance in meeting the requirements of the Copenhagen 
criteria.”465 
This approach was a specific modus operandi within the FCO: 
                                               
460 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
461 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
462 Senior UK Diplomat H – interview – October 2010. According to this source the AKP once 
complained when PW was on annual leave that he was not available to answer a query. 
463 Senior UK Diplomat H – interview – October 2010. 
464 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
465 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
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 “The deal (from Copenhagen 2002) was that if they (the Turks) did 
this, this and this then they would start (accession talks). This means 
that people (member states) have no choice. That was our key 
argument. It is very hard for people to go back on that kind of 
argument. It was about pinning that decision down to the meeting of 
some political criteria and making it difficult to go back.” 466 
There was also dialogue between Westmacott and the EU Commission officials based in 
Ankara. This process was furthered by a commonality of interest between the UK and 
Turkish governments and the EU Commission as well.  The UK FCO acknowledged the 
crucial role of the EU Commission because the final decision by the member states would be 
based on the Commission’s Progress Report of October 2004.  
“The main arbiter …. was the Commission. There were some well-
placed Brits. We worked with them to make sure it came out right.”467 
These “well-placed Brits” included high ranking officials in the European Commission in 
Brussels and also in the European Commission representation468 in Ankara at that time469. 
They in turn worked extremely closely with the Enlargement Commissioner, Gunther 
Verheugen.  
The policy of the UK was to eliminate “legitimate” reasons why other member states could 
object to Turkish accession talks starting ie: human rights whilst presuming they would not 
use “illegitimate” ones ie: religious. In this way therefore the UK was a primary advocate of 
the Turkish case. Its strategy was to get Turkey to the point whereby it would face minimal 
opposition within the Brussels European Council. To this end the UK embassy in Ankara 
provided support to Turkish government officials looking at the strengthening of non-
                                               
466 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
467 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
468 The EU’s office in Ankara began life as a “representation” but became a “delegation” in July 2004. 
Source: http://www.avrupa.info.tr  
469 Michael Leigh (European Commission) and Simon Mordue (EU Representation in Ankara). 
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governmental civil society and the legal and administrative structures of the government 
itself in order to facilitate Turkey’s “catching the EU train”470. Projects encouraged by the UK 
Embassy included women’s rights groups in south eastern Turkey471, human rights training 
for the Turkish judiciary472 and measures to combat human trafficking across Anatolia473. 
The UK also worked to reassure the EU Commission that it would have the support of the 
member states at the Brussels European Council474. The Commission would have been 
reluctant to present a recommendation it did not think would be passed by the Council of 
Ministers475. Therefore the UK worked to get the support of key member states in order to be 
able to reassure the Commission their proposal would not be rebuffed in Council. In the run 
up to Brussels the UK had the backing of Spain, Italy and Greece as well as France and 
Germany. By reducing the normative grounds for objection to Turkey and highlighting the 
geostrategic case, the UK was also able to bring the Scandinavians and the Dutch on board. 
The new CEEC states were told words to the effect of "….we let you in so don't be awkward 
over Turkey…"476 leaving only the Republic of Cyprus and Austria raising serious doubts 
behind the scenes. Thus the UK was able to reassure the Commission it was not backing a 
loser. It was the culmination of a close working relationship between the FCO and the 
European Commission. The co-operation was not an official policy and the Commission was 
“not following FCO orders” but there was communication and some serendipitous 
cooperation between the two477.  
                                               
470 Sir Peter Westmacott. Quoted by journalist Evren Mesci in an interview published in the Turkish 
newspaper “Sabah” on October 14th 2003.  
471 Turkish Daily News Oct 16th 2003, British Embassy marks completion of pro woman project with a 
reception. 
472 Anatolia News Agency, April 2nd 2004. Envoy says Britain wants to see Turkey become EU 
member. Supplied by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.  
473 Anatolia News Agency, Dec 7th 2004. British envoy explains joint project with Turkey in fighting 
illegal migration. Supplied by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.  
474 Senior UK diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
475 Senior European Commission official B – interview – April 2009; Senior European Commission 
official D – interview – August 2010. 
476 Senior UK politician C – interview – September 2010.  
477 Senior UK diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
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1.2. European Commission. 
It was a happy coincidence that, in early 2003, the DG Enlargement of the European 
Commission shared a geostrategic vision of EU enlargement with the UK478. Günter 
Verheugen was “…convinced it was the right thing to do.”479 He saw Turkish accession as an 
extension of eastern enlargement and was in favour of it for similar geostrategic reasons “to 
do with security and defence.”480 These were not explicitly related to ESDP but instead had a 
broad composition and included issues such as promotion of democracy, energy security, 
drugs and people trafficking and the advancement of the EU as a soft power “actor”. Turkey 
would be more democratic, stable and likely to co-operate on a range of security issues from 
ESDP to the crucial energy pipelines criss-crossing Anatolia481, terrorism and policing issues 
(Apap et al 2004). It would also enhance EU credibility in the Middle East, for example, 
“…which was relevant to the peaceful development of Europe”.482  The events of September 
11th 2001 had helped to make the Brussels EU community realise “how crucial the dialogue 
between the west and Muslim world was.”483  
The Commission had also made some prior contact with the AKP government and drawn a 
similar conclusion to that of the UK FCO.  
“…what we saw on behalf of the Commission was the opportunity to 
have a stable government and with (Abdullah) Gul, somebody with 
whom we could do business….he was surrounded by able and 
competent ministers….there was a willingness to engage and a 
                                               
478 Senior UK diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
479 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
480This means general geostrategic interest rather than ESDP per se. ESDP was not a Commission 
area of influence.  During Verheugen’s 5 year tenure as Enlargement Commissioner he met with 
Javier Solana (source: Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010).  
481 The Nabucco Gas Pipeline International consortium was established in June 2004 for example.  
(See Winrow 2009).  
482 Senior European Commission official B – interview – April 2009. 
483 Senior European Commission official A – interview – February 2010.  
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strong commitment built up particularly between (him and) 
Verheugen.” 484. 
After the Copenhagen European Council   Verheugen sent his “best people” to the EU 
representation in Ankara to guide the AKP through the process485 and the Turks were put 
“under heavy pressure” to “keep their word” on the reforms486. As a result, the “the state of 
mind changed in the Commission”487. The Copenhagen criteria remained key to the process 
but Commission officials had come to believe that the AKP government could deliver what it 
said it was going to488 and therefore Verheugen was prepared to act as an advocate for 
Turkey489.  
It was also recognised within the European Commission that if the 2004 progress report 
could show evidence of improvement in Turkey it would be very hard for a member state to 
object to it in the European Council as they could no longer say that Turkey was not ready 
and would have to rely instead on reasons of culture or religion. For this reason there was a 
“concerted effort to use all the tools in the enlargement trick box.”490 If the Commission could 
show a “track record” of reform in Turkey it would make the difference at Brussels:  
“…..(it) would ultimately enable Gunther Verheugen to make the case 
in 2004 that Turkey was able to meet the criteria. Verheugen knew 
exactly what he wanted. We needed to build up a track record.”491  
For this reason, Verheugen spent a lot of time in 2003 and 2004 building personal 
relationships with both Abdullah Gul and Tayyip Recep Erdogan492. He met with them 
                                               
484 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. NB: There was some overlap 
with the UK in this regard. 
485 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. 
486 Senior European Commission official A – interview – February 2010.  
487 Senior European Commission official A – interview – April 2009.  
488 This had not been the case with the previous Ecevit administration - Senior European Commission 
official A – interview - February 2010.  
489 Verheugen would have been very reluctant to make a recommendation in the progress report 
which did not have a very high probability of being passed by the Brussels EU Council summit 
(Source: Senior European Commission official B – interview – April 2009.) 
490 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
491 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
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regularly and there was a “certain explanation of visions” by Verheugen that “if certain things 
were done it would allow such and such to happen.”493  Verheugen made it clear to Erdogan 
and Gul that he needed to see evidence of “concrete deliverables” such as measures to 
outlaw torture and to improve the rights of the Kurdish minority. These were non-negotiable 
because they would be demanded by the member states and also because Verheugen and 
the wider Commission team believed they were the right goals.  
“What was important…was not necessarily whether Turkey would join 
the EU but….that Turkey was anchored in a process whose aim was 
to allow it to join the EU and that would lead to a radical 
transformation in Turkish society and support the government in 
some of the reforms that they wanted to bring through.”494 
Verheugen was keen to uphold the principles of the Copenhagen criteria. However it is also 
fair to say that Verheugen took a “pragmatic” view of the Turkish case and what could be 
achieved in less than two years. His view was that to press conditionality too far in the 
Turkish case would be hypocritical given that several existing member states would not meet 
the Copenhagen criteria if contemporaneously assessed now in his view495. He believed 
Turkey should be judged by its intention to reform, which he assessed as genuine, as well as 
what had actually been achieved. He also believed that once reforms were passed he would 
be able to make the case in Turkey’s favour and therefore they should be encouraged.496 
2. Setbacks and solutions  
However, whilst the UK and Commission assessment of AKP intentions had been optimistic 
at Copenhagen, the first few months of AKP tenure were not positive as events intervened. 
                                                                                                                                                  
492 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  Erdogan is a renownedly 
diffident personality. Their initial bond was built upon his love of football and knowledge of the 
Bundesliga. 
493 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
494 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
495 This was apart from the issue of Romania and Bulgaria. Senior European Commission official D – 
interview – August 2010.   
496 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.   
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There was a “most extraordinary reversal” (Robins 2003b:565) in Turkey’s foreign relations 
in which it managed to “endanger the whole westward edifice of its policies.”497 The 
“privileged insider” relationship with the US was “undermined” by the Turkish parliamentary 
decision not to allow its territory to be used during the Iraq war. Meanwhile its EU aspiration 
was being damaged by the apparent inability of the AKP to exert pressure on Rauf Denktash 
over Cyprus. The ramifications of both Cyprus and Iraq are part of the context of the 
Brussels decision in December 2004. Firstly, Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan in the 
referendum of April 2004 created a sense of obligation to Turkey. Secondly the Ankara 
parliament’s decision not to allow the Americans unfettered access to Turkish territory also 
worked in Turkey’s favour at Brussels.  
2.1. Cyprus 
The Copenhagen European Council   was a serious missed opportunity to find a solution to 
the Cyprus issue (Hannay 2005:197) but the Presidency conclusions urged both sides to 
persist and “seize the opportunity…” 498 of finding a solution before the UN deadline of 
February 28th 2003. This is evidence of the EU’s desire to solve the Cyprus issue as soon as 
possible and certainly before the Republic of Cyprus became a member in May 2004. The UN-
led Cyprus peace process was inextricably linked with the EU enlargement process because 
of the involvement of Cyprus in both. The very date for the deadline - February 28th 2003 - 
was chosen because it was part of a strict timetable leading up to the signing of the EU’s 
Treaty of Accession with the new member states due to take place on April 16th 2003. So, it 
was hoped to find agreement to the Annan Plan by February 28th, hold referenda in both 
halves of the island of Cyprus on March 30th and go forward to the accession signing in April. 
There was no literally no time to spare in a process which previously had dragged on for 
decades. Unfortunately, at the very time when the new AKP government needed to 
concentrate on meeting the Cyprus deadline, it was being forced to grapple with the 
                                               
497 Morton Abramowitz. Former Ambassador to Turkey. Quoted in the New York Times, April 1st 2003, 
A nation at war; estranged allies. 
498 Copenhagen European Council, December 12-13th 2002, Presidency conclusions. Paragraph 10.  
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enormity of the Iraq conflict which “distracted it” from Cyprus (see below)499. Thus the new 
AKP government missed the last chance to find a solution before the Republic of Cyprus 
joined Greece within the European Council . 
This pressing chronological logic was not lost on public opinion in the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). In late December 2002 large crowds took to the streets of 
Lefkosa/Nicosia to urge Rauf Denktash to do all he could to meet the 28th February 2003 
deadline500. At that time the Turkish de facto leader Tayyip Recep Erdogan also urged 
Denktash to take the opportunity while it lasted and to put personal feelings aside in the 
interests of northern Cyprus which stood to gain economically and politically from accession 
to the EU. 
"This business is not Mr Denktash's personal business. It's not 
Ahmet's or Mehmet's or Tayyip Erdogan's. It's the struggle of a nation 
for existence,"501 
In mid-January 2003 there was a further street demonstration in favour of European 
accession in northern Cyprus502. However, whilst the AKP government was in favour the 
Turkish military, which still exerted considerable influence, regarded the loss of strategically 
important Cypriot territory as too high a price to pay for furthering ambitions of EU accession 
for either Turkish Cyprus or Turkey (Heper 2005).  
"Turkey will be insistent on having some part of Cyprus and Turkey is 
ready to pay the price for it unless the U.N. Secretary-General Kofi 
                                               
499 Senior UK diplomat A – interview – March 2010.  
500 Turkish Daily News. December 28th 2002. UN wants quick 'yes', Turkish Cypriots march for 
settlement. 
501 Recep Tayyip Erdogan quoted by the Financial Times. January 3rd 2003. Turkey urges Denktash 
to agree deal over Cyprus. 
502 Financial Times. January 15th 2003. Turkish Cypriots push for UN peace proposal. 
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Annan's Cyprus plan helps to reach an agreement which will satisfy 
both KKTC503 and Turkey."504 
Gunther Verheugen had already stressed the beneficial economic case for the Turkish 
Cypriots505 and also made clear to Ankara that the Republic of Cyprus would accede 
regardless of a solution to the Cyprus issue. 
“Cyprus will become an EU member in 2004 nothing can change that. 
The issue is whether this will be a unified Cyprus or not.”506 
The collective Turkish military view baulked at any suggestion it could be bought off with EU 
money – even if the Turkish Cypriots themselves were happy to be so:  
"The national pride is more important than the money. People without 
their honour mean nothing even though they have money.” 507  
However, Verheugen’s comments indicated the willingness, and indeed eagerness, of the 
EU to get the UN peace plan for Cyprus back on track as soon as possible in order not to 
have to admit Cyprus as a divided island. Verheugen visited Turkey on January 30th 2003 
accompanied by the incumbent and forthcoming EU Presidency foreign ministers George 
Papandreou of Greece and Franco Frattini of Italy.  
As indicated by his December 2002 comments, clearly aimed at the self-interest of Turkish 
Cypriots508, Verheugen was also keen to circumvent the influence of Rauf Denktash. 
Significantly at this time Verheugen believed he had the support of Erdogan against 
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Denktash509.  However the reassurances which Erdogan had given to Verheugen in private 
did not materialise in reality. Denktash “showed no interest in engaging in a serious 
discussion of the main issues in the negotiations…” nor any “sign of….mending his ways.” 
(Hannay 2005: 204)510 Additionally the UN peace plan was being hampered by the imminent 
presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus and the Iraq conflict. Glafkos Clerides was 
continuing with negotiations for the time being but was lagging behind in the polls against a 
hard line challenge from Thassos Papadopolous who then won the first round vote outright 
on February 15th 2003 with 51.55% amidst rhetoric maintaining Clerides had conceded too 
much to Denktash511.  
By February 2003, Iraq was obviously a serious distraction for the Turkish Foreign Ministry. 
The UK envoy Lord Hannay recounts he was reduced to dealing with junior Turkish foreign 
ministry officials over Cyprus as his previous contact “was the lead” on Iraq and often 
cancelled at short notice. 
“In Ankara I was brought face to face with the reality that the looming 
war in Iraq and the need for the Turks finally to give a definitive 
response to the US and the UK requests to allow their troops to 
transit Turkey was gradually drowning out all other issues in the 
consciousness of both politicians and the bureaucracy.”512 
In late February 2003 Kofi Annan extended the deadline beyond February 28th and invited all 
parties to meet in The Hague on March 10th for a final decision to be made but optimism was 
low513. The UN team had already decided that the matter hinged with Ankara and the AKP. If 
                                               
509 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. On another occasion the 
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they could exert the right pressure on Denktash and he acquiesced it was more likely that 
Papadopolous would follow suit. Without that the converse was true.  
What was also decided by Kofi Annan and his envoy Alvaro De Soto in advance of The 
Hague meeting was that if this meeting did not bear fruit the impetus would be lost as the UN 
would have fallen out of step with the EU enlargement timeline. For this reason they decided 
that if no progress was made at The Hague the “plug would be pulled” on the Annan Plan. 
The Hague meeting was not about negotiation but about taking a decision on the future of 
Cyprus and putting it straight to a referendum of the Cypriot peoples514. Kofi Annan heralded 
it as a “….chance for Cyprus to be transformed from a seemingly insoluble international 
problem to a beacon of international hope. Decision time has arrived and opportunity 
beckons. It should not be missed."515 
However, the AKP government of Turkey did not “grasp the Cyprus nettle” at this time 
(Hannay 2005: 213). The decision by the Turkish parliament the previous week not to allow 
US troops movements across Anatolia had knocked the confidence of the AKP to deal with 
such a controversial subject as Cyprus and by The Hague meeting of March 10th 2003 
Erdogan’s Cyprus rhetoric had changed character and he was “singing a quite different 
song…”(Hannay 2005: 214). Even a marathon 16 hour negotiating session overnight March 
10-11th 2003 could not find ground for agreement between Papadopoulos and Denktash who, 
in the absence of real pressure from the Turkish government, had been free not to agree. 
Kofi Annan emerged from the meeting for de Soto to tell reporters “We have reached the 
end of the road.”516 The European Commission made clear that Greek Cypriot accession 
would “continue as planned” 517 but stressed that Ankara’s failure to recognise Greek Cyprus 
before Nicosia acceded would make it very difficult “to envisage the start of membership 
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talks with Turkey."518 In this way the Erdogan government’s inaction over the Annan Plan for 
Cyprus was in danger of jeopardising its future prospects for EU accession. It had acted 
against its own avowed interest of furthering EU accession even in the face of personal 
entreaties from Kofi Annan himself. It would seem that the AKP was still too new to 
governance to tackle the powerful forces of Kemalism in the twin forms of the Turkish 
military and Rauf Denktash. This was exacerbated by the knock of confidence the AKP 
suffered in its own parliamentary party after the vote against US troop movements on March 
1st.  As Hannay (2005: 218) reports: 
“The assumption had to be that the failed vote over Iraq in the 
Turkish parliament had changed everything.” 
After the “very disappointing” 519 outcome of The Hague talks, Kofi Annan said publicly that 
he would not actively pursue the Annan Plan further unless there was “political will for a 
successful outcome”.520 He clearly blamed Rauf Denktash for the impasse.  
“Except for a very few instances, Mr Denktash by and large  
declined to engage in negotiation on the basis of give and take. This  
greatly complicated my efforts to accommodate not only the legitimate 
concerns of principle but also the concrete and practical interests  
of the Turkish Cypriots.”521 
 
2.2. Iraq 
It is clear that in spite of its good intentions vis a vis the EU, pre-established by the UK and 
the EU Commission, the Turkish government got off to a shaky start in 2003. It missed the 
last opportunity to find a solution to the Cyprus issue before the Republic of Cyprus acceded 
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to the EU and became an enemy within. The major reason for this shaky start to the new 
year was the Iraq crisis which the next section now explores in more detail. It will examine 
the implications of the second Iraq War for Turkey’s EU accession hopes. 
Turkey’s strategic value to the pending Iraq campaign, particularly the use of the Incirlik air 
base in Turkey, meant that during the first weeks of the AKP government it was visited in 
Ankara522 by several senior American political and military officials including General Tommy 
Franks523, Marc Grossman524 and John McLaughlin the Deputy Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency525. Around the same time the Turkish Chief of General Staff, General 
Hilmi Ozkok, went to Washington for talks with General Richard Myers526, Dick Cheney, 
Condoleezza Rice, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz527. He also met 
American military chiefs at US Central Command (USCentComm) in Tampa, Florida. Until 
this point the Americans had not expected Turkey to refuse its request for land transit rights 
as “….the American’s view of Turkey was that if they (the US) said ‘Please do this’ then the 
Turks would do it.”528 
However, after his visit, General Ozkok expressed “anxieties” about the US plan for Iraq and 
“hope” that the Iraq issue could be “solved without resort to war.”529 Tayyip Recep Erdogan 
had also refused to commit support – or otherwise - for the American strategy on Iraq and 
expressed a desire to abide by the decisions of the United Nations: 
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"The most preferred result is to resolve this issue in peace….we don't 
want blood, tears or death." 530 
83% of Turks opposed allowing the US to use Turkish bases and a “53% majority of Turkish 
respondents believe the U.S. wanted to get rid of Saddam as part of a war against unfriendly 
Muslim countries, rather than because the Iraqi leader is a threat to peace”531. It had not 
been forgotten in Turkey that Turgut Ozal’s decision to comply with UN sanctions on Iraq 
following the First Gulf War was estimated (although probably overestimated) by the Turks to 
be in the region of $35bn (Barkey 2000). Additionally there were many within the Turkish 
military who feared per se any empowerment of the Iraqi Kurds and the consequences this 
may have for Turkey’s own continuing Kurdish insurrection as well as the destabilising and 
expensive effect of a Kurdish refugee influx from Northern Iraq532. 
However, at this time Turkey was still in negotiations with the US about an aid package to 
compensate them in the event of a second Iraq war533 and this was widely presumed by the 
wider diplomatic community in Ankara to be, at least partly, a bargaining position. It should 
also be noted that at this time Turkey was in the throes of negotiating a favourable outcome 
for itself on both EU accession and the Berlin Plus arrangements for ESDP534.   
The understanding of Turkey’s position on the impending Iraq conflict therefore remained 
fluid. In early December 2002, the Turkish Foreign Minister Yasar Yakis said Turkey would 
allow the US to use its bases only to withdraw the statement hours later with a foreign 
ministry clarification that he was talking about “possibilities not promises”535. At the same 
                                               
530 Associated Press, November 3rd 2002. Turkish election winner says opposes U.S. strike on Iraq 
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time, the US Deputy Secretary of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz, was in Ankara to try to clarify the 
situation and to offer lucrative investment in Turkey’s military infrastructure536. 
The next week Erdogan flew to Washington. In a speech in Washington on December 9th 
2002 Erdogan stressed war in Iraq should be a “last resort” but if it came to pass Turkey 
would provide “the necessary support for the last UN resolution.”537 In talks at the White 
House the next day Erdogan reportedly requested American economic – as well as military – 
aid in return for access to Incirlik and permission to move troops across Anatolia538. Bush 
meanwhile pledged to push Turkey’s case for EU accession at Copenhagen which his 
administration did to arguable effect (see Chapter Four Sec 4.3). However the upshot of the 
talks was ambiguous and in late December the Turkish government remained officially 
undecided about its Iraq policy539. 
Hence, in early January 2003 the UK Secretary of State for Defence Geoff Hoon visited 
Turkey with the UK Chief of General Staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, to discuss the use of 
Turkish air bases and the deployment of troops through Turkey. The UK representation left 
“doubting that they (the Turkish government) would (allow troop movements).” 
“We were desperate to drive across Turkey to Iraq (but) Turkish 
public opinion was against it and it struck me as the response of 
democrats. People were thinking about their constituents. The 
Americans never understood that.”540  
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American pressure on Turkey continued into 2003 because of the time constraints. The 
Turkish military was also pressurising the AKP government for a decision541. The UK Admiral 
Sir Michael Boyce made a second visit on January 23th 2003 while the US Joint Chief of Staff 
General Richard Myers visited on January 19th 2003 and lay down a deadline of February 1st 
for the Turkish decision. On January 25th the NATO Europe Allied Forces Commander 
James Jones visited General Hilmi Ozkok. However, the AKP were reluctant to decide 
without recourse to parliament because of the strong opposition of public and elite opinion. 
On March 1st 2003, the Turkish parliament voted against Erdogan 264-251 with 19 
abstentions. Erdogan had been outmanoeuvred by an alliance between the opposition CHP 
and the conservative wing of his own party led by the parliamentary speaker Bulent Arinc 
with support from deputies from the south and east of Turkey542. Turkey lost significant aid 
from the US, some control over events in northern Iraq and incurred the wrath of the US 
State Department543. “It was a very bad thing for the USA…a lot of people were mad at 
Turkey for a long time…”544 
Immediately after the vote it was hoped the AKP would resubmit it to parliament. The US 
believed it had signed a memorandum of understanding in February allowing logistical bases 
in south east Turkey545. It had thirty ships anchored off the Turkish coast carrying the US 
Army’s 4th Infantry Division and these were left in situ in anticipation of a second vote. 
However, Erdogan and Gul did not feel politically able to do this. The timing was problematic 
                                               
541 Turkish Daily News, 24th January 2003. Top British general lobbies for Turkey's permission for 
British troops. See also Turkish Daily News. January 25th 2003. Top NATO commander visits Ozkok 
to discuss Iraq. NB: The Turkish military was not in favour of war per se but because if it was 
inevitable it wanted time to plan a response so “…the worst decision is better than indecisiveness.” 
Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff, General Yasar Buyukanit quoted in the Turkish Daily News, January 
10th 2003, Any decision better than indecision. 
542 Indeed an old diplomatic hand notes wryly that the AKP supported the war but have liked to rewrite 
history somewhat. This was “not quite the heroic action it is painted to be.” Senior UK diplomat A – 
interview – March 2010. 
543 Financial Times, March 3rd 2003, Turkish vote deals blow to government. 
544 Senior USA State Department official – interview – March 2010. 
545 The Economist, (US edition), March 29th 2003, A friendship on hold. 
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as Erdogan himself, nominally only Chairman of the AKP, was standing for election to 
Parliament in the eastern province of Siirt on March  9th 2003 546.   
“……the Americans left their fourth division floating around in the Med 
for some time but the answer never came…”547  
After that point, Ankara and its EU accession “became a side issue” for the USA whilst it 
dealt with the second Iraq war without access to Turkish territory548. 
2.3. Keeping Turkey on track 
In March 2003 the AKP’s EU prospects seemed bleak prima facie. The intervention of the 
Iraq issue meant it had alienated the USA and failed to take two golden chances to solve the 
Cyprus issue which would have eased its EU accession process. Gunther Verheugen 
warned Ankara that failure to find a solution to the Cyprus issue by December 2004 would 
“complicate matters” in enlargement terms.549 However, in spite of this setback, efforts by 
Turkey’s advocates continued.  
On April 15th 2003550 Abdullah Gul met Gunther Verheugen in Luxembourg to discuss a 
revised Accession Partnership Document. Verheugen pledged financial assistance and 
urged Gul to continue with domestic reform. Gul re-iterated his government’s desire to start 
negotiations in 2004 and willingness to pass the reforms necessary:  
“We have a political will and determination and enough power in 
parliament to carry out all the reform packages….our aim is to speed 
                                               
546 Erdogan was chairman of the AKP but had been prevented from standing for office in the 
November 2002 election because of a conviction for “Islamist sedition” in 1997 when he was a 
member of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi). However he could not be Prime Minister unless he was 
an MP hence the election in Siirt on March 9th  2003..  
547 Senior UK politician A – interview – March 2010. 
548 Senior USA State Department official – interview – March 2010. 
549 Agence France Press, April 15th 2003, Turkey hopeful for EU entry talks, Brussels reiterates 
warning. 
550 The same day as the the Republic of Cyprus was signing the accession treaty with the EU in 
Athens (at the Greek Presidency summit). 
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up this process. We want to start the negotiations in 2004 without 
delay.”551 
Over the next few weeks several EU figures offered reassurance to Turkey that accession 
was still possible.  The French Foreign Minister, Dominique De Villepin, went to Ankara for 
talks on Iraq, Turkey-EU relations and Cyprus. He praised Turkey’s stance on the Iraq war 
and backed its claim for EU accession. 
"We see Turkey's deep aspiration to join the union and France plans 
to stand by your side on this road, which is the road of democracy, 
economic development and social cohesion,"552   
In an interview with La Repubblica newspaper, the EU Commission President, Romano 
Prodi, also included Turkey on a list of future members553. Both were speaking in an anti-Iraq 
war context and thus from an anti-American stance in which Turkey was seen as reinforcing 
the European view and the European need for a security and defence policy separate from 
Washington and NATO. Gunther Verheugen was also vocal at this time in warning the USA 
that its unpopularity within the EU, because of the Iraq conflict, could hinder the Turkish case. 
The pressure brought to bear by Washington in the run up to the Copenhagen European 
Council had “annoyed many Europeans” and “there is no need for them to use such strong 
pressure." 554 However, unlike De Villepin and Prodi, Verheugen was not motivated by an 
anti-American feeling per se but by the belief that Turkish accession was in the best 
geostrategic interest of the EU.  
                                               
551 Agence France Press, April 15th 2003, Turkey hopeful for EU entry talks, Brussels reiterates 
warning. 
552 Dominique de Villepin quoted in the Turkish Daily News, April 24th 2003, France praises Turkey's 
Iraq war policy. 
553 Significantly whilst speaking about Russia as not a possible member. Agence France Press, April 
19th 2003, Prodi urges enlarged EU to show more unity, win US respect. 
554 Gunther Verheugen quoted in the Financial Times, April 22nd 2003, US warned to keep out of 
Turkey's EU talks. 
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 “Islam is a part of Europe such as Christianity or Judaism. The 
membership of a secular and Muslim country like Turkey is beneficial 
because of the developments in the crisis regions.”555 
To this end he stressed the need for reforms and reassured Ankara their case would be 
judged fairly. He urged Turkey to “….stay on course for Europe. You can rely on the 
Commission to make a fair and objective judgment.”556 
In 2003, in spite of an unconfident start, the AKP found itself being “encouraged” to continue 
the reforms and to expedite a solution to the Cyprus issue.  
"Finding a solution to the Cyprus question would considerably affect 
the decision to be made by the EU member countries, which will 
review Turkey's application for membership. The need to resolve that 
problem is stressed in the accession partnership document, albeit it is 
not one of the Copenhagen criteria.” (Sir Peter Westmacott, October 
2003)557 
A similar message was relayed by Gunther Verheugen558 to the AKP leadership privately 559 
and in public. His message was that it would be wrong to “put the cart before the horse” and 
there was a “yawning gap” between stated reforms “and their actual implementation…"560  
Once the twin crises of Iraq and Cyprus had died down, the AKP began to work towards its 
European ambitions. Whilst the AKP’s motives may not have been entirely EU focussed561, 
its parliamentary majority gave it a chance to enact change and to tackle the power of the 
                                               
555 Turkish Daily News, May 8th 2003, Verheugen: My opinions about Turkey changed in a positive 
way. 
556 Gunter Verheugen  Speech to the European parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, April 9th 
2003, Speech, 03/187 Responsible for Enlargement Let us not hesitate in seizing this opportunity EP-
Plenary session Strasbourg, 9 April 2003.Source: Rapid.  
557 Quoted by journalist Evren Mesci in an interview published in the Turkish newspaper “Sabah” on 
October 14th 2003. 
558 Alongside the need for progress on the Cyprus issue. See Agence France Press. April 15th 2003. 
Turkey hopeful for EU entry talks, Brussels reiterates warning. 
559 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
560 Gunther Verheugen’s spokesman Jean Christophe Filori, quoted by Agence France Press, May 
15th 2003, Human rights record casts shadow over Turkey's EU membership bid. 
561 Ugur (2007: 592) has suggested that EU accession was seen as an “opportunity to restrict the 
military’s ability to intervene against parties with an Islamic background.” 
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Kemalist establishment which had dominated policy on both the Cypriot and Kurdish issues. 
As a single party government, the AKP was able to resist pressure from the Kemalist old 
guard including President Necmet Sezer562 and the Chief of Staff General Hilmi Ozkok563. By 
the spring of 2003 the AKP leadership was keen to stress both that it was ready to find a 
solution to Cyprus564 and that it was prepared to maintain progress on domestic reform in 
accordance with the Copenhagen criteria565. Up to July 2004 there were five major reform 
packages passed through parliament by the AKP government covering issues such as the 
death penalty, influence of the military, freedom of speech, Kurdish language rights, 
increased sentences in cases of “honour killing”, increased trade union rights, right of 
association and peaceful assembly. Additionally there were fine-tuning constitutional 
amendments and a major revision of the Penal Code566.  
From early 2003 the amount of EU aid which went to Ankara increased sharply as the 
Commission “used (its) financial assistance to make sure these changes happened…” and 
“put in place a process of transferring management responsibility over to the Turkish 
authorities.”567 Turkey was deliberately treated in a very similar fashion to the other eastern 
enlargement states with methods such as “twinning” in the police force and military. 
Verheugen built up a personal rapport with Erdogan and Gul, there were a “number of 
“closed door conversations” about how “x” could be possible if “y” was done.568. For the UK, 
Westmacott “…nudged them (the AKP) forward on a number of fronts including judicial 
reform, women’s rights, Kurdish rights…..etc.”569 and tried to tell the AKP that these were 
“things that were good for Turkey in their own right”. Westmacott also helped the AKP 
manage its own domestic public relations and “sell this stuff” to Turkish public opinion. “He 
                                               
562 Agence France Press, June 30th 2003, Turkish president vetoes EU-linked reform in setback to 
government. 
563 Associated Press, May 26th 2003, Turkish military deeply concerned over policies of Islamic-rooted 
Government. 
564 Deutsche Press-Agentur. April 17th 2003, Turkey says Cyprus' membership in E.U. will not strain 
relations. 
565 Agence France Press. April 28th 2003, Turkey vows to speed up reforms to strengthen EU bid. 
566 For further detail see Ugur 2005: 592; Tocci 2005: 73; Kubicek 2005: 365. 
567 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
568 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
569 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
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was trying to help them to do the right thing…on issues such as prison governance, honour 
killings and the like.”570 
2.4. The Annan Plan referendum 
As the EU continued to stress the desirability of a Cyprus solution for Turkish accession571, 
so the USA572, and the UK, maintained pressure on Rauf Denktash573 directly - and indirectly 
through the Ankara government574 - to get back into talks on the Annan Plan. However there 
was limited success until February 2004 when there was a flurry of diplomatic activity at the 
United Nations HQ in New York. This involved the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, plus 
other interested parties, after which Kofi Annan announced that he was now prepared to re-
open talks on the Annan Plan with the aim of agreeing on a text which could be put to 
referendum in both the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC before May 1st  2004. The Cypriot 
leaders would have from February 19th to March 22nd 2004 to reach agreement amongst 
themselves after which the Athens and Ankara governments would be brought in for further 
discussions at the Swiss resort of Burgenstock575 until 29th March. Kofi Annan himself would 
have the final authority: 
“As a final resort, in the event of a continuing and persistent 
deadlock, the parties have invited me to use my discretion to finalize 
the text to be submitted to referenda on the basis of my plan.”576 
                                               
570 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010. 
571 Turkish Daily News, April 21st 2003, Prodi: EU's doors still open to Turkey. 
572 In September 2003 the US Cyprus envoy Thomas Weston spent a week touring European capitals 
to talk about the Cyprus issue. In Ankara he made it clear that Turkey “should be doing more” to find a 
solution to the Cyprus issue. Agence France Press. September 3rd 2003, US envoy warns Turkey to 
do more on Cyprus. 
573 Denktash was facing a general election in December 2003 against opposition parties who were in 
favour of a solution and with a public opinion also in favour. In the event the election was fought on 
the Annan Plan issue and the result was extremely close. Whilst the pro EU parties gained a slightly 
higher percentage (2%) of the votes each side ended up with 25 seats each in a 50 seat parliament. 
The swing was not enough to oust Rauf Denktash from his place as the President. 
574 In January 2004 Weston hand delivered a letter to Abdullah Gul from the US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell encouraging Ankara to return to negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan.  
575 Burgenstock castle was used during the filming of the James Bond movie “Goldfinger”. 
576 “UN Transcript of press conference by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at United Nations 
Headquarters, February 13th 2004.” http://www.un.org/webcast/PC2004.html  see also M2 Newswire  
February 16th 2004.  
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However, Rauf Denktash boycotted the Burgenstock talks and, perhaps predictably,  an 
agreement was not reached by 31st March 2004 after which Kofi Annan used his previously 
agreed right to finalise the text for referendum to be held on April 24th 2004 saying it was a 
“…choice between this solution, or no solution.”577  This was a sentiment echoed both by 
Gunther Verheugen that it was the "the best and most balanced solution that can possibly be 
achieved" and the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw who urged “…all concerned to seize the 
moment and bring an end to 30 years of division.”578 
However whilst the Turkish Cypriot side was in favour of the Annan Plan, public opinion in 
the Republic of Cyprus was not and the Cypriot government of Thassos Papadopoulos 
campaigned against it much to the chagrin of Gunther Verheugen579. Although Verheugen 
was present at Burgenstock, which he described to staff as a “prison”580 he was not involved 
in the negotiations and was critical of the UN way of doing things compared to the EU’s. On 
24th April 2004 the Greek Cypriots voted 75.8% against the Annan Plan whilst the Turkish 
Cypriots voted 65% in favour. This left the EU in the difficult position of being about to admit 
a country which had just acted against avowed EU policy and geostrategic interest. It was 
the “worst situation that could be imagined.”581 The American delegation was also in despair 
and finding Papadopoulos “difficult”.  
“We thought if we could be in favour of the plan…encourage the 
Turkish Cypriots to vote yes and encourage the Greek Cypriots to 
vote yes then it would be a huge winner…but everybody 
miscalculated. To my great regret it did not work out…truly to my 
great regret. It was very disappointing.” 
 
                                               
577 Deutsche Press Agentur, April 1st 2004, Hopes fade for reunified Cyprus following talks failure. 
578 Press Association, April 1st 2004, Britain hails Annan’s plan for one Cyprus. 
579 Deutsche Press Agentur, April  21st 2004, E.U. enlargement chief rebukes Greek-Cypriot leader. 
See also Agence France Press. April 21st 2004, EU commissioner lashes out at Greek Cypriot call for 
"no" vote. 
580 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
581 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  Verheugen was also critical of 
Alvaro de Soto and Thomas Weston.  
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We did not expect the Turks to vote yes and the Greeks to vote no. 
We though “Oh my God…how did we get into this dilemma?””582 
 
 “If Clerides had (still) been in charge….we would have got this done 
and life would have been different. We really lost out by the change in 
leadership…it was too bad…..because then our plan would have 
come together, Cyprus would have been in the EU, the Annan Plan 
would have kicked in…plus we would have had the Turks in the 
EU."583 
This abject failure heightened a “sense of obligation” within the European Commission to the 
Turks (and the Turkish Cypriots) in respect of the recommendation to be given in the 2004 
Progress Report and the decision by the member states at Brussels.584 The EU member 
states and Commission approached the impending Brussels European Council with Cyprus 
still as a problem but with the Republic of Cyprus as a member state and Turkey, and the 
TRNC, having been humiliated in an international forum.  
3. The road to the Brussels European Council  
3.1. “Pacta sunt servanda” 585 
In the run up to the Brussels European Council , the pace of reforms in Turkey was positive. 
Verheugen had been gratified to see the AKP reforms implemented and felt real progress 
was being made586. The Annan Plan referendum was an embarrassment to all parties 
concerned except the Republic of Cyprus but ironically it strengthened the Turkish position. 
                                               
582 Senior USA State Department Official – interview – March 2010.  
583 Senior USA State Department Official – interview – March 2010.  
584 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010. 
585 Pacta sunt servanda means “agreements are to be honoured”. 
586 During a visit to Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey in September 2004, in advance of the Progress 
Report, he was impressed by hearing a children’s choir singing songs in a Kurdish language –which 
until very recently had been outlawed. This “…showed (Verheugen) that something was changing on 
the ground so he could justify a pragmatic approach to the Copenhagen criteria.” (Source: Senior 
European Commission official D – interview – August 2010) 
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The European Commission felt beholden to the AKP which had met the challenge of 
constitutional reform and had been left politically vulnerable over Cyprus for their trouble.  
“There was a feeling that we had spelt out to Turkey what was 
expected of them and when they had delivered we needed on our 
side to be able to deliver to have credibility.”587 
The report for the Open Society Foundation588 by Martti Ahtisaari and others in September 
2004 also warned that the EU’s integrity was at stake.  
“Further delay would damage the European Union’s credibility and be 
seen as a breach of the generally recognised principle that “pacta 
sunt servanda” ” 589. 
In the run up to the Brussels European Council , Verheugen’s geostrategic motivation was 
thus joined by a sense of obligation which inclined him to think “pragmatically” about the 
Turkish case and allow Turkey to be judged by its “intention to reform” as well as actual 
reform. Moreover, Verheugen believed such decisions were “…always a matter of judgement 
and “….at the end of the day it is a political decision.”590 In this way Verheugen attempted to 
counter the arguments of those Commissioners who remained concerned about human 
rights. Not only had human rights undoubtedly improved radically, albeit from a low base591, 
but Verheugen could point to examples of having been able to temper the excesses of the 
AKP, such as the criminalisation of adultery in September 2004592, and the desirability of 
being able to continue to do so. 
                                               
587 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
588 A civil society think tank founded by the businessman George Soros. http://www.soros.org 
589 Open Society Foundations, Turkey in Europe: More than a promise? Report of the Independent 
Commission on Turkey, chaired by Martti Ahtisaari.  
590 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
591 Whilst it is clear that legitimate concerns on human rights remained, the situation had improved 
enormously since 1994.  See Human Rights Watch, Advisory Note to Journalists Covering the 
Release of Regular Report on Turkey and Recommendations. October 4th 2004. Also Human Rights 
Watch, Turkey: EU bid hinges on further rights reforms, June 15th 2004. 
592 Filori said: “Such a law could harm Turkey's image in its reform process…all positive developments 
could be overshadowed."  Quoted by Agence France Press, September 7th 2004, Plans by EU 
aspirant Turkey to recriminalize adultery split. 
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Nevertheless, in mid-2004, considerable underlying opposition to the Turkish case remained 
in public and elite opinion inside and outside of the EU. In September 2004 Fritz Bolkestein, 
the Dutch Commissioner593, spoke of the danger of the “Islamisation of the EU if Turkey 
were to start accession talks. This would mean the “….liberation of Vienna (from the Turks) 
in 1683 would have been in vain."594 The Austrian Commissioner, Franz Fischler595, 
circulated a nine page letter to all Commissioners raising “…doubts as to Turkey’s long term 
secular and democratic credentials...” and questioning the cost of potential agricultural 
subsidies to Turkey596. The Vatican was also vocal against the Turkish case:  
"Turkey has always represented another continent throughout history, 
in permanent contrast with Europe. There were wars with the 
Byzantine Empire; think of the fall of Constantinople (now Istanbul) in 
1453 and the threat to Vienna and Austria." 597 
Moreover, some member state leaders in favour of Turkish accession were dealing with 
public opinions and rival politicians who were against. The UK public opinion showed one of 
the highest levels of support for Turkey in the EU albeit only at around 45% in favour598. 
However French public opinion was considerably more opposed with only around 20% in 
favour599 (See also Barysch 2007) leaving Jacques Chirac’s support for Turkey  “out of line” 
with public  opinion and that of his UMP party600 including his political rival Nicholas Sarkozy.  
Gerhard Schroeder faced minor and uneasy normative resistance within the SPD party601 
and stronger opposition from his CDU (Christian Democrat Union) rival Angela Merkel who 
advocated “privileged partnership” for Turkey rather than full accession602. At the same time 
Turkey was feeling “short changed” and “very resentful with some justification” following the 
                                               
593 For internal market and services. 
594 Financial Times, October 8th 2004, Islamisation' warning clouds Turks' EU drive. 
595 For agriculture. 
596 Financial Times, October 10th 2004, Fischler criticises EU plans for Turkey. 
597 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger quoted in the Financial Times. September 6th 2004. Turkey's legacy 
casts long shadow over talks with EU. 
598 BBC News Online, September 30th 2005, EU views on Turkish bid.  
599 BBC News Online, September 30th 2005, EU views on Turkish bid.  
600 Financial Times, October 2nd 2004, Chirac promises Turkey referendum. 
601 Financial Times, October 6th 2004, Membership bid threatens fresh rift within Germany's SPD. 
602 Deutsche Press Agentur. October 3rd 2004. Germany split on Turkish E.U. membership. 
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Republic of Cyprus’ rejection of the latest Annan Plan in April603. Gunther Verheugen had the 
extremely difficult task both of persuading the European Commissioners to back his plan and 
cajoling the Turks to maintain the momentum on Cyprus and domestic reform.  
3.2. Winning over the European Commission 
In the event however, in spite of hostile public opinions, only Franz Fischler and Frits 
Bolkestein spoke publically within the European Commission against Verheugen’s case for 
Turkey to open accession negotiations. They used “emotional” arguments that Turkey was 
too populous, not European and not Christian which Verheugen found “easy to counter” 604. 
Verheugen stressed the reform achievements of the AKP. He made the geopolitical case 
including factors such as energy pipelines605 and co-operation with Justice and Home Affairs 
(primarily people and drug trafficking606). He also warned of the geostrategic consequences 
of not saying yes to Turkey in 2004. “He said that if the promise was not kept it would be 
terrible…not only for Turkey but it would be a signal for the whole Muslim world.”607  
After a “very long debate” Verheugen managed to get the 2004 Progress Report on Turkey 
passed by the Commissioners and it was published on October 6th 2004608. This decision 
was largely based on a sense of duty: 
“…it was a matter of obligation for the EU to agree to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey. You cannot not do something.”609 
Similarly it was felt that Turkey had done what was asked of it: 
“You cannot tell somebody, OK, you are ready for negotiations and 
then never open them. Sometimes the pressure of the policies that 
the EU has set for itself is such that we have to start.”610  
                                               
603 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
604 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
605 For background on the energy related geopolitical considerations see Winrow (2004; 2009).  
606 For background on drug trafficking across Turkey see Robins (2002). 
607 Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
608 Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf      
609 Senior ESDP advisor A – interview – March 2010.  
610 Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – interview – March 2010.  
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Gunther Verheugen had been a major player in this process. He was an arch “political 
animal” who “invested in relationships”611 with the major players within the EU and Ankara 
both for and against the proposal.  
“That was the key (building relationships)….to getting a 
recommendation (to open accession negotiations). Without that I can 
barely envisage a scenario in which a positive recommendation could 
have occurred if it had not been for (Verheugen).”612 
In other words, having staked his reputation on the success of it, Verheugen used his 
political nous to facilitate its progress. This was made possible because of the reforms which 
had been passed in Turkey since the Copenhagen European Council. Turkey had done 
enough to demonstrate its intention to go further and thereby win the support of its previously 
sceptical normative opponents. In the 2004 Progress Report, European Commission officials 
were juggling their sense of objectivity and fairness with the pragmatic approach to 
incentivising further reform accepted by Verheugen613. 
“In view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey 
brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the 
Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfills the political criteria 
and recommends that accession negotiations be opened.” 614  (my 
italics). 
Whilst they were not prepared to overlook obvious breaches nor tell outright lies in the 
progress report “sufficiently fulfilled” was the “…trick that enabled us to demonstrate 
that…this was the right thing to do.”615 It was a “creative formula” which allowed the 
                                               
611 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
612 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
613 Within the Commission there was a sense of objectivity at all times “…politics does not play a 
major role. We need to have the facts backed up…” Senior European Commission official B – 
interview – April 2009.  
614 European Commission, 2004, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  See Appendix  Recommendation of the European Commission on 
Turkey’s progress towards accession, Sec. 2., Assessment of the political criteria.  
615 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010.  
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European Commission to concede the obvious point that Turkey had not yet met the 
Copenhagen criteria whilst not totally compromising its principles. 
“Fundamentally at that time we considered that the political criteria 
were sufficiently met. There were some areas of concern but overall 
the legal framework was in place.”616 
In this way, the Progress Report and its recommendation were generally favourable. The 
Progress Report suggested the opening of accession negotiations with the proviso that 
reforms must continue to make tangible progress and the subtle warning that accession 
negotiations were an “…open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed 
beforehand.”617  
In fact the progress report had not been prepared by the European Commission in isolation. 
It was done in “very very very close” consultation with the “big three” member states of the 
UK, France and Germany.  
“Every single word of the progress report was agreed with Berlin, 
Paris and London….every… single…word and particularly (with) 
Paris. Some parts, words and phrases, were agreed with Chirac 
directly. It was carefully prepared. We invested hours….there were 
no surprises.”618   
Everything was done to ensure the progress report would not fail to advance at the Brussels 
European Council . It was “tailored to make sure that we got the answer that the question 
was looking for.” 619  
                                               
616 Senior European Commission official A – interview – April 2009.  Similar point made by Senior 
European Commission official B – interview – April 2009. 
617 European Commission, 2004, Regular Report from the European Commission on Turkey’s 
Progress towards accession.  Conc. Para. 8: “Recommendation…..” COM(2004) 656. The “open-
ended” clause was the price paid to the Austrian Commissioner Franz Fischler which would allow his 
Prime Minister, Wolfgang Schussel, to interpret the recommendation as a form of “privileged 
partnership” rather than the opening of full accession negotiations and appease his public opinion. 
618 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
619 Senior European Commission official C – interview – March 2010. 
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3.3. Winning over the member states 
Even after the 2004 progress report was published, the sailing was not all plain for those in 
favour of Turkish accession. In October 2004 the Republic of Cyprus subtly raised the stakes 
by suggesting that Cypriot support could, after all, be conditional upon Ankara’s recognition 
of the Republic of Cyprus, something Thassos Papadopoulos could be confident Ankara 
would never do. 
 "As a point of principle, Cyprus is not opposed to Turkey's EU 
accession as long as Turkey behaves towards Cyprus with the same 
responsibilities and obligations as it does to other EU member 
states,"620 
French public and elite opinion meanwhile continued to pressure Jacques Chirac. Chirac had 
already announced that he would seek to amend the French constitution such that the 
admission of any new member to the EU should be subject to a referendum although this 
would not apply to Romania, Bulgaria or Croatia621. In early November 2004 Chirac came 
under further pressure from his UMP rival Nicholas Sarkozy. As a result, Chirac suggested 
that a form of “special partnership” for Turkey may be preferable: 
"It is not impossible that the road taken by Turkey does not allow it to 
adhere to all of the values of Europe. In that case, we must find the 
means to create sufficiently strong links ... without there being full 
integration,"622 
                                               
620 Agence France Press, October 14th 2004, Cyprus will not veto Turkey if it shows respect for Greek 
Cypriot government. 
621 Agence France Press, October 1st 2004, Chirac proposes constitutional change for referendum on 
Turkish EU entry. This was described by the Financial Times as appearing to be a “….cynical gesture 
to appease hostile public opinion.”, October 5th 2004, Chirac’s gamble. 
622 Associated Press, November 5th 2004, Chirac evokes another Turkey scenario: close ties, not 
membership. 
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This partnership concept was reinforced later in November by Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, a 
long-time critic of Turkish accession. In an article in the Financial Times he warned of the 
dangers of extending the EU too much and too far: 
“What is most surprising is the way most European leaders have let 
themselves be drawn into a simplistic choice between agreeing to 
negotiations on Turkey's accession to the EU and closing the door in 
its face.”623 
Additionally, the European Parliament’s centre right grouping, the European People’s Party 
(EPP), gave the job of coordinating its position amongst EU governments to Wolfgang 
Schussel the Austrian Prime Minister624 and Cyprus further re-iterated its desire for Ankara to 
recognise the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus or face veto at Brussels625. In the run up 
to the Brussels European Council therefore opposition to the Turkish case remained 
entrenched at public and elite level. 
However, at the Brussels European Council , the actions of the member states did not reflect 
this opposition. The reforms undertaken in Turkey, particularly since Copenhagen in 2002, 
had neutralised the opposition of those member states opposed to Turkey on normative 
grounds. They had had to concede that progress had been made and needed to be 
encouraged further. This was particularly persuasive when the geostrategic case, including 
9/11, was added – that Turkey was too important to reject. Such narrative was common 
amongst Turkey’s advocates. 
"If Europe ends up by refusing Turkey, it would risk seeing it being 
rocked by a radical Islam and joining up with Iraq and Syria to form a 
threatening unity at its borders." 626 
 
                                               
623 Valerie Giscard D’Estaing, Financial Times, November 25th 2004, A better European bridge to 
Turkey. 
624 Financial Times, November 9th 2004, France calls for fall back option in Turkish EU negotiations. 
625 Xinhua News Service, November 21st 2004, Cyprus sets five demands for Turkey's EU aspiration. 
626 Dominique Strauss Kahn, Interview with the Financial Times. November 26th 2004. Socialist 
heavyweight fears Europe 'breakdown' 
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“…after 40 years of promises ...(not opening accession negotiations)  
would have very negative consequences…..in my opinion Turkey's 
membership of the European Union is totally in (the EU’s) interest."627 
The member states were reluctant to be seen as illiberal and there was a feeling amongst 
the member states that they “would not want to be seen as anti-Muslim or some kind of 
racist reason.” 628  
However, Jacques Chirac was forced to make further concessions to his public opinion. In 
early December it was made clear that, at Brussels, Chirac would have three pre-conditions 
for agreeing to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Firstly, that Turkey must be 
prepared to settle for less than full membership if talks failed; secondly that if talks were 
successful the Turkish case would be the subject of referenda in the member states and 
thirdly that the start of talks should be delayed until the second half of 2005 – in order not to 
become entwined with the French referendum on the Lisbon Treaty due in May 2005. 
The Cypriot President Thassos Papadopoulos, who was already unpopular because of the 
Annan Plan referendum629, was maintaining his demands for the Turkish government to 
recognise the Republic of Cyprus before accession negotiations could be opened. Whilst the 
government in Nicosia may have lacked credibility it retained a veto in the European Council 
and “could not simply be ignored”630.  
The nub of the issue was that Turkey was being asked to sign an additional Protocol to the 
Ankara Agreement of 1963 to incorporate the new member states of the fifth enlargement – 
including Cyprus. Nicosia’s intention may, or may not, have been disingenuous but the logic 
of the Cypriot case was so strong as to be very difficult for the EU Commission and the 
Dutch Presidency to ignore given the veto potential of the Republic of Cyprus. How could 
Turkey expect to enter accession negotiations with an institution which included a country it 
                                               
627 Joshka Fischer, quoted by Agence France Press, October 20th 2004. Turkish EU membership 
would be "D-Day" in anti-terror war: German FM. 
628 Senior UK politician A – interview – March 2010.  
629 It was a widely held view in the Commission that Papadopoulos had “cheated” over his stance on 
the Annan Plan referendum - Senior European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
630 Ludlow (2005:14) 
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did not recognise?  This point was made to Ankara by both the EU Commission and the 
Dutch Presidency. It was also accepted in principle in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the AKP leadership. However it remained an extremely sensitive domestic issue and 
was not fully addressed by Ankara or the Dutch Presidency before the Brussels European 
Council and remained unresolved as it began.  
Therefore, as Brussels approached, the member states were being asked to judge the case 
on the basis of a progress report which was largely favourable. In this way, the normative 
objections amongst member states had been neutralised. France remained a key player as 
whilst Jacques Chirac had been obliged to water down his support for Turkey he remained 
an advocate for Ankara in practice. Some member states felt they had been “wrong footed” 
and there was “no way out”631 of offering to open accession talks with Turkey. They felt 
unable to voice residual concerns about religion and economics and were trapped within the 
norms of the European Council which was premised on “politeness” and it would be “quite a 
big thing to be sitting in the Council of Ministers wanting to stop such and such…countries 
would need to look around for support.”632 The reality was that at the Brussels European 
European Council the number of countries willing to be associated with illiberal thinking was 
limited. Austria633 had been appeased with the “open ended” wording of the progress report 
and a deal for Croatia to become an EU candidate634 and Greece was also in favour of 
opening accession negotiations with Turkey. 
However the issue of Cyprus was a trickier political conundrum.  As noted by an unnamed 
EU diplomat, “…the Greek Cypriots wanted to rub the Turks’ noses in it.”635 The the Republic 
of Cyprus’ clever stance meant it was not opposing Turkey but merely asking it to comply 
with the “reasonable” request to recognize the Republic. However, the political sensitivity of 
                                               
631 Senior European Commission official A – interview – April 2009.  
632 Senior UK politician A– interview – March 2010. 
633 The UK FCO had “scant regard” for Austria which had a “nasty party” in power which was a “throw 
back to the siege of Vienna etc….”(Source: Senior UK Diplomat C – interview – April 2010.) 
634 Verheugen was also an old friend of Wolfgang Schussel which had helped make the deal. Senior 
European Commission official D – interview – August 2010.  
635 Financial Times, December 18th 2004, Ankara accepts deal after war of nerves. 
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the outcome of the Annan Plan referendum meant Erdogan could not compromise. In 
advance of the European Council he had insisted that the Cyprus issue was a UN issue and 
“should not be put on the table” at Brussels636. It is ironic therefore that whilst residual 
normative and cultural opposition to the Turkish case was losing strength within the 
European Council it was the “Cyprus issue” which was coming back to haunt the Turkish 
accession negotiations prospects and continued to threaten Turkey’s EU aspiration. 
3.4. The Brussels European Council December 2004. 
The Dutch Prime Minister, Jan Peter Balkenende, believed he had resolved the issue of the 
Additional Protocol and Turkey recognising the Republic of Cyprus with Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in discussions on the evening of Thursday 16th December 2004 (Ludlow 2005). 
Accordingly members of the Dutch team drafted a wording which was then to be attached to 
the Presidency conclusions. Balkenende called a late night press conference on Thursday 
16th December 2004 to announce the good news. He presumed the issue was a fait 
accompli and other issues entirely were planned for Friday morning. However, Balkenende 
misread the Turkish sensitivity on Cyprus and the nuances of eastern Mediterranean politics. 
As (yet another) unnamed ambassador proclaimed at the time, it may have been simply the 
Dutch national trait of plain speaking. “The Dutch only do black-and-white - they don't do 
grey…" 637 
Erdogan was upset by Balkendende’s having told the press that he had “agreed” to 
recognise Cyprus de facto, if not de jure, and for it to be added to the Presidency 
conclusions as an annex.  
“That was a complete shock to (Erdogan) …we were prepared to 
help out over Cyprus, but we didn't expect the deal to be written 
down in those terms. We wanted to keep it out of the limelight."638  
                                               
636 Financial Times, December 8th 2004, Turkey outlines its terms. 
637  December 18th 2004, Financial Times, Ankara accepts deal after war of nerves. 
638  December 18th 2004, Financial Times, Ankara accepts deal after war of nerves. 
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Erdogan harangued Balkenende on the fifth floor of the European Council’s Justus Lipsius 
building in Brussels until the early hours of Friday 17th December 2004. Erdogan accused 
Balkenende of bias against Turkey and of “choosing 600,000 Greek Cypriots over 70m 
Turks”639. Erdogan also resented the restrictions on free movement of people and farm 
subsidies even though these conditions had been “cleared with (the Turks) beforehand...” by 
the UK diplomatic team640. They had been very careful to ensure there were enough 
preconditions to keep the member states on side and that the Turks could accept the terms 
of the deal. However the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus was the deal-breaker and 
Erdogan “almost blew it with mercurial behaviour and demands and language…”641 
Overnight a compromise was worked out at diplomatic level between the Dutch Presidency 
and the Turks642 by which the Turkish government would indicate that they intended to sign 
the Protocol recognising the Republic of Cyprus before negotiations actually began but 
would not be required to do so immediately. Erdogan agreed to this but later on Friday 17th 
December 2004 announced he was leaving for the airport that afternoon – before anything 
official was signed. Tony Blair and Gerhard Schroeder were despatched to resolve the 
situation643 and “…thanks to (Blair’s) intervention Erdogan did not leave the Justus Lipsius 
building…”644 and eventually agreed to sign645 if it was made clear that member states did 
not consider signing the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement to be the same as formal 
recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Tony Blair had anticipated the difficulty of the Brussels 
negotiations and had asked Sir Peter Westmacott to attend because of his trusted 
relationship with the AKP leadership646. Westmacott was with Blair as he “patrolled the 
                                               
639  December 18th 2004, Financial Times, Ankara accepts deal after war of nerves. See also Ludlow 
(2005). 
640 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
641 Senior UK politician C – interview – September 2010.  
642 By a Dutch and Turkish diplomat who just happened to be old friends (Ludlow 2005).  
643 Silvio Berlusconi was also present having invited himself along – Ludlow 2005:33. 
644 Ludlow (2005:34). 
645 “Tony Blair more or less persuaded Erdogan personally to (sign the accession agreement).” - 
Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010.  
646 Senior UK Diplomat E – interview – May 2010.  
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corridors ….to find Erdogan”647 and with his help Blair “more or less persuaded Erdogan 
personally to sign the documents.”648 Jacques Chirac649 was called upon to reign in the 
Cypriot zeal on the Friday morning. When Papadopoulos seemed inclined to push his case 
for Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus Chirac said: 
“Mon cher Thassos – we don’t do that sort of thing around here.”650  
Conclusion 
It has already been established in Chapters Three and Four that structural geostrategic 
changes in Europe in the late 1990s led to the offer of EU candidacy to Turkey in December 
1999. Furthermore this offer then set in train several processes which served to 
incrementally upgrade the Turkish case within the EU and also encouraged pro-EU actors 
within Turkey to start the process of constitutional reform. It is argued here that these 
processes, coupled with the continuing geostrategic considerations, meant that the 
Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 were 
obliged to deal with Turkey in a more sympathetic manner than might otherwise have been 
the case. 
Furthermore the resulting compromise wording reinforced the previous emphasis on the 
Copenhagen criteria and placed the European Commission in the role of arbiter in the 
Turkish case. This created an opportunity for purposeful advocacy of the Turks. It was 
purposeful because of the emphasis which had been repeatedly placed by the European 
Union on the pivotal role of the Copenhagen criteria as conditions for entry. Having reiterated 
that Turkey would be treated as a state like any other on the basis of these criteria how 
would the EU be able to refuse Turkey if it subsequently met them? In this way the 
purposeful agency by Turkey’s advocates within the EU could become rhetorical entrapment 
                                               
647 Senior UK politician C – interview – September 2010.  
648 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
649 Chirac had already taken a political gamble by backing the Turkish case and took a “personal hit” 
as a result. (Source: Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010.) 
650 Ludlow (2005:33) 
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(Schimmelfennig 2009) at the 2004 Brussels European Council . While the structural 
geostrategic issues of enlargement, Cyprus and ESDP were influential on processes along 
the way – and continued to be so to some extent - ultimately they were a secondary issue to 
the process and agency of rhetorical entrapment at Brussels. 
This chapter then has concentrated on the time period between 2002 and 2004. It has 
sought to outline the processes and agency which led to the rhetorical entrapment of the 
member states at the Brussels European Council . It is argued that there was an attempt 
over this time within Turkey, and by advocates outside of it, to “tick the boxes” of the 
Copenhagen criteria in order to oblige member states to acquiesce to opening accession 
negotiations with Turkey. 
The structural issues which were so influential at the Helsinki and Copenhagen European 
Councils were still in evidence at Brussels but had changed character. After May 2004 the 
accession of the CEEC enlargement round, including Cyprus and Malta, took the urgency 
out of the need to find a solution to the Cyprus issue before Greek Cyprus acceded as that 
was now a fait accompli. Furthermore the post-Cold War legacy of ESDP, which was a 
flagship policy at Helsinki and Copenhagen, had been usurped by the events of September 
11th 2001, the “war on terror” security environment and the subsequent Iraq war.  
Having said that, 9/11, and associated events, had highlighted Turkey’s geostrategic value 
as a Muslim democracy and also as a country bordering the Middle East. When making his 
case for the progress report within the Commission in September and October 2004 Gunther 
Verheugen drew heavily upon Turkey’s geostrategic value and the dangers of repeating the 
mistakes of Luxembourg in 1997. Similarly those member states which had advocated 
Turkey were doing so from continuing geostrategic motives. Nevertheless the influence of 
geostrategic issues on member state policy making at Brussels was considerably less than 
had been the case at either Helsinki or Copenhagen. 
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The outcome of the period 2002-2004 can be understood more through process and agency 
than just structure. It was the effect of previous decisions, influenced by structure and 
process, which had made the agency possible. In other words, the process from Helsinki to 
Brussels was path dependent. The Helsinki European Council elevated Turkey to candidate 
status which encouraged reform in Turkey and embedded Turkey within the EU’s 
institutional and bureaucratic structure. The very fact that it was a candidate, coupled with 
the on-going security considerations, put Turkey high on the agenda at Copenhagen in 2002 
and, with the need to keep Turkey on side for the sake of Cyprus and ESDP, contributed to 
the conciliatory wording of the Presidency conclusions in December 2002 which raised 
Ankara’s status further. They stated unambiguously that a decision would be taken in 
December 2004 based on whether the Commission considered Turkey to have met the 
Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’s advocates capitalised on this sequence of events. 
It is important to note here that there was no suggestion of trying to circumvent the 
Copenhagen criteria merely of trying to maximize the chances of Turkey actually meeting it – 
or coming closer to doing so. To this end the Turkish government was advised by both the 
UK Embassy in Ankara and the European Commission Representation to Ankara. There 
was considerable overlap between these two bodies thanks to the “well placed Brits” within 
the Commission such that both the Commission and the FCO were working in parallel 
towards the same end and from the same motivation.  
The upshot of this serendipitously symbiotic policymaking was that Turkey was helped to 
make progress and specifically of the kind that would tick the boxes of the Copenhagen 
criteria. By the autumn of 2004, after some skilful politicking by Gunther Verheugen, Turkey 
had done enough to enable the Commission to decide that it had “sufficiently fulfilled” the 
criteria (helped by the on-going structural security issues651). This reassured those member 
states which had previously opposed Turkey on normative grounds and rhetorically 
                                               
651 When making his case for the progress report within the Commission in September and October 
2004 Gunther Verheugen drew heavily upon Turkey’s geostrategic value and the dangers of 
repeating the mistakes of Luxembourg in 1997. 
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entrapped those which remained opposed to Turkey on cultural grounds but were reluctant 
to say so in public. The phrase “sufficiently fulfilled” was used again in the Presidency 
conclusions at the 2004 Brussels European Council . 
“(The European Council has) decided that, in the light of 
the…..Commission report and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession 
negotiations….”652 
In this way the actors pressing Turkey’s case worked within the norms of the EU, and indeed 
used the norms of the EU strategically, to further what they considered to be their own self-
interest. Structural security issues were present but were not as predominant as at Helsinki 
and Copenhagen. Instead the outcome can be explained through the instrumental rhetorical 
entrapment of some member states which remained sceptical about, or hostile to, the 
Turkish case by those actors who were convinced of the wider geostrategic benefits doing 
so. The Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council  – influenced by 
structural factors – and its ensuing processes had presented an opportunity to Turkey’s 
advocates within the European Union to rhetorically entrap the other member states.  
It was understood by the advocates that if Turkey could make significant progress the 
remaining reluctant member states would not be able to say no to accession negotiations 
because the EU had previously committed itself to that criterion and built its whole post-Cold 
War identity upon it. For this reason it was worthwhile for Turkey’s advocates to put in the 
effort to help the AKP make the necessary progress as there was a good chance that 
Turkey’s opponents would be “rhetorically entrapped” by their own previous normative 
statements. In addition, to say no after Turkey had made such politically risky progress 
would have risked destabilising the eastern Mediterranean area and also undermining the 
EU’s credibility as a liberal institution.  
                                               
652 Brussels EU Council December 2004 Presidency conclusions. Section 22. See Appendix V. 
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It is certainly ironic that the very conditions which it had initially been presumed would keep 
Turkey on the periphery of Europe – the Copenhagen criteria - ultimately obliged the 
member states to open accession negotiations. The member states were passively 
rhetorically entrapped within their own identity, and by their previous decisions, and crucially 
they were actively rhetorically entrapped by the actions of other EU member states.  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to account for the unprecedented progress which the Turkish EU 
accession process made between 1999 and 2004. Neither before nor since this time has the 
Turkish case made such strides forward. However this progress was not the result of Turkey 
suddenly becoming a popular option. Its unpopularity, based within both normative 
objections to Turkey’s record of human rights and democracy and also “cultural”, economic 
and demographic concerns, has been broadly constant since it first applied in 1959. In fact, 
the very fact that both normative and cultural concerns remain strong in 2012 adds weight to 
the question of why and how Turkey was able to make such progress between 1999 and 
2004.   
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So the question which has been addressed here is: What happened in and around the EU 
Turkish accession process between 1999 and 2004 to enable the outcome of the Brussels 
European Council in 2004? In order to address this issue it has been necessary to consider 
whether the outcome was due to events within the EU, its member states, the Turkish 
government or whether it was due to structural factors. In other words, was the change due 
to structure, process or agency?  
The evidence presented here suggests all three factors contributed to Turkey’s progress 
between 1999 and 2004. It uses a Historical Institutionalist temporal approach to posit an 
explanation of why and how this happened: the decision to offer candidacy to Turkey in 1999 
was influenced by structural considerations and started a series of path dependent 
processes which created an opportunity for agency and led to the decision by the member 
states at Brussels five years later to open accession negotiations with Turkey.  
This path dependence was both material, in terms of the time and money invested in Turkey 
by the EU, and ideational in terms of the stress placed on the Copenhagen criteria. 
Furthermore the combination of on-going geostrategic structural considerations and these 
path dependent processes put the Turkish case onto the agenda at the Copenhagen 2002 
European Council and obliged still reluctant member states to compromise with Ankara and 
agree to a date for “talks about talks” two years hence. This then enabled Turkey’s 
advocates within the EU to actively progress the Turkish case by advising and helping 
Turkey to meet the Copenhagen criteria thereby “rhetorically entrapping” the member states 
at Brussels in 2004. A process can thus be traced back from Brussels to Helsinki in 1999.  
The explanation lies in the complex interaction of structure, process and agency during this 
time. All were present throughout and influenced each other but the relative influence of 
each was not static and altered through time. Fundamentally, however, it is important to note 
that processes cannot be seen in isolation. It is necessary to consider the structural 
considerations which influenced the EU member state decision-making and the agency of 
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some EU member states. This argument is an extension of that about the CEEC 
enlargement process which highlighted the role of the European Commission and its 
“principled policy advocates” who ratcheted up the CEEC case and delegitimised opposition 
to it (Sedelmeier 2005:9). Similarly it echoes the argument that those EU member states with 
residual opposition to CEEC enlargement were hampered by not wanting to appear contrary 
to the fundamental principles of the EU (O’Brennan 2006:180). 
This conclusion will explore these issues in more detail. It will firstly look at the empirical 
findings of Chapters Three, Four and Five before going on to assess the role of structure, 
process and agency. It will also look at how well the process tracing methodology has 
served to provide evidence for the explanation offered by the theoretical approach of 
Historical Institutionalism. Lastly, it will examine the time period from 2004 until the present 
day and suggest a future research agenda. It concludes ultimately that the combination of 
circumstances - structure, process and agency - which broke the previous stalemate and 
facilitated progress between 1999 and 2004 was a window of opportunity which has now 
closed.  
1. Empirical Findings 
As described in Chapter One, the object of the empirical research in this thesis is to 
establish the validity or otherwise of the following propositions: 
Firstly, structural changes, including the end of the Cold War, geopolitical pressures and 
domestic changes made possible the acceptance of Turkey as a candidate between 1997 
and 1999. 
Secondly, the process of engagement that began in 1999 then enabled a combination of 
incremental commitment, purposeful advocacy and rhetorical entrapment to create the 
conditions in which Turkey was accepted as a negotiating partner for accession in 2004. 
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Thirdly, this same process of engagement enabled the specific problems of Cyprus, ESDP 
and security cooperation to be by-passed or defused in such a way that negotiation for 
accession could start even without their solution. 
This has been approached through looking at the time period 1999-2004 and specifically at 
the processes leading up to three major European Councils in that time – Helsinki 1999, 
Copenhagen 2002 and Brussels 2004. This section will revisit the conclusions from these 
chapters before returning to evaluate the propositions. 
1.1. Helsinki 
As highlighted previously, the decision of the Helsinki European Council to offer candidacy to 
Turkey was perhaps a surprising one considering the outcome of the Luxembourg European 
Council just two years before. Chapter Three sought to explain this abrupt change of policy 
by the EU towards its longest-standing applicant.   
It concluded that the EU’s stance on Turkey at Helsinki had been driven by its response to 
the changing geostrategic landscape in Europe following the end of the Cold War. The 
instability of the Balkans in the 1990s in general, and the horror of the Bosnian conflict in 
particular, created a determination that it should not be allowed to happen again on the 
European continent. This had two consequences: firstly, it led to the St Malo agreement 
between France and the UK which created a path for an EU based security and defence 
policy. Secondly, it expedited the CEEC enlargement programme.  
The smooth progress of both the CEEC enlargement round and what would become ESDP 
required the cooperation of Turkey and therefore the more sympathetic consideration of the 
Turkish case for EU accession in early 1999. With regard to CEEC enlargement the EU had 
no choice but to include Greek Cyprus because otherwise Greece would not support it. 
However it was reluctant to admit Greek Cyprus as part of a divided island653. Therefore it 
                                               
653 This would have meant importing into EU jurisdiction one of the world’s most intractable border 
disputes. 
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was seen as preferable to find a solution to the Cyprus issue before the CEEC enlargement 
round was finalized and that required some form of cooperation with Turkey.  
ESDP on the other hand required the cooperation of Turkey because whilst the EU member 
states were increasingly keen to develop an autonomous security capability within the EU 
they did not want to pay for separate facilities. In other words it was always the case as 
ESDI developed into ESDP that it would require access to NATO capability over which 
Turkey had some influence. The prospect of conflict in Kosovo in early 1999 added urgency 
to both of these issues: There was a perceived need to maintain stability in the Balkans and 
eastern Mediterranean and the need to find some way of closing the animosity between 
Greece and Turkey as NATO allies.  
For all of these reasons, in the year before Helsinki, it was necessary to undo the umbrage 
taken by Turkey following the “rejection” of it at the Luxembourg European Council in 1997. 
Tony Blair had already extended Lord Hannay’s role as Cyprus conciliator to include an EU 
remit during the 1998 UK EU Presidency654. Much of the problem at Luxembourg had been 
caused by on-going mistrust by Turkey of EU motives because of the Cyprus issue and 
because Turkish politicians conflated the issues of EU accession and NATO expecting one 
(EU accession) to act as quid pro quo for the other (Turkey’s contribution to NATO since 
World War 2). However, EU actors such as Jean-Claude Juncker of Luxembourg had also 
failed, as EU President, to appreciate, or had decided to ignore, the role of Greece and the 
nuances of the EU’s geostrategic considerations vis a vis Turkey.  
The member states, in 1999, found themselves obliged to reconsider the Turkish case anew 
and were gradually persuaded that it was in the interests of the EU as a whole to offer 
candidacy to Turkey. In other words, some placation of Turkey was necessary in order to 
smooth the passage of the NATO operation in Kosovo as well as both ESDP and CEEC 
enlargement. At the same time however it was not thought possible that Turkey could 
                                               
654Hannay was also made Tony Blair’s personal envoy to Turkey in 1998 (Hannay 2005: 84) 
231 
 
become a candidate without some sort of acknowledgement of the Copenhagen criteria 
which could not simply be ignored. To this end, the Turkish government was encouraged by 
Gerhard Schroeder to put in writing that it understood changes would need to be made in 
Turkey before it could be considered as a candidate. The resulting “Ecevit Letter” of May 
1999 played an important part in persuading sceptical member states, such as the Dutch 
and the Scandinavian countries, to overlook their normative misgivings about Turkey.  
Such misgivings were also mollified by the high conditionality of the Helsinki European 
Council Presidency conclusions. Turkey was reassured that it would be treated as a “state 
like any other”, according to the Copenhagen criteria, with the intention of reassuring Ankara 
of the EU’s inherent fairness. Hidden within this however was the insincerity of intent 
highlighted effectively by Font (2005). Those member states which retained misgivings 
(although not necessarily outright objections) were reassured that whilst the EU was offering 
candidacy the process could not progress unless Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria. 
Therefore either the grounds for their misgivings would have been solved by definition or 
Turkey would not make it that far. It was the latter which was assumed to the case. In this 
way the member states offered candidacy to Turkey in order to be able to manage the 
Cyprus issue and, to a lesser extent, ESDP in the wider interests of the EU and Europe655. It 
was not thought possible in 1999 that Turkey would make significant progress towards the 
Copenhagen criteria in the short or medium term.  
However, the high conditionality of the Helsinki European Council Presidency conclusions 
set in stone the undertaking that Turkey would be treated as a “state like any other”. In other 
words, if it met the Copenhagen criteria it would be eligible to open accession negotiations. 
The very condition which, it was presumed, would keep Turkey at bay from the EU ultimately 
facilitated the opening of accession negotiations.  
                                               
655 The Kosovo conflict had passed by this time. Arguably its primary role had been to help create the 
political will to maintain harmony in the eastern Mediterranean and to expedite ESDP – both of which 
required Turkish cooperation. 
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Others (Robins 2003a; Onis 2000) have argued that the change of heart at Helsinki can be 
attributed to the election of more sympathetic governments in Greece and Germany at that 
time and the rapprochement after the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in August and 
September 1999. However, I consider these to be serendipitous factors but not the primary 
causes of the Helsinki decision. The German government of Gerhard Schroeder acted as it 
did because it had been convinced of the geostrategic argument in favour of Turkish 
accession. Conversely whilst Costas Simitis and George Papandreou were undoubtedly 
more conciliatory than their predecessors, and political opponents, in terms of Turkish 
candidacy they gave very little ground on the vital issue of Cyprus which ultimately almost 
scuppered the proceedings at Helsinki and necessitated Verheugen and Solana to fly to 
Ankara to persuade Bulent Ecevit to return with them.  
Instead, the evidence suggests that it was wider geostrategic need which led to the change 
in EU policy towards Ankara at Helsinki. Turkey was no more, or less, popular than it had 
been at Luxembourg but the wider security environment had changed which caused a need 
for the Turkish aspiration – which was deep-rooted and heartfelt – to be “managed” rather 
than dismissed or postponed. This was done by making it clear to Ankara that reform was a 
necessary precursor to accession and a statement of intention to reform was a precursor to 
candidacy. Such action by Ankara however was prompted by an EU actor, namely Germany. 
The Schroeder government was clearly acting to enable candidacy to take place for 
geostrategic reasons656.  
Thus, actors within the EU were working to bring Turkey up to a certain standard (the 
Copenhagen criteria) but were not seeking to relax the criteria in spite of the geostrategic 
imperative. Therefore, the only way progress was possible was if Turkey demonstrated that 
it was prepared to change to meet the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover the EU reiterated its 
commitment to the Copenhagen criteria in the Helsinki European Council Presidency 
                                               
656 This was an early indication of the type of agency which would become more in evidence after 
2002. 
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conclusions. Many member states remained unconvinced that Turkey would ever meet the 
criteria and this was a factor, ironically, in their agreeing to candidacy. However, the very act 
of re-iterating the conditionality so heavily in the Turkish case would mean, five years later, 
that options vis a vis the Turkish case were limited. 
1.2. Copenhagen 
The road to Copenhagen was one of frustration for those parties trying to advance the 
Turkish case. Both ESDP and Cyprus had proved intractable since Helsinki and the 
Copenhagen European Council began without solutions to either. This situation was to prove 
highly influential on its outcome. 
In fact the difficulties of Copenhagen in 2002 can be traced back to the “legacy” of the 1999 
Helsinki European Council. Whilst Turkey achieved candidacy at Helsinki it did not have the 
reassurance on ESDP which it had wanted657. Ankara was deeply insecure about where it 
fitted into the ESDP framework and this was exacerbated by the USA also being outside of 
the decision-making process in ESDP.  
Bulent Ecevit’s government deeply mistrusted Greece and was very ready to suspect 
skulduggery by Athens. This made the ESDP issue highly politically sensitive and difficult to 
resolve. The situation was exacerbated by the vagueness of the Helsinki decisions on ESDP 
which resulted in an atmosphere of ambiguity and mistrust between the EU and the USA 
and Turkey.   
The belligerence and suspicion engendered by the ESDP issue did not make Bulent Ecevit’s 
government inclined to exert the necessary pressure on the TRNC President, Rauf Denktash, 
to make progress on the Cyprus issue. Neither the EU nor Turkey was apparently acting in 
its own perceived “best interest” at this time. The EU was not able to drop its normative 
                                               
657 Bulent Ecevit was also deeply unsettled over agreement with the Republic of Cyprus that its future 
progression in the enlargement process was not linked to a settlement on the Cyprus issue.  
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concerns even in a wider geostrategic interest658 and Turkey was not willing to be flexible on 
either ESDP or Cyprus when progress on either would have helped its EU ambitions. This 
situation reflected the slightly artificial atmosphere of the Helsinki European Council where 
issues had been resolved to achieve the short term aim but there was no underlying 
resolution to either ESDP or the Cyprus issue. Mistrust remained on both sides as EU actors 
believed Turkey was trying to get into the EU through the back door of ESDP and Turkey 
was convinced Greece was working vicariously to gain the upper hand on Cyprus and in the 
eastern Mediterranean659.  The long-standing Turco-Greek mistrust had been exacerbated 
at Helsinki by the de-linking of Greek Cypriot accession from the need to find a solution to 
the Cyprus issue. This removed any incentive for the Greek Cypriots to cooperate at the 
same time as raising Turkish suspicions of trickery afoot660.  
In this way, efforts to solve both the ESDP “problem of Turkey” and the Cyprus issue 
continued but failed to find resolution in advance of the Copenhagen European Council in 
December 2002. These efforts were primarily under the auspices of the UK, as a member 
state, rather than the EU as a whole. Lord Hannay661 was a personal envoy for Tony Blair 
based within the Number 10 Downing Street office and his efforts on Cyprus are well 
documented (Hannay 2005). However, the FCO was also busy behind the scenes on ESDP 
as efforts were made, led by the senior diplomat, Sir Emyr Jones Parry, to break the 
deadlock, with American backing, of the “problem of Turkey” within NATO and ESDP. The 
UK was instrumental in making efforts to break the deadlock on Cyprus and ESDP both for 
the sake of NATO, ESDP and the EU enlargement process.  
Both Cyprus and ESDP were crucial issues for the EU at Copenhagen. ESDP had become a 
high status, flagship, project and the EU had committed itself to Operation Concordia - taking 
                                               
658 For example to carry over Turkey’s de facto privileged WEU status into ESDP. 
659 Turkish anxiety was that ESDP – and NATO capability – could theoretically be used against it to 
resolve a dispute over Cyprus or Imia/Kardak., 
660 For the Republic of Cyprus’ point of view on this issue see Melkopides (2006) 
661 By this time Hannay was back to working for the UK FCO. His EU “remit” had ended with the UK 
presidency in June 1998.  
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over from NATO’s Operation Amber Fox – in March 2003 and wanted to do this with access 
to NATO capability. Member state leaders arrived at Copenhagen with this crucial point still 
under discussion. Similarly Copenhagen was to be the final decision point for the CEEC 
enlargement round – including Malta and Greek Cyprus. The EU had remained keen to find 
a solution to the Cyprus issue before it was imported into its jurisdiction. For both of these 
reasons therefore at Copenhagen it was necessary to assuage Turkish concerns. 
However, the government of Bulent Ecevit had not made significant progress towards 
meeting the Copenhagen criteria since the Helsinki European Council. Ecevit’s political 
culture and personal involvement662 meant it was 2001 before the Ecevit government even 
attempted to pass reforms. By this time Ecevit’s health was failing and Turkey was in the 
throes of a major economic crisis requiring IMF intervention. Much of 2002 was spent in 
political stagnation before an internal rebellion within Ecevit’s “Democratik Sol Party” meant 
an election was called. The majority of the constitutional reforms were passed in July 2002 
after the dissolution of parliament by MPs who had stayed behind in Ankara rather than 
returning to the campaign trail before the November election. 
Whilst the sum total of reforms passed in Turkey was nowhere near enough to pacify the 
normative concerns of the EU member states, the passing of some reforms was to prove 
significant as a bargaining tool on Turkey’s behalf at the Copenhagen Council meeting. It 
demonstrated a considerable political will on Turkey’s behalf to pass more reforms and this 
was regarded favourably by the EU Commission and the more sympathetically inclined 
member states. Moreover, the UK Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Peter Westmacott, had 
established strong links with the AKP during 2002 and ascertained that it was willing, and 
able, to implement further reforms should it be elected. Whilst neither ESDP nor Cyprus 
were solved before the Copenhagen European Council, the UK went to Copenhagen with 
the knowledge that the AKP was a marked departure from previous Turkish governments -
particularly that of Bulent Ecevit.  
                                               
662 He had been the Prime Minister in 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus.  
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At Copenhagen, whilst Tony Blair was not able to convince his fellow member states that 
Turkey had done enough to go forward to accession status he was able to make a case to 
the other member state leaders that Turkey was too geostrategically significant to be side-
lined as at Luxembourg. Therefore some form of words was necessary to keep the Turks on-
side and to maintain the reform process under the AKP. In other words if the member states 
wanted to have any chance of solving the Cyprus issue before Greek Cyprus acceded, or to 
be able to launch Operation Concordia effectively in three months’ time, they would have to 
make concessions to Turkey at Copenhagen.  
In accordance with the prevalent EU identity at that time these concessions did not lower the 
conditionality attached to the Turkish case. On the contrary, the need for reforms in 
accordance with the Copenhagen criteria was highlighted. However, the Presidency 
conclusions in 2002 did incrementally, and inadvertently, increase the commitment to Turkey 
by making future Turkish progress dependent on a favourable report from the European 
Commission in October 2004. This was a compromise negotiated by Tony Blair who was 
then also able to convince Erdogan and Gul that this compromise, far from being another 
“snub” to Turkey, was an opportunity. 
 
1.3. Brussels 
The diplomacy in evidence at the Copenhagen European Council was able to keep the 
Turkish government “on side” enough for CEEC enlargement to go through, including Greek 
Cyprus, and for the NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana, to find enough of a solution to 
the “problem of Turkey” on the side-lines at the Copenhagen European Council to pave the 
way for Operation Concordia663 three months later. The consequence of the need to find 
                                               
663 Operation Concordia began on 31st March 2003. It was designed to create and maintain the 
political and security conditions in Macedonia in which the 2001 Ohrid Peace Agreement between the 
FYRoM and its Albanian minority population could be implemented. The operation used NATO assets 
and lasted until December 2003. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-
operations/completed-eu-operations/concordia.aspx?lang=en 
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such expedient solutions to these wider structural issues however was a marked increase in 
the conditionality involved in the Turkish case in order to secure continuing cooperation by 
the Turks. The need to compromise meant the member states were reluctant to say “no” to 
Turkey. Instead they reiterated the treatment of Turkey as a state “like any other” and 
delayed a decision for two years to be dependent on the forthcoming Commission October 
2004 Opinion on Turkey’s progress. 
At Copenhagen, Erdogan and Gul were dissatisfied by this wording as it fell short of what 
they had repeatedly demanded. However, they were placated by the UK delegation on the 
basis that the conclusions were an opportunity and, if Turkey made substantial further 
progress, the member states would be obliged to agree to open accession negotiations 
when they met at Brussels two years hence. EU “identity” was such that if Turkey could 
make this constitutional progress, many member states would find it hard to “renege” on a 
deal made in good faith and would be able to see that the progress in Turkey was in the 
wider interests of the EU and its member states anyway. 
Soon after the Copenhagen European Council the AKP was struggling to deal with the 
impending Iraq conflict – and Ankara’s relationship with Washington – which inevitably 
pushed the vital issues of EU accession and Cyprus down the agenda of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Ankara. The Turkish parliament’s vote against cooperation with the US on 
Iraq effectively wiped out the goodwill of the Bush administration towards Turkey for several 
years. 
Conversely however, Turkey’s stance on the Iraq issue may have helped its case within the 
EU where many member states – including France and Germany – had misgivings about the 
“war on terror”. The UK maintained its allegiance with the USA on the issue but also 
continued to work on the geostrategic basis that a Turkey within the EU was better than one 
outside of it. The UK Ambassador in Ankara, Sir Peter Westmacott, continued his very 
effective diplomacy in Ankara advising the Erdogan government on which policies to pursue 
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to maximize effectiveness within the EU – such as women’s rights – and how to sell these 
policies to a socially-conservative support base and public opinion. At the same time the 
European Commission was also working effectively in Ankara towards a similar end. 
It helped enormously that the Enlargement Commissioner Gunther Verheugen had become 
convinced of the geostrategic case for opening accession negotiations with Turkey and 
apparently had the backing of the European Commission President, Romano Prodi. 
Verheugen’s Deputy Director General for DG Enlargement, Michael Leigh, was a “Brit” as 
was Simon Mordue, one of Verheugen’s “best people” who worked for the European 
Commission’s Ankara delegation and subscribed to the same view of geostrategic benefit. 
There was a synergetic relationship between the UK FCO and the European Commission 
which meant they were working to the same end from broadly the same motivation with 
national and ideological links in common. In this way, once the initial political trauma of the 
Iraq war had receded, the AKP government was able to make more progress in the two 
years between 2002 and 2004 than ever before towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria.  
In the meantime the structural concerns which had dominated at Helsinki and Copenhagen 
had both receded and changed their character. The issues which had been prominent in 
1999 – Kosovo and the Balkans - been usurped by the “war on terror” in general and the Iraq 
conflict in particular. ESDP suddenly seemed an old-hat solution to a new non-state security 
problem. The EU’s enlargement and security policies in eastern Europe and the Balkans 
(including Operation Concordia) had had the desired effect of stabilizing the area.  
The Cyprus issue remained a concern until the Annan Plan referendum in April 2004. Prior 
to that, the EU, working vicariously through the UN, had continued to hope for a solution 
before the accession of Greek Cyprus. However the vote by the Greek Cypriots against the 
Annan Plan in April 2004 ended this hope. It had been predictable, and perhaps inevitable, 
since the decision at Helsinki four and a half years earlier not to insist on a solution to the 
Cyprus issue as a pre-condition of Greek Cypriot EU accession. After the referendum 
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outcome it was obvious that it would not be possible for solution to the Cyprus issue to be 
found before Greek Cyprus acceded and the urgency faded. Ironically however the political 
damage this potentially caused to the AKP may have ultimately worked in its favour. Latterly, 
Turkey had cooperated on the Cyprus issue and the ultimate belligerence appeared to have 
been on the Greek Cypriot side especially after the election in which Thassos Papadopolous 
ousted Glafkos Clerides in February 2004. There was certainly a feeling within both the UK 
FCO and the European Commission that the AKP had been hard done by and deserved 
some allowances to be made as a quid pro quo. Furthermore whilst the structural issues had 
changed, the new security environment also highlighted Turkey’s geopolitical value and the 
need to keep it on side with the EU. 
The Brussels European Council approached in 2004 with the Turkish application 
precariously placed. On the one hand it had made considerable advances towards the 
Copenhagen criteria but on the other it still did not meet the criteria. However, the 
constitutional reforms which had been made enabled Gunther Verheugen to argue within the 
European Commission that Turkey had “sufficiently fulfilled” the Copenhagen criteria. The 
Cyprus issue too had positive and negative connotations. The outcome of the Cyprus 
referendum on the Annan Plan in April had left the situation in Turkey vis a vis Cyprus highly 
febrile and the AKP simply unable to make further concessions to the EU particularly on the 
Cyprus issue but the referendum outcome had won sympathy for Turkey within the 
European Commission and with sympathetically inclined member states.  However, in spite 
of these advances, obstacles remained. There was still considerable opposition to the 
Turkish case in both public and elite opinion in several EU member states including France. 
Additionally, the Greek Cypriot government,664 of Thassos Papadopoulos, was prepared to 
push the Turks to the limit in order to scupper the wider objective of opening accession 
negotiations with Ankara. The Greek Cypriot strategy was to make its assent conditional on 
the Turks recognizing all EU member states before accession negotiations opened. 
                                               
664 NB: Not the Greek government which had signalled its assent. 
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Papadopoulos was well aware that asking Erdogan to recognise Greek Cyprus there and 
then was not politically possible for the AKP.  
The question remains then – why did none of the member states veto the option? There are 
two strands to the answer to this question. Firstly, the UK assumption in 2002 had been 
proved right. The normative concerns against Turkey of the majority of the member states 
had been sufficiently met by Turkey’s constitutional reforms for their influence to have 
diminished. There was a strong logic that whilst Turkey did not actually meet the 
Copenhagen criteria the incentive of EU accession had achieved an enormous amount since 
Helsinki in 1999 and encouraging it further was in the wider interest of the EU. Crucially 
however, in addition to this ameliorating effect of the reforms on normative concerns on 
countries such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavians, the leading member states 
countries – Germany and France - remained convinced enough of the geostrategic case to 
carry on regardless of hostile public and elite opinion. Similarly the UK was not deterred by 
the AKP’s slightly erratic start to its foreign policy career over transit lines to Iraq. Meanwhile, 
Austria was restricted by a desire not to appear racist in an EU forum and had been 
appeased by the Croatia deal whereas the belligerence of the Greek Cypriot approach was 
simply not tolerated within the European Council . The result was that it was agreed to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey albeit with the “open-ended” caveat (another concession 
to Austria) and the inclusion of a referendum on Turkish membership in some member 
states before final membership could be granted.  
In terms of the propositions outlined at the beginning of this section the following can be 
concluded. Firstly, structural changes, including the end of the Cold War, changed the 
attitude of the EU member states towards Turkey in the time between the Luxembourg and 
Helsinki European Councils. These geostrategic issues made the member states more 
willing to consider the Turkish case in 1999 in spite of normative and cultural concerns. 
There are two caveats to this point. This relaxing of EU member state attitudes to Turkey in 
1999 was only possible after Turkey had openly acknowledged its intention to reform in the 
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“Ecevit letter”. Therefore, even under geostrategic pressure, there was no suggestion that it 
would be possible for the EU to lower its conditionality for Turkey.  Additionally a large factor 
in the member states being willing to concede candidate status for Turkey was because 
candidacy was so heavily predicated on Ankara meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The 
prevailing view amongst the member states was actually that Turkey would not be able to do 
this in the short or medium term and so further progress was not a realistic possibility. In 
other words the member states felt able to make concessions to Turkey safe in the belief 
that it further progress would not be possible. 
Secondly, it has been shown that the institutional processes initiated by the Helsinki decision 
to offer candidacy enabled a combination of incremental commitment, purposeful advocacy 
and rhetorical entrapment to create the conditions in which Turkey was accepted as a 
negotiating partner for accession in 2004. The involvement of Turkey as a candidate meant it 
was the subject of annual progress reports and recommendations which were automatically 
to be considered by the European Councils. Therefore the EU member states were forced 
into a position whereby, after 1999, they had to take a public stance on the Turkish case 
whereas previously this was not the case. This left them vulnerable to the influences of both 
wider structural factors and the agency of Turkey’s advocates within the EU when it came to 
policy making on Turkey. 
The conclusion here is that, at the Copenhagen European Council, structural factors and the 
agency of the UK, in the persona of the Prime Minister Tony Blair, resulted in the 
compromise wording of the Presidency conclusions. Turkey had not made the progress 
necessary for the opening of accession negotiations to be a fait accompli but the 
geostrategic considerations of CEEC enlargement (and Cyprus) and ESDP’s Operation 
Concordia meant any rebuff could not be put to the Turks in such stark terms. Instead the 
EU resorted to the more diplomatic language of reiterating its adherence to the Copenhagen 
criteria and conceding a date for “talks about talks” two years hence to be decided on the 
basis of the European Commission’s progress report in 2004. It is unlikely such a softly softly 
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approach would have been taken if it had not been for the geostrategic concerns of 2002 
and the skillful diplomacy of the UK. 
The result of this approach however was to create an incentive for the Turkish AKP 
government to press ahead with reforms. The EU had locked itself in to a pledge to judge 
Turkey as a state like any other i.e.: by the Copenhagen criteria. If Turkey could meet the 
challenge of fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria then the EU member states would lose 
credibility if they did not fulfil the obligation, particularly in the light of the ever-present, 
although changing, geostrategic considerations. In other words after the Copenhagen  
European Council, if Turkey made good progress on domestic reform then the EU member 
states would face significant material and ideational costs if they did not agree to open 
accession negotiations. Thus the AKP had an incentive to carry out constitutional reforms665 
and Turkey’s advocates within the EU had an opportunity for meaningful and worthwhile 
advocacy. For the first time it was worth making the effort to help Turkey meet the 
Copenhagen criteria because its further progress now hinged on the opinion of the EU 
Commission in 2004 which would be making a decision strictly in accordance with the 
Copenhagen criteria and in the context of the wider EU liberal identity. 
Finally, whilst these path dependent processes may have been initiated by geostrategic 
concerns and were then helped along by them at Copenhagen it is the case that ultimately 
the process overtook structure in terms of influence on Turkish-EU accession. By 2004 the 
EU was rhetorically entrapped by its previous decisions rather than pressurised by 
geostrategic concerns which had actually slightly subsided. By December 2004 both CEEC 
enlargement and ESDP had been dealt with and were no longer geostrategic priorities. 
However the legacy of previous decisions taken under the influence of these issues lived on. 
                                               
665 Many of which were unpopular with its socially conservative support base in the Anatolian 
hinterland. 
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At the empirical level then this is what has been discovered and now I will look at how 
shaping it according to the conceptual framework of structure, process and agency helps it 
to be framed further. 
2. Structure, process and agency  
The relative influence of structure and agency on process however is not an empirical 
judgment but an ontological one. It is entirely possible to agree on empirical findings but 
disagree on the relative role of structure and agency (Hay 2002: 91). Therefore this section 
will examine how structure and agency, as well as process, contribute to the empirical 
findings already outlined.  
At the end of Chapter Two a series of propositions were set out. The first one asked what 
were the patterns of interaction between structure, process and agency that shaped the 
decisions in 1999 to admit Turkey as a candidate and then in 2004 to open negotiations with 
Turkey. Structure and agency were influential to different degrees at different times on the 
path dependent processes which characterize this time period. In the run up to the Helsinki 
European Council, structural geostrategic considerations were the most influential on EU 
decision making. Geostrategy continued to affect the EU member states’ decision making up 
to Copenhagen and was still influential at Brussels although to a lesser extent. The agency 
of Turkey’s advocates within the EU is also evident throughout the time frame666 but it was 
only after Copenhagen in 2002 that advocacy on Turkey’s behalf could actually achieve the 
opening of accession negotiations. Both structure and agency were influencing the 
processes of path dependence at this time. Structure initiated them and continued to be a 
factor. Furthermore the processes were used strategically by agents to further a self- 
interested course of action. 
The second proposition asked what evidence there was of the impact of critical junctures 
and of path dependency (with its associated forces of increasing returns, self-reinforcement, 
                                               
666 The Ecevit letter in April 1999 and the Istanbul and Ankara letters in 2001 are testament to this. 
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positive feedback and lock-in) in the evolution of EU-Turkey relations during the period 1999-
2004? This proposition asks specifically about the processes involved between 1999 and 
2004 and this will be addressed in more detail in the next section on Historical 
Institutionalism as an approach. In brief however, the Helsinki European Council should be 
seen as a critical juncture because once the offer of candidacy was made to Turkey it was 
increasingly hard thereafter to reverse course. The EU had effectively – although 
unintentionally – committed itself to judging the Turkish case by the Copenhagen criteria. 
The offer of candidacy in itself started processes which made that more likely. It encouraged 
pro-EU actors, within Turkey, and gave Turkey a permanent position on the European 
Council agenda. The EU member states were obliged to publically consider the Turkish case 
at every EU Council. Their decision-making was then affected by the wider structural 
geostrategic concerns working in Turkey’s favour which have already been outlined. This 
combination of process and structure ratcheted up the Turkish case between Helsinki and 
Copenhagen to an extent which was not warranted by the actual progress made by Turkey. 
This interaction of structure and process created an opportunity after the Copenhagen 
European Council for advocates of Turkey within the EU to act on its behalf to help or 
“advise” the Ankara government to meet the Copenhagen criteria. In so doing they made a 
strategic use of EU norms which led to the rhetorical entrapment of the member states at 
Brussels.  However, whilst agency ultimately tipped the balance in Turkey’s favour it was 
preceding events which had created the conditions in which the agency could operate.  
Thirdly the Chapter Two propositions asked what evidence there was of interaction between 
different agents within the process of EU-Turkey relations, and in particular of the interaction 
between member states and European institutions. There was a very close relationship 
between the UK Ambassador to Turkey, Sir Peter Westmacott, and the AKP government. Sir 
Peter became an unofficial advisor to Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul to the extent 
that UK FCO legend has it that they once complained when he was away on annual leave 
and unavailable to answer a query. He was able to advise on which aspects of the criteria 
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they should prioritise in order to maximize the positive impression on the other EU member 
states. Additionally, Westmacott advised on how to sell the changes to a potentially socially 
conservative and nationalist Turkish public opinion667.  
Furthermore the UK FCO operated in tandem with the European Commission officials who 
were working towards the same end and some of whom were “well placed Brits”668. In this 
way the UK FCO and the well placed Brits worked to “….get the Turks into a place where 
they could tick off all the points for joining.”669 It was a strategy based on the premise that if 
Turkey could meet the Copenhagen criteria the EU would be obliged to open accession 
negotiations. Whilst the FCO was involved in hands-on advice and consultancy by 
Ambassador Westmacott to the Turkish government between 2002 and 2004 the 
Commission were working in tandem through the EU Representation in Ankara. Additionally 
Gunther Verheugen worked hard in Brussels to convince his fellow Commissioners that 
Turkey had “sufficiently fulfilled” the Copenhagen Criteria and the Commission also worked 
closely with the French foreign ministry in general and Jacques Chirac in particular670. The 
Commission would not have submitted a positive recommendation on the Turkish case 
without Paris’endorsement and the progress report was approved line by line by the Chirac 
office in advance. There was a happy coincidence of efforts by the three major EU member 
states – the UK, France and Germany – to bring about the opening of accession 
negotiations with Turkey in 2004. However, this agency was only effective because of 
previous processes.  
The last proposition in Chapter Two questioned the evidence for the influence of structure, 
process and agency on Cyprus and ESDP. The conclusion is that structural factors made 
these issues relevant to the Turkey-EU accession process between 1999 and 2004. Indeed 
                                               
667 The AKP at this time was also working within the politically charged atmosphere caused by the 
Cyprus issue and forthcoming referendum. 
668 Such as Michael Leigh and Simon Mordue. 
669 Senior UK Diplomat B – interview – March 2010. 
670 As Senior European Commission official C told me, nothing went in to the 2004 Progress Report 
on Turkey which had not been previously cleared with Jacques Chirac’s office. 
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Turkey would probably not have become a candidate if it had not been for its involvement in 
CEEC enlargement via Cyprus and ESDP. Subsequently this involvement led to concerted 
efforts to solve the Cyprus issue and the “problem of Turkey” for ESDP. So the Turkey-EU 
accession process was a positive influence on efforts to solve these problems. Conversely 
these “problems” help to take the Turkish case forward at Helsinki and Copenhagen and to a 
lesser extent at Brussels. The need not to alienate Turkey, for these reasons, meant the EU 
member states were obliged to treat Ankara with more caution than may otherwise have 
been the case. Ultimately however the decision at Brussels in 2004 was the result of 
rhetorical entrapment rather than a major geostrategic influence (although this was a minor 
factor). The decisive role played by geostrategy was in creating the conditions in which 
agency could operate rather than influencing the final decision. 
The conclusion of this section is that structure initiated processes which gave rise to the 
opportunity for agency. Therefore the 1999 decision was primarily due to structure, although 
agency had played a small part. The 2004 decision was primarily due to agency although 
structure continued to play a small part. Linking the two dates is a complex path dependent 
process on which structural geostrategic considerations and agency were also influential.  
Structural concerns initiated the path dependent processes and both influenced the outcome 
of the Copenhagen European Council which created an opportunity for agency on Turkey’s 
behalf. Whilst the decision to offer candidacy in 1999 was predominantly geostrategic it had 
the unintended consequence of facilitating the Turkish accession process, contributing to the 
creation of a range of circumstances which worked in favour of the Turkish case. This was 
the first time since 1959 that this had been the case. For example, at Helsinki and 
Copenhagen, when in reality the Turkish case was weak as not much progress had been 
made constitutionally, geostrategic considerations pushed it forward regardless. However 
after 2002 real changes did start to be made in terms of constitutional reform in Turkey and 
then the member states found themselves rhetorically entrapped by previous emphasis on 
the Copenhagen criteria. They could not say no to Turkey when it had done a large part of 
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what had been asked of it. Ironically, by this time, the geostrategic issues which had nudged 
the Turkish case previously had receded. Greek Cyprus was already a member of the EU 
and eastern Europe and ESDP had been usurped in the security stakes by the wholly 
different scenarios created by the attacks of September 11th 2001.  
3. Assessing the research framework 
How well has Historical Institutionalism been able to account for the change which can be 
seen in the EU’s policy towards Turkish accession? It has been concluded that the EU’s 
change of heart towards Turkey was the path dependent result of geostrategic influences 
upon its decision making. The fundamental reason for the outcome of Brussels in 2004 was 
that the member states were rhetorically entrapped by decisions taken at previous junctures.  
This process of rhetorical entrapment has been traced back to the decision at Helsinki in 
1999 to make Turkey a candidate of the EU. However it is argued that the Copenhagen 
2002 decision to set a date for talks about talks was also crucial because it served to 
reiterate the importance of the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria. By laying such high 
emphasis on these criteria the EU inadvertently created an opportunity for Turkey and its 
advocates within the EU. In making this argument, the role of both geostrategy and agency 
has been acknowledged. They have also been incorporated within Historical Institutionalism 
albeit a “stretched” version based on the work of Sven Steinmo (2008). This stretched 
version contains the usual elements of an HI approach such as path dependence, self-
reinforcing mechanisms and lock-in but it allows for context to be taken into account and for 
such processes to be based around ideational factors as well as material. HI defined in this 
way has been able to account for the factors involved in this complex real world approach to 
the research puzzle.  
The 1999 Helsinki European Council should be seen as a critical juncture in what follows up 
to the Brussels European Council in 2004. It created a path dependent process linking the 
time span from which it was hard to backtrack.  As outlined above, many of the European 
248 
 
Union member states had always regarded the Luxembourg decision on Turkey as a 
mistake because it failed to recognise that Turkey had a geostrategic value and therefore its 
aspiration needed to be “managed” rather than rebuffed. This imperative became stronger 
as the Kosovo conflict loomed in late 1998 and Turkey’s cooperation was required to 
progress with both ESDP and the CEEC enlargement round including Greek Cyprus. 
Therefore at the Helsinki European Council Turkey was made a formal candidate of the EU 
and the psychological fillip which candidacy gave to its pro-Euro actors was considerable. 
Even though “candidacy” by itself was meaningless to the EU without some form of reform, 
within Turkey it was seen as recognition of Turkey’s right to be a candidate and it 
encouraged pro-EU actors into thinking it was worthwhile for them to make efforts towards 
reform. Bulent Ecevit’s inherent reticence and opposition to the EU meant that this progress 
was not immediate but it began to exist and to gather pace. Therefore Turkey arrived at the 
Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 having made more reforms than ever 
before in its history and with a newly elected government mandated to implement reforms 
necessary for EU accession.  
At the same time, the structural geostrategic factors which had been influential at Helsinki 
continued to influence the decision making on Turkey by the member states. Their options 
were constrained at Copenhagen by the need to solve the “problem of Turkey” for the sake 
of ESDP Operation Concordia and to find a solution to the Cyprus issue before the 
accession of Greek Cyprus. Both ESDP and CEEC enlargement were flagship EU policies 
which had taken on great symbolic importance for the EU and its role in the 21st century.  
The path dependence at play at this time is threefold: Firstly, pro-EU actors in Turkey were 
encouraged by the offer of candidacy at Helsinki and the associated institutional involvement 
which meant reform started to take place. Secondly the institutional involvement made 
Turkey a regular fixture on the agendas of the European Council meetings which meant it 
could not be so easily side lined and had to be addressed. Thirdly, the stress placed by the 
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EU on considering Turkey as a candidate “like any other” in accordance with the 
Copenhagen criteria created a rhetorical trap for the EU.  
These path dependent processes are both material and ideational. There had been material 
investment as a result of Helsinki and also ideational investment in the form of repeated 
emphasis of the Copenhagen criteria. By offering candidacy the EU committed itself to the 
process of progress reports and pre accession agreements which kept Turkey on the 
enlargement agenda. Additionally, the stress on the Copenhagen criteria meant that the EU 
would lose credibility if it reneged on the “deal” to consider Turkey as a candidate like any 
other if Ankara had made the required changes to its Constitution.  
The situation after December 2002 created the opportunity for the agency of Turkey’s 
advocates within the EU to take it further and to actively rhetorically entrap the member 
states. It was the combination of structural and process based circumstances at 
Copenhagen which had led to the highly conditional Presidency conclusions which made the 
agency of rhetorical entrapment worthwhile. Furthermore, the election of the AKP with a pro-
EU mandate, and the UK’s prior knowledge of AKP intentions, made it a worthwhile – 
although not guaranteed – policy for the UK and the Commission. The rhetorical entrapment 
of the member states at Brussels can be traced back to the decision at Helsinki which was 
taken for wider geostrategic reasons and definitely not because the EU wanted to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey five years later.  
It is in the nature of a research puzzle such as this to be complex and to be able to draw on 
an eclectic range of theory crossing the rationalist–reflectivist divide. This has required a 
critical realist epistemology (Wight 2006; 2007a; 2007b) which does not claim to find a 
generalisable “truth” but sets out to provide evidence for a given explanation of a causal 
process on the balance of probabilities. It has therefore been able to draw on the concept of 
path dependence as either material or ideational or both. The Helsinki decision initiated 
material changes in EU policy towards Turkey and encouraged pro EU actors there. It was 
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also ideational in that the emphasis placed on the Copenhagen criteria would serve to 
rhetorically entrap the member states at the Brussels European Council in 2004. It is surely 
ironic then that the very criteria which many member states believed would help to keep 
Turkey out of the EU eventually served to help Ankara claim its place within it.  
Within this path dependence examples of self-reinforcing mechanisms and lock in can be 
seen. The bureaucratic snowball of institutionalization which developed between 1999 and 
2002 was self-reinforcing as Turkey became increasingly bound into the process of 
accession agreements and annual progress reports on which decisions had to be made. The 
repeated recourse made to the Copenhagen criteria as the ultimate means of judging a 
candidate’s suitability meant the EU was then “locked-in” to this process in 2004 when it may 
rather not have been.  
The added value of this study, however, is also to introduce agency into the path dependent 
process. The agency of the UK FCO and some EU actors was possible because of previous 
decisions taken by the EU but also because it was making strategic use of the EU’s norms. 
Ankara’s advocates correctly presumed that Turkey’s residual opponents would be reluctant 
to oppose the Turkish case in open forum if if Ankara had made the requisite reforms. Thus 
by Brussels in 2004 EU decision making vis a vis Turkey was dependent on agency as well 
as structure and process. However the agency was possible because of the structure-
process interaction which preceded it. 
Furthermore the evidence shows that self-interested behaviour, such as that underpinning 
this agency, is possible within a normative context such as the EU. The UK’s agency was 
based on the premise that the EU member states would feel bound by their previous rhetoric 
based with the EU “identity”. In essence, the UK actors – and their counterparts within the 
Commission – were utilising the EU’s norms to serve their own rational policy aims. As a 
result of the eclectic definition of HI in use here this is not a logical contradiction. Neither is it 
a case of stretching Historical Institutionalism to fit the empirical facts. It is, however, the 
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application of HI as an “approach” rather than a “theory” which aims to reflect empirical 
complexity rather than developing a theory for universal application. The ultimate conclusion 
of this section therefore is that Historical Institutionalism, as defined to allow space for 
structure and agency as well as process, has been an effective explanatory tool for these 
purposes because it has opened up temporal insights which have made the processes 
visible as well as the influences upon them. Additionally HI, as here defined, allows an 
eclectic approach and is able to account for change by incorporating agency as well as 
structure and process within itself. This could be said to be similar to the opportunity 
structures approach of McAdam et al (2001).  
Indeed others have considered similar issues and argued that change is the result of the 
interaction of structure and agency (Hay 2002). This would be an interesting approach to this 
research puzzle; however it does not take process into account in such detail as Historical 
Institutionalism and therefore could not offer such a complex and comprehensive 
explanation of the research puzzle  
4. Methodology  
As seen in Chapter Two, the methodology used here has been an attempt to identify causal 
mechanisms through process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005: 206). As such it has not 
aimed to prove anything but instead to offer evidence for a given account of events through 
detailed examination of primary and secondary sources and as such “shares some of the 
basic features of historical explanation.” (George and Bennett 2005: 208). However, process 
tracing remains a methodology of political science and perhaps produces theoretically 
informed history but it does not set out to produce a narrative per se. It is aiming for political 
science which is based on more than just correlation. It seeks to determine the causal 
mechanism for a given outcome by producing an account of the processes involved. It is 
particularly useful in explaining deviant cases of which Turkey-EU accession is one. In this 
study it has been effective in providing evidence for the explanation of why several member 
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states would act in a way which was contrary to their own self-interest by agreeing to open 
accession negotiations with Turkey in 2004. Process tracing was a suitable method for the 
research puzzle here because, by definition, it can cope with the complexity of the puzzle 
and furthermore requires such complexity to be coherent within itself. For a process tracing 
account to be coherent it is necessary to amass large amounts of empirical evidence and for 
all intervening steps to have been explained according to the approach in hand.  
However whilst the strengths of process tracing are its ability to deal with complexity within 
the realms of political “science” it is not without problems. Process tracing takes “lots of time” 
(Checkel 2005:18) and also requires “…enormous amounts of information...” (George and 
Bennett 2005, 223). This is certainly true and inevitably invokes anxiety in the researcher 
that they may not have enough information to sufficiently make their case and thus not be 
“scientific” enough. In this study this issue has been addressed by carrying out a large 
number of interviews and detailed documentary research. What actors concerned were 
saying privately and publicly on a given day has been studied on a micro level enabling a 
version of events to be pieced together which can explain the outcome on the balance of 
probability. As such it is primarily a study of the diplomacy involved and does not claim to be 
the whole story. For example an economic argument has not been addressed. Neither does 
it necessarily claim to be the only possible explanation. It is entirely possible that other 
processes and causal mechanisms were also in operation within the time frame. However it 
does claim that what is presented here is probably an accurate account.  
The interviews were conducted over a period of time (18 months) which allowed for findings 
to emerge from initial interviews and then be tested through primary and secondary sources. 
Many of the salient claims in the thesis – such as the role of the UK and Germany – have 
been multi-sourced through several interviews and media reports. In this way I have built a 
strong multi-sourced case for the explanation of rhetorical entrapment to explain the 
outcome of the Brussels December 2004 European Council . Moreover it has been possible 
to incorporate the inherent complexity of the research puzzle within the method of process 
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tracing. In so doing, and by providing evidence for the complexity involved, it is possible to 
argue that a valid within case analysis has been made which does not seek to offer general 
laws of theory applicable to other cases but which “merely” seeks to provide a strong 
argument in favour of the causal mechanism proposed. In other words, process tracing has 
been suited to this research puzzle and to the theory of Historical Institutionalism as applied 
here. It is been a very happy match of research design and methodology.  
5. Turkey-EU relations: 2004-2011 and beyond? 
As of October 2011, the European Commission has just published its latest progress report 
on Turkey which praised the progress made but outlined that there were still concerns about 
“fundamental rights” including “freedom of expression”671 within Turkey. Additionally the 
accession negotiations process with the EU has effectively stalled. Out of 33 chapters only 
13 have been opened and only one has closed. Of the remaining 12, eight are frozen and no 
more can be officially closed until Turkey has accepted the Ankara Protocol. This has been 
the situation since the European Council decision of December 2006 requiring Turkey to fully 
implement the additional Protocol to the Association Agreement. This action was taken in 
response to Turkish refusal to allow freedom of movement to sea and air traffic registered in 
Greek Cyprus or for which had Greek Cyprus as its last port of call672. Five years on, this 
issue is seriously hindering Ankara’s progress towards accession. 
The issue of Cyprus continues to adversely affect the Turkish accession process with the EU. 
Moreover, it provides a reason for those member states who remain opposed to Turkish 
accession, now including France and Germany, to oppose the Turkish case and instead 
offer ideas such as “privileged partnership”. There is a significant danger that such 
stagnation will create a self -fulfilling prophecy. If Turkish public opinion detects continuing 
hostility to Ankara’s case, support for the EU will drop further. This will make it harder for the 
AKP government to continue to pass the reforms necessary for Turkey to meet the 
                                               
671 European Commission, Turkey 2011 progress report. 12.10.11 Page 7. 
672Associated Press, December 15th 2006, EU Slows Turkey's Membership Talks. 
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Copenhagen criteria and the pace of reform will slow down. For those countries, such as 
France and Austria, who remain opposed to Turkish accession this is a positive outcome but 
for those, such as the UK, who are long standing and continuing supporters this is a 
geostrategic risk which the EU should not be taking. As the Independent Commission on 
Turkey, chaired by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, said in 2009, continuing 
failure to “manage” Turkey effectively, and to actually alienate Ankara further, would create 
tension and potential instability in the eastern Mediterranean, hinder the development of 
Berlin Plus arrangements within NATO and cut Turkey, an EU neighbour, further adrift673. 
For these reasons the Ahtisaari report suggested those EU member state leaders such as 
Nicholas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel should show some “responsibility”674 in their dealings 
with Ankara as to act in this way was not to act in the wider interests of the EU.  
However the efforts of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and his special advisor, 
Alexander Downer, to solve the Cyprus issue have not worked so far. After several months 
of talks, both sides were told in 2010 that they were in “last chance saloon” and that 
continuing failure to reach any kind of common ground would be “goodnight nurse”675 and 
yet still no agreement has been reached. An agreement on Cyprus would provide a way 
through the deadlock for Turkish EU accession but still does not look likely and the spectre 
of formal partition of Cyprus is now on the horizon.676   
The fact that the Turkish process ran into such difficulties in December 2006, only just over a 
year after accession negotiations began, merely highlights the original research puzzle 
examined in this thesis. If the process was so brittle why did the EU member states agree to 
open it at all? The lack of progress since 2004 certainly indicates that many member states 
had reservations even as they were agreeing to open accession negotiations. What this 
                                               
673 EU Observer, September 7th 2009, EU and Turkey in 'vicious circle,' experts say. 
674 Financial Times, September 7th 2009, Brussels attacked on Turkish accession. 
675 Financial Times, November 7th 2010, UN talks are 'last chance for solution' on Cyprus. 
676 The Times, November 8th 2010, No ifs or buts, Turkey must be part of the EU;  
Cyprus is just an excuse for those who cannot stomach the accession of a Muslim country. See also 
Financial Times, November 26th 2010, UN chief says window for Cyprus deal 'closing’.  
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thesis has done is to offer an explanation as to why progress was possible between 1999 
and 2004 when it was not before and has not been since. The issues which hindered 
Turkey’s case before 1999 – cultural differences, the Cyprus issue – have continued to be a 
hindrance even during the time period in hand. So why and how was progress possible? The 
answer lies in the combination of circumstances which meant that Turkey made 
unprecedented progress towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Ultimately this was 
expedited by the agency and advocacy of certain actors as already outlined. However 
because these problems of Turkey’s cultural differences and troubled relationship with both 
Greece and Greek Cyprus were not actually solved, but merely managed effectively and 
overridden at that time, they have come back to haunt the process. Turkey’s case is about to 
be overtaken by Croatia which opened accession negotiations at the same time and it 
remains to be seen whether Turkey will accede before Serbia which the Commission has 
just recommended should become a candidate677.  
There are several ironies involved here. Firstly, it could be argued that the AKP was always 
less interested in actual democratic reform and EU membership than in the benefits, of 
religious freedom, which they could bring. Therefore it is possible that it has been convenient 
for the problem of Cyprus to hinder further reforms which may have been unpopular with its 
socially conservative support in the Anatolian hinterland. Secondly, it is convenient for the 
current French and German governments to have a Cypriot reason with which to object to 
the Turkish cause rather than having to say explicitly that they, and their public opinions, are 
reluctant to admit a Muslim country. 
However there are currently significant structural changes occurring in the EU-Turkish 
accession firmament. The Greek debt crisis and the knock on effect to Greek Cyprus will 
undoubtedly reduce Greek and Cypriot bargaining power within the EU which could 
                                               
677 See European Parliament press release REF. : 20111012IPR29014, December 10th 2011, MEPs 
favour recommendation to give Serbia official EU candidate status and back new enlargement 
strategy.  
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potentially help the Turkish case. At the same time however the Eurozone crisis may distract 
attention from further enlargement and remove enthusiasm for it. Also the Turkish AKP 
government has a third mandate, following the election of July 2011, and a relatively 
unscathed economy outside of the Eurozone. This renewed confidence in its foreign and 
economic policy approach, led by the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, has led it to look to 
places other than Brussels for allegiance and may have dimmed Ankara’s enthusiasm for 
pursuing its European aspiration with the previous vigour.  
In final conclusion therefore it is my contention that the Turkish accession case took a 
significant step forward at the Helsinki European Council because of structural changes in 
the European security environment in the late 1990s which meant that the Turkish case had 
to be managed rather than ignored. The decision to offer candidacy however included 
Turkey within the EU’s institutional framework and had the unintended consequence of 
encouraging actors within Turkey to begin to instigate internal reforms towards the meeting 
of the Copenhagen criteria. This, coupled with the continuing influence of the structural 
geostrategic factors, meant the Presidency conclusions of the Copenhagen European 
Council in 2002 made more concessions to the Turkish case than they otherwise may have 
done. They once again stressed the significance of the Copenhagen criteria and put the 
Commission in the role of arbiter in the Turkish case based on an assessment of how far it 
had gone towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Implicit within this approach was the 
presumption that if Turkey had met the criteria the EU would open accession talks with 
Ankara. This offered an opportunity for those actors within the EU to act instrumentally over 
the next two years. Thus it was that after 2002 the AKP government was helped to 
implement enough reform in Turkey to secure (albeit narrowly and with difficulty) this 
outcome. Member states with residual opposition either agreed because the leader was 
convinced of the geostrategic case (Jacques Chirac) or because normative concerns had 
been mitigated (Sweden, Netherlands) and/or it was unwilling to voice cultural concerns in 
an open forum (Greek Cyprus, Austria). In this way, Turkey’s constitutional reform 
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programme “rhetorically entrapped” those member states within the EU into agreeing to 
open accession negotiations with it.  
However in spite of this rhetorical entrapment at Brussels there has since a lingering anti 
Turkish sentiment in the European public sphere. The “yes” to Turkey at Brussels was 
actually much more of a “yes…but” as the EU included caveats that Turkey’s accession 
status could be cancelled if its human rights record deteriorated (which surely went without 
saying) and also that Turkish membership could be put to a referendum in member states if 
required. Such caveats were noted by the Turks at the time and along with the requirement 
to recognise Greek Cyprus as a state have remained contentious. Many within the EU have 
continued to advocate a privileged partnership for Turkey – rather than full membership – 
including the UMP government of Nicholas Sarkozy in France and the CDU coalition 
administration of Angela Merkel in Germany678. This stance has, in turn, served to 
demotivate, or give an excuse to, the AKP to slow down constitutional reforms. 
Simultaneously Turkey’s international reputation on dealing with press freedom679 and 
Kurdish insurgency680 has deteriorated and there has been no progress in solving the on-
going stalemate over the Cyprus issue. This looks unlikely to improve in the near future or at 
least until after the Greek Cypriot term as European Council president for the second half of 
2012, is over.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
678 The Guardian, March 29th 2010, Angela Merkel's Ankara visit tense after claims of hatred towards 
Turks; The Financial Times, February 26th 2011, Sarkozy receives cool welcome in Ankara. 
679 The Economist, March 10th 2011, Turkey: A dangerous place to be a journalist 
680 The Economist, August 27th 2011, Turkey and the Kurds: Giving war a chance. 
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Senior European Commission official B – April 3rd 2009 
 
Senior European Commission official C – March 18th 2010 
 
Senior European Commission official D – August 17th 2010 
                                               
682 NB: Interviews were carried out under Chatham House rules. Some interviewees have worked in 
different places at different times. In this case they have been listed twice to protect identity. 
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European Council 
Senior official in European Council DG enlargement A – March 29th 2010 
 
Senior official in European Council DG enlargement B – March 18th 2010 
 
Senior official in European Council DG enlargement C – March 24th 2010 
 
Senior ESDP advisor A – March 9th 2010 
 
 
UK 
Senior UK politician A – March 2nd 2010 
 
Senior UK politician B – March 19th 2010 
 
Senior UK politician C – September 10th 2010 
 
Senior policy advisor UK Foreign Office – March 2nd 2010 
 
Senior FCO official A – March 2nd 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat A – March 11th 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat B – March 31st 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat C – April 12th 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat D – April 12th 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat E – May 28th 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat F – June 25th 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat G – March 23rd 2010 
 
Senior UK Diplomat H – October 13th 2010 
 
 
USA 
Senior USA State Department official – March 27th 2010 
 
 
Turkey 
Turkish NGO official A – March 24th 2010 
 
Turkish NGO official B – March 29th 2010 
 
Senior Turkish diplomat A – March 30th 2010 
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Senior Turkish Diplomat B - March 24th 2010 
 
Senior Turkish Diplomat C – March 5th 2010 
 
Senior Turkish Diplomat D – March 24th 2010 
 
Senior Turkish diplomat E - February 12th 2010 
 
 
European parliament 
MEP – March 25th 2010 
 
 
Miscellaneous 
Senior German policy advisor – 17th August 2010 
 
Brussels NGO official A – February 2nd 2010 
 
Brussels NGO official B – March 31st 2010 
 
Senior NATO official – March 23rd 2010 
 
Academic A – February 25th 2010 
 
Academic B – March 31st 2010 
 
Dutch Diplomat – March 25th 2010 
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Appendix 1 - The “Lipponen Letter”683 
 
Mr Prime Minister, 
 
Today, the European Union has set out on a new course in its relations with the Republic of 
Turkey. I am very pleased to inform you officially of our unanimous decision to confer Turkey 
the status of candidate State, on the same footing as any other candidate. 
When, in the European Union, we discussed the draft conclusions annexed to this letter, I 
said, without being challenged, that in Para. 12 of the conclusions there was no new criteria 
added to those of Copenhagen and that the reference to Para. 4 and 9a was not in relation 
to the criteria for accession but only to the political dialogue. The accession partnership will 
be drawn up on the basis of today’s Council decisions. 
In Para. 4 the date of 2004 is not a deadline for the settlement of disputes through the ICJ 
but the date at which the European Council will review the situation relating to any 
outstanding dispute. 
Regarding Cyprus, a political settlement remains the aim of the EU. Concerning the 
accession of Cyprus, all relevant factors will be taken into account when the Council takes 
the decision. 
In the light of this, I invite you with the other candidate States to our working lunch in Helsinki 
tomorrow. 
 
Paavo Lipponen. 
 
 
                                               
683 Taken from Hannay (2005: 115) 
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Appendix II – The “Who lost Turkey?” speech 
Speech/99/151 – Gunther Verheugen - at the conference “The Second Decade towards a 
New and Integrated Europe", Den Haag, 4 November 1999684. 
Prime Minister, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, 
I am very pleased and proud to speak to such a distinguished audience with so many 
familiar faces. Familiar faces, I am glad to say, from both the East and the West. The East 
and the West that are no longer separated by the Iron curtain. That curtain was symbolised 
by the Berlin Wall that fell, now almost exactly ten years ago.  
This was an emotional experience.  
We do not want to have walls in Europe anymore. Not between the countries of the West 
and the East, not inside countries, not between parts of a single city, not in a single street!  
I was told that one of the most famous photographs in the Netherlands concerning the 
second World War shows a train. A train ready for deportation. The doors are almost closed. 
We see the face of a woman in despair. That woman was recently identified. She was a 
gypsy.  
In Eastern Europe, the gypsies, the Roma people, are still numerous. Governments are 
doing what they can to combat their discrimination. This is why there should be no walls, not 
even in a single street. 
Ladies and gentlemen, The Roma problem is but one of the problems that we are facing 
when we talk about the enlargement of the European Union.  
Three weeks ago, the European Commission made some ambitious proposals for 
enlargement. Proposals that may have far-reaching consequences for the future of Europe. 
This Commission sees enlargement as one of its major political priorities.  
Not only for its mandate of 5 years, but for the whole decade to come.   
The whys and wherefores of enlargement have been set out quite often enough. I am going 
to use the word "historic" once only: this is a historic opportunity, a historic challenge and a 
historic responsibility. 
Our proposals are targeted to a number of objectives: 
− We want to strengthen the enlargement process's credibility and send a clear signal to 
the candidate countries that they are welcome. 
− We want an enlargement strategy which projects the idea of a larger Europe, while being 
realistic enough not to jeopardise what has already been achieved. 
                                               
684 Known commonly as the “Who lost Turkey” speech.  
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− We want to reconcile the conflicting demands of speed and quality by making the Union 
ready for enlargement by 2002, by extending and accelerating negotiations, and at the 
same time building in safeguards so that we will only take in countries that clearly meet all 
the accession criteria. 
− For the Commission, these proposals are also a signal about the way it sees its own role 
in driving and shaping the enlargement process, thus responding to the high expectations. 
We have put a package on the table of more than 1000 pages. I should underline that 
President Prodi took a great personal interest and provided his full support.  
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A large number of pages of this package are devoted to reports on the progress with the 
preparations for membership by the candidates. They go into great detail. Nothing has been 
glossed over or left out. These are not school reports, but a factual basis for taking political 
decisions.  
In these reports, we concentrate on preparatory measures that have been completed. From 
this, a mixed picture arises: some candidates progress well, in others the pace is sometimes 
slackening.  
A full picture would, however, have to include the great number of projects still at the political 
decision-making or implementation stage. If you look at what is in the pipeline, a more 
encouraging picture emerges. Nevertheless, one cannot escape the impression that the 
difficulties have often been underestimated and that much remains to be done.  
We must, however, bear in mind that the candidate countries have resolutely set out on what 
is going to be a long haul. The central and eastern European countries in particular, which 
are in the throes of unprecedented change, have started down the hardest road. 
The key issue of the package is a strategy paper, the "composite paper" paving the way for 
our recommendations to the Helsinki European Council.  
The questions that we are addressing are the following:  
− What strategy are we going to propose for the future enlargement negotiations? 
− With which other countries should negotiations begin? 
− Should a date be fixed for the first accessions? 
− What line should we take on transition periods? 
− What should be Turkey's future status in the enlargement process? 
− What is the enlargement process's longer-term impact on the shape of Europe? 
The strategic recommendations are based on the assumption that we need a strong political 
signal in Helsinki. This is what the Member States want too. Like us, they have learned a 
fundamental lesson from the Kosovo crisis.  
Peace and stability across Europe are not yet a matter of fact: they must be maintained in 
some areas and achieved in others. This is a situation where the Commission has chosen to 
act as initiator and guardian. It is a matter of using and enhancing political momentum. 
Enlargement is the most effective means we have of upholding our shared values across 
Europe. 
I will not pretend that enlargement to the East is completely without risk. The window of 
opportunity could easily slam shut again. All that is needed is for public opinion in the 
candidate countries to give way to frustration or public opinion in the Member States to 
decide that the risks of enlargement outweigh the opportunities. 
This imposes two courses of action: 
− First, we have to bring the candidates into line with the Union as quickly as possible. 
− Second, we must stick to the political, economic and institutional accession criteria 
defined by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993. Accession is only for those who 
are properly prepared and fully able to observe and implement the rules applying to any 
Member State. 
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We have analysed two options for continuing or opening negotiations: a defensive strategy 
and an offensive strategy.  
Having weighed up the advantages and disadvantages, we have chosen for an offensive 
strategy. 
What does this mean? 
First, we recommend maintaining our present course with the candidate countries already in 
negotiations.  
The six front runners - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus - 
are still more or less neck and neck. But gaps are likely to open up as we enter the toughest 
chapters of the negotiations. The problems that are appearing, such as for agriculture, differ 
from case to case. So this needs to be addressed. 
Secondly, the Commission proposes that negotiations should now be opened with all other 
candidate countries that meet the political criteria.  
This means opening negotiations with all other candidates with the exception of Turkey.  
The six countries of the second group - Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Malta – present a mixed picture in terms of preparations. They are not running neck and 
neck, and the negotiating strategy should reflect this fact.  
Let me be quite clear here: the Commission is proposing a change of strategy on political 
grounds. If we further subdivide the second group or put them on a back burner, we risk 
losing some countries along the way by depriving their reforms of a tangible, credible 
objective. Because the political consequences of this cannot be measured, no risk should be 
taken.  
Yet, we also have to uphold the credibility of our own criteria, the Copenhagen criteria. 
This is why we are imposing conditions in two cases: 
The opening of negotiations with Bulgaria should be subject to our obtaining, before the end 
of the year, a binding political commitment that the country will decommission, within an 
acceptable time-scale, reactor units 1 to 4 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant. These units 
cannot be modernised and present a danger like other old Soviet style reactors in Eastern 
Europe. We also need further confirmation of significant progress with economic reforms. 
In the case of Romania, the opening of negotiations should be subject to the condition that 
the government honours its pledges to improve conditions in orphanages by the end of the 
year. We also expect Romania to take appropriate macroeconomic measures. During my 
visit to Romania last week, I have been able to obtain some encouraging assurances from 
President Constantinescu and Prime Minister Vasile. 
I am confident that on this basis the European Council in Helsinki will decide on the opening 
of negotiations with the six further candidates, which could then be launched early in the 
next year. 
Opening negotiations with six candidate countries that still differ in their state of preparations 
demands that the negotiating process be clearly differentiated from the very outset. This 
clear differentiation is central to what the Commission is proposing.  
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It means introducing a series of new elements into the negotiating processes.  
For instance, negotiations on a particular area should be opened on a country-by-country 
basis, taking account of each country's state of preparation. Negotiations should proceed on 
the basis of merit, not on the basis of compassion. That is why the monitoring of the 
preparations by the candidates will be intensified. 
In practice, this approach would mean that the Union would open negotiations next year with 
all members of the second group on at least a minimum number of areas. For countries that 
are more advanced than others, the number of areas addressed could be somewhat higher, 
similar to that of last year for the first group.  
The history of the European Union has shown that setting target dates can generate a 
dynamic of its own. I only need to recall the date of 1969 set for the completion of the 
customs union among the six founding countries, the 1992 project for the completion of the 
internal market or the 1999 deadline for the start of the euro.  
The question of target dates for the next enlargement of the Union has also been posed, not 
least by the candidate countries themselves.  
This is where speed and quality need to be reconciled. The target date for the euro was so 
effective because there was no guarantee that a Member State could participate. The only 
guarantee was that others would participate. 
Although there was perhaps an exception for the country that I happen to know well… 
But the key factor was: participation was granted to those Member States that were ready, 
that fulfilled the criteria.  
After careful verification and many discussions, the Commission therefore proposes to name 
a target date for the Union to take the first decisions on accession.  
That date should be the year 2002. 
It is the date from which we have foreseen to make available financial resources for 
acceding States.  
It is also the date at which the institutional reforms required for the forthcoming enlargement 
round need to have been adopted and ratified.  
Finally, 2002 is a date by which we believe that negotiations with the most advanced 
candidates could be concluded.  
I should add, however, that the date of the decision on accessions is not the same as that of 
actual accession in view of the ratification procedures. On this basis, the objective of 
completing the first batch of accessions during the lifetime of this Commission and this 
European Parliament is perfectly feasible. 
At the same time, we should not fool ourselves. There are enormous challenges waiting for 
the candidate countries. I already referred to agriculture, but there is also the environment, 
infrastructure or social policy.  
In this context, the Union has always made it clear that, for the candidates, there can be no 
permanent derogations to the achievements that we: six, nine, ten, twelve and now fifteen 
Member States have realised over a period of more than 40 years. 
This is where the issue of transition periods arises. With transition periods it is like with 
compliments: one should not overdo them.  
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For instance, it goes without saying that any transition periods accorded to the candidate 
countries must not interfere with the working of the internal market. On the other hand, it is 
obvious, as President Prodi has also repeatedly underlined, that the Union will have to grant 
transition periods if the first accessions are to take place within the lifetime of this 
Commission.  
The Commission therefore proposes, also in this field, a differentiated approach.  
Where the single market is concerned, we should limit the number and duration of transition 
periods, subjecting them to the condition that the acceding countries move quickly to adopt 
the outstanding rules.  
In other areas, however, where considerable investment is required such as infrastructure 
and the environment, it is likely that we will have to accept longer transition periods in some 
cases. Even then, the candidate countries must give clear undertakings concerning their 
alignment on EU norms and make provision for the requisite investment. 
Let me finally say a word about Turkey.  
We all know that this country does not fulfil the political criteria laid down in Copenhagen. 
The issues are well-known: human rights, the Kurdish problem, the role of the armed forces, 
which remains enshrined in the Constitution, Cyprus and outstanding bilateral issues with 
Greece. There is some progress, for instance in the general bilateral relations with Greece, 
but not much.  
At the same time there are the geopolitical and strategic arguments that make it imperative 
to support Turkey's affiliation with Europe, bring about democratic change in Turkey, 
encourage it to change its position on Cyprus and put its relations with Greece on a sound 
footing.  
I have said in the European Parliament that, were there no history to the Union's relations  
with Turkey, we could consider a completely different strategy. We could, for example, form 
a highly developed association with Turkey, creating a model for dealings with other near 
neighbours, e.g. Russia, Ukraine or North Africa. 
History, however, precludes this option. If we deprive Turkey of the prospect of accession, 
we will be held responsible for everything that goes wrong in the country.  
Then the question might become: “who lost Turkey”? 
I think we can all agree that we want a stable, Europe-oriented Turkey. We want a Turkey 
where democracy and the rule of law comply with European standards, which protects 
human rights and minorities and enjoys relaxed relations with its neighbours. We should give 
ourselves a chance of achieving this objective. 
That is why the Commission proposes to change tack.  
Turkey should now be considered as a candidate. In any event, negotiations with Turkey 
cannot and will not be opened as long as it does not meet the political criteria, as with any 
other candidate country. 
We have proposed a number of practical steps that can be taken to build a platform for 
reforms. In this way, Turkey is no longer put aside. It will also be a test of credibility. It will 
reveal whether Turkey can deliver on the promises made in Prime Minister Ecevit's letter to 
Chancellor Schröder.  
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But I repeat: there can be no question of opening negotiations until Turkey has completed 
the reforms needed to satisfy the Copenhagen political criteria. 
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, 
We have behind us a decade of change that nobody would have dreamt of only 15 years 
ago.  
In the European Union, we moved from 10 to 15 Member States. We had three far-reaching 
changes to the Treaty of Rome. The euro emerged. We are acting on jobs, economic 
reforms, liberty, security and justice.  
Outside, we saw the end of the divisions created in Jalta and Potsdam, the failure of 
communism and centrally planned economies.  
This reminds us that we should not be shy in front of the next decade. Rather should we be 
ambitious. Ambitious in bringing the people of Europe together in peace, prosperity and 
security. I hope you can share this ambition with me.  
Thank you for your attention.  
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Appendix III - Helsinki EU Council, December 1999,  
Presidency conclusions  
 
Section 9: 
(a) The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong 
support for the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to bring the process to a successful 
conclusion. 
 (b) The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of 
Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of 
accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above 
being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors. 
 
Section 12: 
The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the 
Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards 
complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the 
Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on 
the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-
accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political 
dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession 
with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in 
paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community 
programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the 
context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of 
previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession 
preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the 
obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the 
acquis. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying 
the harmonisation of Turkey's legislation and practice with the acquis, the Commission is 
invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the acquis. The European Council 
asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European 
Union financial assistance for pre-accession. 
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Appendix IV - Copenhagen EU Council, December 2002, 
Presidency conclusions  
 
Section 18: 
The European Council recalls its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that Turkey is a candidate 
State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other 
candidate States. It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting 
the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the 
subsequent implementation measures which cover a large number of key priorities specified 
in the Accession Partnership. The Union acknowledges the determination of the new Turkish 
government to take further steps on the path of reform and urges in particular the 
government to address swiftly all remaining shortcomings in the field of the political criteria, 
not only with regard to legislation but also in particular with regard to implementation. The 
Union recalls that, according to the political criteria decided in Copenhagen in 1993, 
membership requires that a candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities. 
 
Section 19: 
The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European 
Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the 
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European 
Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. 
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Appendix V – Brussels EU Council, December 2004, 
Presidency conclusions  
 
Section 17: 
The European Council recalled its previous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, at 
Helsinki, it agreed that Turkey was a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis 
of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States and, subsequently, concluded 
that, if it were to decide at its December 2004 meeting, on the basis of a report and 
recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. 
 
Section 22: 
The European Council welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified by 
the Commission. It decided that, in the light of the above and of the Commission report and 
recommendation, Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open 
accession negotiations provided that it brings into force these specific pieces of legislation. It 
invited the Commission to present to the Council a proposal for a framework for negotiations 
with Turkey, on the basis set out in paragraph 23. It requested the Council to agree on that 
framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005. 
 
